Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of  Bearing Arms  for Self-Defense by O\u27Shea, Michael P.
American University Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 3 Article 3
2012
Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry
Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of
"Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense
Michael P. O'Shea
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
O'Shea, Michael P. (2012) "Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of "Bearing
Arms" for Self-Defense," American University Law Review: Vol. 61: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol61/iss3/3
Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial
Tradition and the Scope of "Bearing Arms" for Self-Defense
Abstract
This Article sheds light on a major constitutional question opened up by the United States Supreme Court’s
landmark decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago: Does the Second
Amendment “right to bear arms” include a right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home? Some
courts and commentators have declared that Heller held that the Second Amendment right is limited to the
home, so that restrictions on handgun carrying do not even fall within the scope of the Second Amendment.
Others assert that the potential applicability of the right to bear arms outside the home is simply a “vast terra
incognita,” devoid of guidance, into which lower courts should hesitate to venture for prudential reasons.
Keywords
Law
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol61/iss3/3
585 
MODELING THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO CARRY ARMS (I):  JUDICIAL 
TRADITION AND THE SCOPE OF “BEARING 
ARMS” FOR SELF-DEFENSE 
MICHAEL P. O’SHEA* 
 This Article sheds light on a major constitutional question opened up by the United 
States Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago:  Does the Second Amendment “right to bear arms” 
include a right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home?  Some courts and 
commentators have declared that Heller held that the Second Amendment right is 
limited to the home, so that restrictions on handgun carrying do not even fall within 
the scope of the Second Amendment.  Others assert that the potential applicability of 
the right to bear arms outside the home is simply a “vast terra incognita,” devoid of 
guidance, into which lower courts should hesitate to venture for prudential reasons. 
 These courts are mistaken about Heller and mistaken about the absence of 
guidance.  As I show, Heller and McDonald have two holdings, not just one:  they 
adopted a particular interpretation of the right to bear arms, then applied that 
understanding to the bans on handgun possession that were before them.  The right 
that Heller and McDonald recognized—the individual “right to . . . bear arms for 
the purpose of self-defense”—has a long tradition in the state courts, and that 
tradition supports a right to carry outside the home.  Post-Heller lower court decisions 
that confine the scope of the Second Amendment right to the walls of the house have 
reached those results, not by addressing and distinguishing this large and relevant 
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body of precedent, but by ignoring it. 
 The centerpiece of the Article is an analysis of the past 190 years of state court 
constitutional precedent on arms carrying.  I show that there have been two different 
traditions of the individual right to bear arms:  a defense-based right, under which 
courts construe the right to bear arms as protecting a meaningful right to carry 
handguns for self-protection, and a “hybrid” or civic-based right, under which gun 
possession is protected, but courts do not view self-defense as a central purpose of the 
right, and therefore uphold broader restrictions on weapons carrying.  I show that 
Heller and McDonald embraced the first tradition and rejected the second.  Once 
lower courts and scholars look to the correct line of precedent, they will find powerful 
arguments that the Second Amendment’s scope includes a right of individuals to carry 
handguns in public for self-defense. 
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Ab esse ad posse valet consequentia.1 
INTRODUCTION 
If the decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller2 and McDonald v. City 
of Chicago3 have established the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms as a “part of ordinary constitutional law,”4 then we 
should expect important issues of Second Amendment interpretation 
and application to become increasingly amenable to resolution using 
the tools of ordinary constitutional reasoning.  The purpose of this 
Article is to show how far that expectation can be met with respect to 
the most significant Second Amendment issue currently facing state 
                                                          
 1. “From the fact that something exists, it follows that it is possible.”  SIMON 
BLACKBURN, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 1 (2d ed. 2005). 
 2. 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, and thus invalidating, as 
unconstitutional, District of Columbia bans on handgun possession and the 
defensive use of firearms in the home). 
 3. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms is a constitutional right that is fully applicable, via the Fourteenth 
Amendment, against state and local governments). 
 4. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. 
Chicago, 26 J.L. & POL. 273, 274 (2011) (“Perhaps the most significant consequence 
of McDonald is that the Second Amendment right to arms is now part of ordinary 
constitutional law.”). 
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and lower federal courts:  whether, and to what extent, the Second 
Amendment5 right to “bear arms for the purpose of self-defense”6 
includes a right to carry handguns (and perhaps other common 
defensive weapons) outside the home.7  I will apply familiar tools of 
doctrinal and historical analysis8 to this question, and will argue that 
the Second Amendment right to bear arms should be understood to 
protect a presumptive right to carry a handgun outside the home for 
self-defense.  This right requires that most individuals be able, if they 
so choose, to obtain authority to carry a loaded defensive handgun 
legally at most times and in most places.  The right is also subject to 
some forms of regulation.  Important examples are likely to include 
the requirement of a carry permit or license (if issued on an 
objective, nondiscretionary basis), and regulations of the mode of 
carry, such as requirements that handguns must be carried openly, or 
that they must be carried concealed. 
                                                          
 5. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. II. 
 6. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026; id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 460, 467 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a former ban on loaded firearms in vehicles in 
national parks, while reserving the question of whether the Second Amendment 
right to bear arms extends outside the home), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011).  The 
Fourth Circuit noted that “there now exists a clearly-defined fundamental right to 
possess firearms for self-defense within the home.  But a considerable degree of 
uncertainty remains as to the scope of that right beyond the home and the standards 
for determining whether and how the right can be burdened by governmental 
regulation.”  Id. at 467; see also Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 
1110, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (upholding, against Second Amendment challenge, a 
California county sheriff’s refusal to treat the plaintiff’s desire to carry a handgun for 
self-defense as sufficient cause for the issuance of a concealed carry permit); 
Complaint at 8, Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. 1:09-cv-01482 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 
2009) [hereinafter Palmer Complaint] (challenging District of Columbia’s complete 
ban on carrying handguns for self-defense outside the home as a violation of the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms). 
 8. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).  Bobbitt 
famously identifies six principal “modalities” of constitutional argument:  (1) 
historical, (2) textual, (3) structural, (4) doctrinal, (5) ethical, and (6) prudential.  
My investigation is primarily doctrinal—i.e., precedent-based—in nature, insofar as it 
identifies a coherent American case law tradition expounding the individual right to 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and argues that the scope of the Second 
Amendment should be determined in conformity with this tradition because Heller 
and McDonald hold that the Second Amendment protects the same right.  See id. at 
17–18 (“[W]hen we say that a neutral, general principle derived from the caselaw 
construing the Constitution should apply [to a particular legal problem] . . . we make 
an appeal in a doctrinal mode.”).  My investigation is secondarily historical in nature, 
paying particular attention to eras that are important for determining the original 
meaning of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.  See id. at 13 (noting that 
historical approaches to interpretation “are distinctive in their reference back to 
what a particular provision is thought to have meant to its ratifiers”). 
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These conclusions are contrary to the decisions of some post-Heller 
lower courts that have rendered restrictive opinions holding that the 
Second Amendment confers no protection outside the walls of an 
individual’s home, largely because the particular laws challenged and 
struck down by the Supreme Court dealt with the possession and 
defensive use of handguns in the home.9  Other lower courts have 
hesitated even to consider whether or not the Second Amendment 
right exists outside the home; they have expressed the belief that the 
issue is “a vast terra incognita” devoid of guidance.10 
I will show that these lower courts are mistaken both about what 
Heller and McDonald held, and about the supposed absence of 
guidance for courts applying the Second Amendment to restrictions 
on defensive weapons carrying.  A complete analysis of the Second 
Amendment’s applicability to weapons carrying ought to follow the 
two-step sequence that has begun to emerge as orthodoxy in post-
Heller lower court decisions.11  First, there is the question of scope.  
Does the conduct protected by the right to bear arms extend to the 
carrying of common weapons outside the home?  That question is the 
subject of this Article.  I will show that the weight of judicial authority 
over the past two centuries has held that the existence of an 
individual constitutional right to bear arms for the purpose of self-
defense implies a right to carry a handgun outside the home.12  This 
                                                          
 9. E.g., People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (stating that 
Heller and McDonald were “specifically limited” to the right to possess a handgun in 
the home for self-defense), leave for appeal granted, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2011); 
Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011). 
 10. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475. 
 11. E.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining 
the two-step approach as (1) asking “whether the challenged law imposes a burden 
on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee,” and (2) 
applying an appropriate form of “means-end scrutiny” when step one is answered in 
the affirmative (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States 
v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958 
(2011). 
 12. See, e.g., Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 705 (Ind. 1990) (holding 
that peaceable citizens are constitutionally entitled to a handgun carry permit); State 
ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 141, 148–49 (W. Va. 1988) 
(striking down a discretionary handgun carry permit requirement); State v. Delgado, 
692 P.2d 610, 614 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (striking down a ban on possessing a 
switchblade knife in public); City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737, 738–39 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (striking down a ban on handgun carrying); State v. Rosenthal, 
55 A. 610, 611 (Vt. 1903) (striking down a handgun carry permit requirement); In re 
Brickey, 70 P. 609, 609 (Idaho 1902) (striking down a ban on carrying handguns); 
Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227 (1861) (affirming the right to openly carry a 
handgun in public); Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 402 (1859) (affirming the right 
to carry a Bowie knife in public); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) 
(holding that the Second Amendment protects the right to openly carry a handgun 
for self-defense); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (same); Bliss v. 
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type of defense-based right to bear arms is the most commonly 
recognized type in American state constitutions,13 and has been 
interpreted by a rich body of case law.  It is the same right that the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Second Amendment as guaranteeing 
in Heller and McDonald.14 
To summarize the argument that follows:   
1.  Heller and McDonald “held”—the Supreme Court’s word—that 
the Second Amendment protects the individual “right to keep and 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.”15 
2.  Over the past two centuries, American courts applying the 
individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense have 
held with near-uniformity that this right includes the carrying of 
handguns and other common defensive weapons outside the home.16  
Furthermore, the majority of these decisions have held that the right 
gives most persons the opportunity to carry a defensive handgun in 
most places and times.  The exercise of this right can be regulated, 
but not frustrated or prohibited.  I call this view of the right’s scope 
“presumptive carry.”  A minority of decisions have held that the right 
extends only to a more limited class of places and situations (such as 
on one’s private property, and elsewhere when the individual can 
demonstrate an unusual threat), but even under this view, the right 
cannot constitutionally be confined to the walls of the home.  I call 
this minority view of the right “non-presumptive carry.”  Most courts 
that took this more restricted view did so because they were applying 
a different type of right:  they denied Heller and McDonald’s premise 
that the right to bear arms is a right grounded in individual self-
                                                          
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 91–92 (1822) (affirming the right to carry both 
open and concealed weapons for self-defense).  Many of these cases are discussed 
individually in Part III infra. 
 13. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 191, 205–07 (2006) (finding that twenty-two state constitutions 
expressly include an individual right to self-defense through the keeping and bearing 
of arms, and that courts in an additional fourteen states treat the right to bear arms 
as individual self-defense). 
 14. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (Heller “held” 
that “the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense”); id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (same); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) 
(holding that the “central component” of the Second Amendment right to bear arms is 
individual self-defense); id. at 613 (discussing and rejecting the conception under 
which the right protects individual gun ownership, but is defined and limited by the 
civic purpose of resisting governmental tyranny rather than the personal purpose of 
self-defense). 
 15. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
 16. See infra Part III (pointing to both pre- and post-ratification sources on the 
right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense). 
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defense.17  Finally, the tradition contains virtually no precedential 
support for the position that a right to bear arms for self-defense is 
consistent with a complete ban on public handgun carrying—the 
position I call “no carry.” 
3.  Consistent with the tradition, many details of the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of the Second Amendment right in Heller and 
McDonald suggest that the right protects the carrying of handguns for 
self-defense outside the home, and these details suggest in particular 
that it includes presumptive carry rights. 
4.  Furthermore, experience suggests that holding the Second 
Amendment protects presumptive carry would not be practically 
disruptive.  At the level of statutory law, presumptive carry is already 
the law of the land today in a supermajority of states that represent 
fully two-thirds of the American population.  These states allow law-
abiding individuals to carry handguns for self-defense, either 
according to a permit-based carry licensing system that uses 
nondiscretionary, objective criteria for issuance (“shall-issue” 
licensing), or by omitting any requirement of a permit to carry a 
handgun. 
5.  Accordingly, the soundest interpretation of the Second 
Amendment is that its scope includes presumptive carry rights.  
Different jurisdictions may implement this right in different ways, 
such as by requiring handguns to be carried either openly or 
concealed, and/or by requiring a carry permit that is issued on a 
shall-issue basis. 
Given the force of the arguments from pre-Heller judicial tradition 
and the governing Supreme Court opinions, the refusal of some 
lower courts to recognize any application of the right to bear arms 
outside the walls of one’s house should be viewed as prima facie 
evidence that these courts are not treating the Second Amendment as 
ordinary constitutional law, contrary to Heller and McDonald.18 
The final step in analyzing Second Amendment carry rights is to 
determine what method of Second Amendment scrutiny courts 
should use to evaluate the constitutionality of gun regulations that 
affect conduct falling within the scope of the right.  I plan to 
                                                          
 17. See infra Part III.B (discussing the “hybrid” individual right view). 
 18. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3043 (“reject[ing] th[e] suggestion” that “the 
Second Amendment should be singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment” compared to the other liberties in the Bill of Rights); Heller, 554 U.S. at 
634 (rejecting “a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach” to the Second 
Amendment because that is not how the Court treats “other enumerated 
constitutional right[s],” and the Second Amendment should be treated the same).  
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undertake that task in a second article that will serve as a companion 
to this one.19 
(To preview that article’s conclusions:  a critical ingredient in 
Second Amendment scrutiny—particularly when analyzing general 
regulations, i.e. those that apply to all peaceable individuals—should 
be a functional analysis of the degree to which the regulation 
burdens the practical ability to exercise the right.20  I will argue that 
general regulations of activity within the scope of the Second 
Amendment are constitutional if they are (1) reasonable and (2) do 
not frustrate the right in practice by imposing a substantial burden 
on its exercise.  This entails an inquiry similar to intermediate 
scrutiny, but places particular weight on the requirement that 
regulation must leave open ample alternative channels by which the 
right can be effectively exercised.) 
The present Article deals with scope.  Part I supplies a useful 
vocabulary for the discussion by distinguishing three different 
conceptions of the relationship between self-defense and the right to 
carry arms; these are the three competing “models” of the right 
alluded to in the Article’s title.  Part II examines what Heller and 
McDonald suggest about which model best fits the scope of Second 
Amendment carry rights.  Part III conducts a detailed review of the 
long history of litigation in state courts over the carrying of weapons.  
This Part shows that courts applying a defense-based, individual right 
to bear arms have regularly held that it includes a right to carry 
weapons outside the home.  This right was particularly well-protected 
in the period between the ratification of the Second Amendment in 
1791 and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, 
which Heller and McDonald teach is a critical period for originalist 
inquiry into the right to keep and bear arms.  Finally, Part IV 
concludes by identifying important lessons that the Article’s analysis 
implies for legal scholars, historians, and courts today. 
I. A TAXONOMY OF CARRY RIGHTS 
There are many local variations in contemporary handgun carry 
laws.  Some concern minor matters of detail, while others reflect 
serious differences of scope.  The states differ in whether a permit is 
                                                          
 19. Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right to Carry Arms (II):  The 
Case for Burden-Based Scrutiny (draft). 
 20. See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2011) (adopting a 
burden-based approach to Second Amendment scrutiny), reh’g en banc granted, 664 
F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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required to carry a defensive handgun outside the home;21 whether a 
permit is available on a shall-issue basis to all citizens who do not fall 
within a limited set of specific exclusions, or is instead vested in the 
discretion of state or local officials;22 which places are off-limits for 
legal handgun carry;23 and the foundational question of whether 
carrying weapons in public is legal at all.24  Judicial interpretations of 
state and federal constitutional right-to-arms provisions throughout 
American history have displayed a similar diversity.  Different 
constitutional provisions securing a right to keep and/or to bear 
arms have been interpreted to protect relatively broad handgun carry 
rights; relatively narrow, situationally limited carry rights; or no carry 
rights at all. 
The apparent profusion of different standards and regulations is 
more tractable than it may first appear.  We can clarify the issue by 
grouping the different legal regimes into three basic models for 
purpose of analysis.  The essential question raised by the post-Heller 
handgun carry litigation is whether the Second Amendment protects 
what I will call presumptive carry rights, non-presumptive carry rights, or 
no carry rights. 
These three conceptions differ chiefly in the relationship they 
envision between the scope of the right to carry one’s arms for self-
defense and the scope of the right to actually employ arms in the use 
of force in self-defense.  The latter, of course, is typically governed by 
the narrow limitations imposed by the doctrine of justification in 
criminal law:  the defender must have a reasonable basis for believing 
                                                          
 21. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3102, 13-3112 (2011) (allowing open or 
concealed carry of handguns without a permit, but also making available an optional 
permit), with MINN. STAT. § 624.714 (2011) (requiring a state-issued permit to 
lawfully carry a gun). 
 22. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425b(7) (West 2009) (stating that 
county concealed weapons licensing boards “shall issue” a carry permit to all 
applicants who meet stated requirements), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131 
(2007) (granting local officials broad discretion to issue permits only to individuals 
they deem “suitable”). 
 23. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c10(a)(16) (West 2011) (prohibiting carry in 
places of worship), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.3 (2009) (prohibiting permit 
holders from carrying firearms in any establishment where alcoholic beverages are 
sold and consumed), with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1272.1, 1277 (2011) (designating 
neither restaurants nor churches as a prohibited place for permit holders, though 
elementary schools and bars are prohibited). 
 24. While nearly all American jurisdictions authorize private individuals to carry 
handguns in public in at least some limited circumstances—and the majority are 
“shall-issue” jurisdictions where most individuals can obtain a permit to carry at most 
places and times—two jurisdictions, Illinois and the District of Columbia, are 
outliers.  See infra Part I.D.2 (discussing the laws of the two “no carry” jurisdictions). 
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that an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm exists.25  
Otherwise, the use of force is unlawful.  The proper understanding of 
this relationship is that the two rights, while functionally related, 
should nevertheless differ sharply in their respective scopes.26  
Relatively broad rights to carry defensive weapons are appropriate 
because they are necessary to give the defender a genuine chance of 
having arms available when needed for immediate self-defense.  
However, some constitutional and statutory sources tend to conflate 
the two rights, as though the authority to have a piece of equipment 
available to confront an unplanned emergency should exist only 
during the emergency that authorizes actually using the equipment.  
Such conflation makes it unlikely that the equipment will be available 
when it is needed, and thus defeats the purpose of the right. 
A. Self-Defense as a Justification of the Use of Force 
In general, the justification of self-defense authorizes the otherwise-
criminal use of force when “[o]ne who is not the aggressor in an 
encounter . . . reasonably believes (a) that he is in immediate danger 
of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary and (b) that the use of 
such force is necessary to avoid this danger.”27  The use of deadly force 
(such as a firearm) in self-defense is ordinarily justified only if one 
reasonably believes that the other is about to inflict unlawful death or 
serious bodily harm, and that it is necessary to use deadly force to 
prevent it.28 
This traditional expression of self-defense law has been qualified by 
so-called “Castle Doctrine” statutes enacted in numerous states in the 
past two decades.  These statutes create a presumption that lethal 
force is authorized against an unlawful intruder in one’s home or, in 
many such laws, one’s vehicle or place of business.29  Related statutes, 
                                                          
 25. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4, at 142 (2d ed. 
2003) (explaining that a defender is justified in using “a reasonable amount of force” 
against an assailant when he reasonably believes that he is “in immediate danger of 
unlawful bodily harm”). 
 26. Cf. Use of Deadly Force for Lawful Self-Defense, FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & CONSUMER 
SERVS., DIV. OF LICENSING, http://licgweb.doacs.state.fl.us/weapons/self_defense. 
html (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (“In receiving a license to carry a concealed weapon 
for lawful self-defense, you are undertaking a great responsibility.  A license to carry a 
concealed weapon is not a license to use it.”). 
 27. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 10.4, at 142. 
 28. See id. § 10.4(b), at 145 (distinguishing between the use of nondeadly force 
for self-defense, which may be used whenever one reasonably believes another is 
about to inflict unlawful bodily harm upon him, and deadly force, which may 
generally be used only in apprehension of unlawful death or serious bodily harm). 
 29. See Jason Stein & Bruce Vielmetti, Assembly to Take Up ‘Castle Doctrine’ Bill, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/ 
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often called “Stand Your Ground” laws, abolish the requirement that 
a defender retreat, if possible, before using defensive force in a 
public place.30 
Presumptive carry names statutory and constitutional regimes that 
recognize an ability of most persons to carry defensive firearms at 
most times and places, thereby rendering it realistically likely that 
they will be able to use firearms in case of a sudden, serious defensive 
confrontation.  Non-presumptive carry names regimes that partially 
conflate the right to carry defensive arms with the right to employ 
defensive force:  it only protects weapons carrying when a special 
circumstance exists showing a heightened likelihood that a particular 
individual will need to employ defensive arms; otherwise, carry is 
generally unprotected.  It is also fairly common for non-presumptive 
carry regimes to include geographic limitations, protecting broader 
carry rights in a limited set of locations such as one one’s own land or 
business property.  Finally, no carry regimes completely conflate the 
two rights:  under these regimes, individuals cannot lawfully possess 
weapons for their defense outside the home at all, except, perhaps, if 
such conduct literally falls within the slender confines of a necessity 
defense to criminal liability. 
B. Presumptive Carry 
A legal provision, whether constitutional or statutory, recognizes 
presumptive carry rights when it gives most individuals the 
opportunity, if they so choose, to carry defensive weapons in most 
places and times.  Under this conception, the individual is not 
confined to carrying in only special or unusual situations (such as 
when she can document a particularized threat to her life), nor is the 
individual subject to still sharper restrictions that would prevent 
carrying a weapon except when immediately confronted with a violent 
assailant.  Such laws recognize that the assailant, not the defender, 
                                                          
assembly-to-take-up-castle-doctrine-bill-132936283.html (describing pending 
Wisconsin legislation that would protect people who shoot intruders in their homes, 
vehicles, and businesses). 
 30. LAFAVE, supra note 25, § 10.4(f), at 155–57; see Christine Catalfamo, Stand 
Your Ground:  Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 504, 504 (2007) (describing Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law as abrogating 
the duty to retreat before using deadly force); J.P. Neyland, Note, A Man’s Car Is His 
Castle:  The Expansion of Texas’ “Castle Doctrine” Eliminating the Duty to Retreat in Areas 
Outside the Home, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 719, 721–23, 729–33 (2008) (explaining that 
Texas has statutorily abolished the “duty to retreat” when (1) the defendant was 
rightfully in the location where deadly force was used; (2) the defendant did not 
provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and (3) the defendant was 
not engaged in criminal activity at the time deadly force was used). 
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chooses the time and place of an unlawful attack; thus, recognizing 
presumptive carry rights gives individuals a reasonable chance to 
ensure that they will actually have arms for self-defense in a crisis. 
Despite its relative breadth, the presumptive carry rights 
conception is usually understood to be consistent with a degree of 
regulation.  A common form of regulation requires those who carry 
arms to use one of two main modes:  either open carry, such as in an 
exposed belt holster, or concealed carry, under the wearer’s outer 
clothing.  Both possibilities have been reflected in recent American 
law.31  Other states allow handguns to be either open or concealed, at 
the wearer’s discretion.32  In previous generations, “open carry” was a 
common requirement for lawfully carrying weapons in many 
American jurisdictions.33 
The requirement of a carry permit is also ordinarily consistent with 
presumptive carry, as long as the permit issuance scheme is shall-issue 
in nature and does not impose unreasonable requirements such as 
high fees, onerous training requirements, or the like.  Analogously, 
the requirement of a driver’s license to operate a motor vehicle in 
public is not the kind of regulatory obstacle that prohibits most adults 
from being able, if they so choose, to drive most places at most times.  
Despite the driver’s license requirement, it is not unreasonable to 
describe America as a “presumptive driving” jurisdiction at the level 
of statutory law. 
As I will use the term here, then, presumptive carry is consistent 
with the limited regulations just described.  Not all jurisdictions 
impose these restrictions.  But they are common, even in pro-gun 
jurisdictions, and some of them have a long historical pedigree.  
Under these regulations, most people can still obtain the ability to 
carry a defensive handgun in most places and times, if they so choose. 
1. Constitutional law 
Most decisions that, like Heller and McDonald, treat self-defense as a 
                                                          
 31. E.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.035(a) (West 2011) (requiring concealed 
carry, by prohibiting a permit holder’s intentional failure to conceal a handgun).  
Conversely, until November 1, 2011, Wisconsin lacked a concealed carry permitting 
law and the only way to carry a handgun legally was to carry openly.  Compare WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 941.23 (West 2005) (“Any person except a peace officer who goes 
armed with a concealed and dangerous weapon is guilty of a . . . misdemeanor.”), 
with WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.23(2)(d) (West 2011) (allowing “licensees” to lawfully 
carry a concealed weapon). 
 32. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1351 (2010) (authorizing issuance of 
“handgun carry permit” allowing open and concealed carry). 
 33. See infra Part III. 
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central purpose of the constitutional right to bear arms have 
interpreted it to include a presumptive right to carry personal 
weapons outside the home.34  I will survey the state courts’ decision-
making in this area in Part III of this Article.  For now, it is sufficient 
to offer a few examples of constitutional decisions recognizing 
presumptive carry. 
On rare occasions, courts have recognized an absolute right to 
carry arms, allowing little or no scope for regulation.  The first 
American right to arms case, an 1822 Kentucky decision,35 took this 
position.  In the court’s view, the right to bear arms provision then 
found in the Kentucky Constitution36 established a categorical right to 
carry one’s weapons in any manner, whether concealed or open:   
[T]o be in conflict with the constitution, it is not essential that the 
act should contain a prohibition against bearing arms in every 
possible form—it is the right to bear arms in defense of the citizens 
and the state, that is secured by the constitution, and whatever 
restrains the full and complete exercise of that right, though not an 
entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the 
constitution.37 
Scholars of the period have accurately described this absolute 
approach as “the road not taken,”38 and it has remained unusual in 
American jurisprudence. 
Much more common are constitutional decisions recognizing a 
general right to carry defensive arms while allowing some regulation, 
such as prohibiting concealed carry while allowing open carry.  These 
too are presumptive carry decisions:  they allow for the carrying of 
defensive weapons in most places and times, in a manner that is 
effective for self-defense.  For example, a nineteenth-century Georgia 
Supreme Court decision struck down, as a violation of the Second 
Amendment, a ban on carrying pistols openly, while upholding a ban 
on concealed carry.39  In the same vein, an early twentieth-century 
                                                          
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822). 
 36. KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 23 (“[T]he rights of the citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”). 
 37. Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) at 91–92 (emphasis added). 
 38. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to Be Applied to the 
White Population”:  Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed South’s Legacy 
to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1321 (1995). 
 39. See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (“[S]o far as the act . . . seeks to 
suppress the practice of carrying certain weapons secretly, . . . it is valid, inasmuch as 
it does not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  But . . . so much of it, as contains a 
prohibition against bearing arms openly, is in conflict with the Constitution, and void 
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decision of the Idaho Supreme Court struck down a ban on carrying 
loaded handguns in cities and towns as a violation of the Second 
Amendment and the state constitution.40  The court held that the 
legislature could lawfully regulate the manner of carry, such as by 
prohibiting concealed weapons, but it “ha[d] no power to prohibit a 
citizen from bearing arms in any portion of the state,” whether inside 
or outside of a city or a town41—a strong expression of presumptive 
carry rights.  In the latter twentieth century, a series of Oregon 
decisions concluded that the state constitution’s right to bear arms42 
protects “handcarried weapons commonly used for defense.”43  In 
subsequent cases, the Oregon courts concluded that the provision 
protects the carrying of common weapons outside the home,44 
although the legislature can regulate the exercise of the right by 
mandating a particular method of carrying.45 
2. Statutory law 
At the level of statutory law, presumptive carry is the supermajority 
rule in America, whether measured by number of jurisdictions or by 
population.  Beginning with the adoption of shall-issue permit-based 
concealed carry46 in Florida in 1987,47 and continuing up to the 
adoption of shall-issue carry in Iowa and Wisconsin in 2011,48 a steady 
                                                          
. . . .”), quoted in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612 (2008). 
 40. In re Brickey, 70 P. 609, 609 (Idaho 1902). 
 41. Id. 
 42. OR. CONST. art. I, § 27 (“The people shall have the right to bear arms for the 
defence of themselves, and the State . . . .”). 
 43. State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980). 
 44. See State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 614 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (holding that 
the right to bear arms protects public possession of a switchblade knife); State v. 
Blocker, 630 P.2d 824, 826 (Or. 1981) (holding that the right to bear arms protects 
public possession of a billy club). 
 45. See State v. Smoot, 775 P.2d 344, 345 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“A person may 
possess and carry a switchblade so long as it is not concealed.”). 
 46. “Shall-issue” handgun carry permitting statutes, which were enacted by 
dozens of states beginning in the 1980s, “enable persons who are legally allowed to 
possess a handgun in their own home to be eligible for a license to carry a concealed 
handgun for protection.  The laws require that after passing a background check 
(and sometimes a firearms safety class), eligible persons must be granted the permit 
if they apply.”  Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”:  The New Wave of 
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1995).  Individuals may be 
disqualified from a permit only for specifically enumerated reasons, such as a 
significant criminal record, insanity, drug addiction, or the like.  Nicholas J. Johnson, 
A Second Amendment Moment:  The Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 715, 748 (2005). 
 47. See generally Richard Getchell, Comment, Carrying Concealed Weapons in Self-
Defense:  Florida Adopts Uniform Regulations for the Issuance of Concealed Weapons Permits, 
15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 751 (1987). 
 48. Traditionally, Iowa maintained a “may-issue” handgun carry permitting 
statute, vesting county sheriffs with wide discretion over permit issuance.  On April 
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wave of adoptions has brought the total number of states with 
presumptive carry laws to a minimum of thirty-nine.  Thirty-five states 
make available shall-issue handgun carry permits.49  Four more states 
dispense with a permit requirement—any adult who is legally entitled 
to own a handgun may carry it for self-defense without needing a 
state-issued permit.50  Arguably, one more state could be included 
because it does not authorize concealed carry on a shall-issue or 
permit-free basis, but does authorize open carrying of handguns in 
many situations.51  But even leaving the last state out, the undisputed 
                                                          
29, 2010, Iowa Governor Chet Culver signed into law new legislation creating a 
uniform “shall-issue” permit system for all counties.  The law took effect on January 
1, 2011.  Rod Boshart, Culver Signs Gun Permit Legislation, QUAD CITY TIMES, Apr. 29, 
2010, http://qctimes.com/news/local/article_58dbd018-53a4-11df-934a-001cc4c002 
e0.html.  Iowa had previously maintained a “may-issue” system of permit issuance 
that left local sheriffs with substantial discretion to issue or deny permits to particular 
applicants, although many sheriffs administered the statute, in practice, in a manner 
similar to a “shall-issue” system.  See Johnson, supra note 46, at 748 n.186 (discussing 
Iowa’s pre-2011 licensing system). 
 Wisconsin allowed open carry, but not concealed carry, prior to adopting a 
“shall-issue” permit-based concealed carry law in 2011.  John Rondy, Wisconsin 
Governor Signs Law on Concealed Carry of Guns, REUTERS, July 8, 2011, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/08/us-guns-wisconsin-
idUSTRE7676T620110708. 
 49. The shall-issue states currently are Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See Johnson, supra note 46, at 748; Right-to-Carry 2010, NRA-
ILA (Apr. 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/articles/2010/right-
to-carry-2010.aspx.  Since Johnson’s analysis in 2005, Kansas (2006), Nebraska 
(2006), Iowa (2010), and Wisconsin (2011) joined the ranks of “shall-issue” states, 
while Arizona and Wyoming abandoned the requirement of a permit to carry a 
concealed handgun.  See infra note 50. 
 50. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Vermont, and Wyoming.  See ALASKA STAT. § 
11.61.220(a) (2003) (allowing concealed carry of a deadly weapon, without permit, 
as long as carrier notifies law enforcement officers during police contact); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 13-3102 (2011) (same).  Vermont has not required a permit to carry a 
concealed handgun since the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in State v. 
Rosenthal, 55 A. 610 (Vt. 1903), holding that such a permit requirement violated the 
state constitution’s right to bear arms, id. at 611.  Wyoming has long allowed 
permitless open carry, and recently enacted legislation authorizes concealed carry 
without a permit.  Wyoming Governor Signs Concealed Gun Bill, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Mar. 
2, 2011, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article_ 
a70b73fc-452e-11e0-9751-001cc4c03286.html. 
 51. The “arguable” state is Alabama.  Many authorities indicate that the open 
carry of a handgun is generally lawful in Alabama, without the requirement of a 
permit.  See C.D.J. v. State, 671 So.2d 139, 141–42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (examining 
precedent and concluding that a person may carry an unlicensed pistol if the pistol is 
carried openly and the person is on foot); Ala. Att’y Gen. Op. 2007-054, at 8–9 (Mar. 
6, 2007) (citing Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-73, -75 (2006)) (concluding that county animal 
control officers who are not commissioned law enforcement officers may lawfully 
carry handguns if they “follow the same procedures as are required of other citizens”; 
accordingly, an animal control officer who is not “traveling in a vehicle . . . may carry 
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presumptive carry states represent more than three-fourths of the 
states, and fully two-thirds of the United States by population.52 
Some readers might argue that the requirement to obtain a state-
issued permit before carrying a defensive handgun makes it inapt to 
call that legal regime “presumptive carry,” since an individual is not 
able to carry without a permit.  They may argue that only states that 
dispense with the permit requirement for carrying should qualify.  
There is a political movement in several states to repeal carry permit 
requirements and allow all individuals who may lawfully own a 
handgun to carry it for self-defense.53  Proponents tend to refer to 
such laws as “constitutional carry” laws, and they have enjoyed some 
success in recent years.  Of the four states that currently authorize 
citizens to carry handguns without a permit, both openly and 
concealed, three enacted such laws within the past decade.54 
                                                          
an unlicensed and unconcealed pistol in all places except where there are specific 
restrictions regarding the carrying of a firearm, i.e., airline passenger planes, sports 
stadiums, private property”).  However, there remains uncertainty about the 
practicability of open carry in some parts of the state.  The Alabama code retains an 
older statutory section, Ala. Code § 13A-11-52, which broadly prohibits any private 
person from “carry[ing] a pistol about his person on premises not his own,” but with 
the disclaimer “except as otherwise provided in this article.”  This provision is viewed 
as largely superseded by later provisions that do not prohibit open carry, see K.J. v. 
State, 690 So.2d 541, 544–45 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), but the matter is not one of 
crystalline clarity.  Alabama also makes available concealed carry permits issued on a 
discretionary, “may-issue” basis by local sheriffs.  ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75(a) (2010).  
Such a permit is necessary in order to carry a handgun lawfully in a vehicle.  
Permitless open carry is lawful only on foot.  Id. § 13A-11-73.  In practice, most 
Alabama sheriffs administer this “may-issue” permit law similarly to a shall-issue law.  
See Johnson, supra note 46, at 748 nn.184, 186. 
 The ability to open carry for self-defense, without a permit, is one way a 
jurisdiction can satisfy the right to presumptive carry, as long as the restrictions on 
carrying do not rise to a level where they practically frustrate the exercise of the 
right. 
 52. The thirty-nine states listed in notes 49 and 50 have an estimated total 
population, according to the 2010 Census, of 205,903,415.  Adding Alabama, the 
“arguable” state discussed in the preceding note, would bring the total population of 
presumptive carry states to 210,683,151.  The population of the United States in 2010 
was 308,745,538.  See Guide to State and Local Geography—Selected Data from the 2010 
Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/geo/www/guidestloc/ 
select_data.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).  Thus, by the more conservative 
definition, 66.7% of Americans now live in jurisdictions where presumptive carry is 
the law.  Id.  Using the slightly broader definition that includes Alabama, that figure 
is 68.2%.  Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Mark Stollenwerk, Georgia Legislator Introduces Bill to Repeal Permit 
Requirement to Open Carry Handguns!, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 2, 2009), 
http://www.examiner.com/gun-rights-in-washington-dc/georgia-legislator-
introduces-bill-to-repeal-permit-requirement-to-open-carry-handguns (describing a 
legislative push to repeal carry permit requirement in Georgia). 
 54. See supra note 50; James Heiser, Wyoming Adopts “Constitutional Carry” of 
Firearms, THE NEW AMERICAN (Mar. 4, 2011, 9:18 AM), http://www.thenewamerican. 
com/usnews/constitution/6559-wyoming-adopts-constitutional-carry-of-firearms 
(detailing the Wyoming legislature’s repeal of carry permit requirements in the 
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Nevertheless, I classify shall-issue carry permitting statutes as a form 
of presumptive carry because shall-issue carry still allows most 
individuals the ability to carry for self-defense.  The difference 
between a jurisdiction where “a law-abiding, competent adult has a 
clear path to a concealed carry permit,”55 and one where most 
individuals do not have any such path available—as in jurisdictions 
such as California or Maryland, which recognize only what I term 
non-presumptive carry rights—is much more significant in practice 
than the difference between the thirty-four states that authorize shall-
issue permit-based carry and the four that have adopted permit-free 
carry.56 
C. Non-Presumptive Carry 
Some statutes, and some constitutional right-to-arms guarantees, 
have been interpreted to secure non-presumptive carry rights:  they 
recognize a right to carry arms, but one that only applies under 
substantially limited circumstances, or is subject to special situational 
requirements, such as a specifically identifiable threat. 
1. Constitutional law 
Some American courts have interpreted constitutional right-to-
arms provisions as securing a right to carry a handgun, but have given 
that right a limited scope that falls short of presumptive carry.  Under 
this interpretation, the right to bear arms protects a right to non-
presumptive carry.  The right applies only under substantially limited 
circumstances, or in a limited set of places, or attaches only in special 
situations such as an identifiable and imminent threat of bodily 
harm.57  Thus, in this view, a complete prohibition on the carrying of 
handguns is unconstitutional, but most individuals can 
                                                          
state). 
 55. David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 99, 126. 
 56. I do not wish to dismiss the policy differences between shall-issue carry and 
“constitutional carry”; real debate is possible about whether even objective licensing 
of defensive arms carrying accords best with constitutional values.  Nevertheless, as I 
will argue in detail in Part III infra, the case law discloses a long tradition of 
upholding some regulation of the right to carry arms, and the shall-issue permit 
requirement reflects an extremely common and popular way of regulating, without 
frustrating, the exercise of the right today.  The question whether the Second 
Amendment protects even a presumptive-but-regulable right of the sort consistent 
with permit requirements is actively controverted today.  Despite the name, 
arguments for a constitutional entitlement to “constitutional carry” have a way to go 
before they arrive at ripeness. 
 57. See infra note 60 (citing the Texas constitution’s self-defense provision). 
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constitutionally be prohibited from carrying in most circumstances. 
For example, a late nineteenth-century Texas Supreme Court 
decision upheld a statute that prohibited private citizens from 
carrying a handgun off their own property, with an exception for any 
person who had “reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful attack 
on his person, and . . . such ground of attack shall be immediate and 
pressing.”58  The court construed that exception as applying to “any 
one having reasonable grounds to fear an attack.”59  It held that the 
statute did not violate the Texas right-to-arms provision60 because, by 
including the exception for those who had reasonable grounds to 
fear an attack, the legislature had adequately “respected the right to 
carry a pistol openly when needed for self-defense.”61  This is not a 
complete negation of carry rights; but neither is it a conception 
broad enough to allow a typical citizen to have defensive firearms 
available while carrying out ordinary activities.  Rather, this view 
envisions that special factual circumstances must exist for the right-to-
arms provision to apply—here, facts showing that an individual is 
either in a special location, such as on his own land, or subject to a 
specific threat of unlawful attack.  Such a conception partially 
conflates the right to carry defensive firearms with the right to use 
them.  It conditions the exercise of the right on a somewhat relaxed 
version of the imminence requirement of the law of self-defense in 
the actual use of force.  Some courts adjudicating post-Heller carry 
rights cases have upheld similar contemporary statutes against 
Second Amendment challenge, noting that such “pressing self-
defense” exceptions are potentially relevant to the constitutionality of 
carry bans.62 
This interpretation was most common in Southern states during 
the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction eras.63  However, it has 
                                                          
 58. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 456 (1875).  The statute also allowed travelers to 
carry handguns in their baggage.  Id. at 456–57. 
 59. Id. at 460. 
 60. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep 
and bear arms, in the lawful defence of himself or the State, under such regulations 
as the Legislature may prescribe.”). 
 61. Duke, 42 Tex. at 459. 
 62. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1114–15 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (upholding California statute that generally bans carry of loaded handguns 
except with a permit issued at the discretion of local officials; concluding that any 
burden on conduct potentially protected by the Second Amendment “is mitigated by 
[other] provisions . . . that expressly permit loaded open carry for immediate self-
defense,” and when the carrier is protected by a judicial restraining order). 
 63. See, e.g., State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 226 (N.C. 1921) (Allen, J., concurring) 
(concluding that a restrictive municipal handgun permit requirement violated the 
federal and North Carolina constitutional rights to bear arms because it included 
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been uncommon in jurisdictions where individual self-defense was 
understood to be an important component of the constitutional right 
to bear arms.  Instead, as I will discuss in Part III, most decisions 
adopting the non-presumptive carry approach did so because they 
did not believe the right-to-arms provision at issue was importantly 
concerned with individual self-defense64—unlike the Second 
Amendment right recognized by Heller. 
Finally, in a few cases, constitutional right-to-arms provisions have 
been interpreted to protect the ability to carry a handgun, but not to 
carry a loaded handgun that could be readily used to defend against a 
sudden assault.65  Because allowing such restrictions severely impairs 
the ability to use the handgun for self-defense,66 an interpretation of 
constitutional rights that countenances this kind of restriction 
likewise cannot be described as recognizing a presumptive right to 
carry. 
2. Statutory law 
States with permit systems that are not shall-issue are commonly 
grouped as “may-issue” or “capricious-issue.”67  However, a distinction 
should be made between states that give officials unguided discretion 
over permit issue and states that articulate standards for permit 
issuance that are objective in nature but too strict to be met by 
average individuals in typical circumstances.  Statutes of the second, 
more principled variety, which provide for the issuance of permits to 
individuals who can demonstrate a special threat to their life or 
                                                          
“[n]o provision . . . for an emergency, and no exception in favor of one who carries a 
pistol off his premises openly, in the necessary defense of his person or property, 
when he has had no opportunity to secure a permit”); State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9, 
10–11 (W. Va. 1891) (holding that a state statute forbidding the carrying of a loaded 
handgun unless the defendant could show that he was “a quiet and peaceable citizen, 
of good character and standing in the community” and “had good cause to believe . . 
. that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of another person” 
did not violate Second Amendment right to bear arms). 
 64. E.g., Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566 (1882) (“The [state] constitutional 
provision sprung from the former tyrannical practice, on the part of governments, of 
disarming the subjects, so as to render them powerless against oppression.  It is not 
intended to afford citizens the means of prosecuting, more successfully, their private 
broils in a free government. . . .  The ‘common defense’ of the citizen does not 
require that.”). 
 65. Peruta, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1114–15; State v. Boyce, 658 P.2d 577, 579 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1983); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 475–76 (1874). 
 66. See O’Shea, supra note 19 (analyzing this type of restriction). 
 67. Cf. David Kopel, Nebraska is 40th State to Enact Shall Issue Licenses for Defensive 
Handgun Carrying, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 1, 2006, 12:35 AM), 
http://volokh.com/posts/1143873304.shtml (describing all states that issue permits, 
but are not “shall issue,” as “Capricious Issue”). 
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person, correspond to the non-presumptive carry model of 
constitutional right.  Such statutes recognize a genuine entitlement 
to carry in some circumstances, but are far more limited in scope and 
availability than shall-issue or permitless carry statutes. 
An example of a non-presumptive carry statute is Maryland’s 
current carry permit law, which requires the Secretary of State Police 
to issue a handgun permit to an individual who can demonstrate a 
“good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, 
such as a finding that the permit is necessary as a reasonable 
precaution against apprehended danger.”68  Moreover, a rejected 
permit applicant can appeal to the state’s Handgun Permit Review 
Board for formal administrative review of the Secretary’s decision, 
and the Review Board’s decisions are subject to judicial review in the 
state’s courts pursuant to the Maryland Administrative Procedure 
Act.69  In short, issuance of authority to carry is not left to the 
unguided discretion of the executive, but instead is directed by some 
objective guideposts.  However, individuals are presumed unable to 
obtain the right to carry for self-defense; the statute requires an 
objective demonstration of an unusual level of threat or danger in 
order to overcome the presumption.70 
D. No Carry  
No carry rights mean that ordinary individuals cannot lawfully carry 
handguns outside their homes—even under the limited 
circumstances typically allowed under a regime of non-presumptive 
carry rights. 
1. Constitutional law 
On rare occasions in the nineteenth century,71 then with more 
frequency in the twentieth century,72 state and lower federal court 
decisions interpreted the Second Amendment, or state constitutional 
                                                          
 68. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 69. Id. § 5-312. 
 70. Snowden v. Handgun Permit Review Bd., 413 A.2d 295, 298 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1980) (establishing an objective test to determine if requisite showing of danger 
is met, instead of relying on applicant’s assertions of subjective fear). 
 71. State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 28 (1842). 
 72. E.g., United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
the Second Amendment does not protect handgun carrying unless it is closely 
connected to participation in an organized militia); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 
103, 106–07 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding the Second Amendment protects only 
collective, not individual, rights); Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 850 
(Mass. 1976) (same with respect to both Second Amendment and state constitution); 
City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905) (same). 
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right-to-arms provisions, to provide no protection to the individual 
carrying of common weapons for self-defense.  The most prominent 
example of this approach was the lower federal courts’ interpretation 
of the Second Amendment following the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Miller,73 although the cryptic Miller opinion 
did not require such a reading.74 
Nearly all these no carry constitutional decisions, however, rejected 
the key interpretive step taken by the Supreme Court in Heller:  they 
rejected carry rights because they concluded that the right to keep 
and bear arms was not concerned with individual self-defense.  
Indeed, in many cases, these courts reasoned that the constitutional 
right to arms did not protect an individual right at all.75  Heller, of 
course, rejected both of these premises.76 
In the 217 years between the ratification of the Second 
Amendment and the decision in Heller, cases where a court examined 
a right to bear arms grounded in self-defense, and yet interpreted 
that right to extend no protection outside the home, are vanishingly 
rare.  One 1929 Oklahoma case upheld a ban on carrying handguns 
outside the doors of the home77 but did so on the basis of an earlier 
(and dubious) decision holding that handguns fell outside of the 
scope of the right to bear arms altogether.78 
                                                          
 73. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of 
National Firearms Act’s registration and taxation requirements, as applied to 
defendants’ possession and transportation of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun). 
 74. See Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 352–62 (2009) (describing Miller as “opaque and 
open-ended” and identifying three different possible interpretations of Miller’s 
instruction to keep the amendment’s militia purpose in view); see also Brannon P. 
Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?:  Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. 
Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 971–72 (1996) (suggesting a 
similar division of post-Miller interpretations). 
 75. See, e.g., Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 22 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.) (asserting that the right 
to bear arms does not authorize the individual to “protect and defend by individual 
force his private rights against . . . illegal invasion”); id. at 32 (opinion of Dickinson, 
J.) (contending that the Second Amendment does not protect “personal rights”; 
instead, it “is but an assertion of that general right of sovereignty belonging to 
independent nations, to regulate their military force”). 
 76. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 599 (2008). 
 77. Pierce v. State, 275 P. 393, 395–96 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929). 
 78. Id. at 394 (citing Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 260 (Okla. 1908)); cf. OKLA. CONST. 
art. II, § 26 (protecting “[t]he right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of 
his home, person, or property,” while allowing the legislature to “regulat[e] the 
carrying of weapons”).  Since the Oklahoma court held that handguns were 
constitutionally unprotected, there was no constitutional right to carry a handgun, 
even in the curtilage of one’s own home. 
 In addition to the Oklahoma cases, a few opinions extolling the perceived 
extent of the legislative power to regulate the carrying of arms for self-defense have 
used language bordering on nullification.  See People v. Zerillo, 189 N.W. 927, 928–
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2. Statutory law 
Only two American jurisdictions currently offer no legal avenue for 
a private citizen to obtain the ability to carry a handgun in public for 
self-defense:  Illinois and the District of Columbia.  Illinois’s no carry 
position is fifty years old.79  Prior to the adoption of the Illinois 
Criminal Code of 1961, state law did not criminalize the carrying of a 
handgun for self-defense unless the handgun was concealed.80  The 
District of Columbia’s law dates back only a handful of years, and was 
part of the District’s response to the decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller.81  The District had previously maintained a limited statutory 
provision allowing for the issuance of permits to individuals at the 
discretion of the chief of police, although permits were rarely or 
never issued in practice.  However, in revamping its gun laws after 
Heller, the District’s City Council eliminated the authority to issue 
carry permits.82  The constitutionality of the District’s carry laws is 
currently under litigation in federal district court.83 
Apart from these two instances, some jurisdictions have statutes 
allowing the issuance of carry permits, but leave so much discretion 
to issuing authorities that they can plausibly be argued to fall in the 
no-carry category rather than non-presumptive carry.84  The 
                                                          
29 (Mich. 1922) (striking down a statute prohibiting aliens from possessing firearms 
and stating in dictum that, even though the Michigan Constitution expressly 
guarantees individuals the right “to bear arms for the defense of himself,” the 
legislature “has power in the most comprehensive manner to regulate the carrying 
and use of firearms”). 
 79. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1(a)(4) (2010) (originally enacted in 1961 and 
prohibiting the carry of handgun except on one’s own land or dwelling, or that of 
another by invitation). 
 80. Prior to 1961, Illinois law only prohibited the carrying of concealed handguns, 
a level of regulation consistent with presumptive carry.  See People v. McClendon, 161 
N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959) (stating that the essential elements of a violation 
of the contemporary weapons statute were “[c]oncealment and accessibility”). 
 81. See VIVIAN S. CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40474, D.C. GUN LAWS AND 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1 (2010) (“[T]wo bills from the District are the Firearms 
Control Amendment Act of 2008 and the Inoperable Pistol Amendment Act of 2008, 
which amended the D.C. Code in an effort to comply with the ruling in Heller as well 
as provide a different range of restrictions on firearm possession.”). 
 82. D.C. CODE § 22-4506 (Supp. 2011) (repealing the pistol carry permitting 
provision).  
 83. See, e.g., Palmer Complaint, supra note 7.  Oral argument on cross-motions for 
summary judgment was held in Palmer in January 2010.  Thereafter, the case 
remained in limbo for 18 months, with no ruling or opinion issued.  On July 18, 
2011, the Palmer case was reassigned to a new federal district court judge.  See Palmer 
v. District of Columbia, No. 1:09-cv-04182 (D.D.C. July 18, 2011) (order designating 
and assigning a senior United States judge for service in another circuit). 
 84. See Kopel, supra note 67 (noting that eight “states give local law enforcement 
almost unlimited discretion to issue permits, and permits are rarely issued in most 
jurisdictions, except to celebrities or other influentials”) 
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difference lies in whether an applicant’s objective demonstration of 
an unusual defensive need is sufficient to ensure issuance of a permit, 
or still leaves the permitting authority free to exercise its discretion.  
For example, New Jersey’s permitting statute vests the decision in a 
Superior Court judge, who acts on the recommendation of the 
applicant’s local police chief as to whether the applicant has a 
“justifiable need to carry a handgun.”85  Massachusetts requires an 
applicant for a carry permit to demonstrate a “good reason to fear 
injury to his person or property,” but the law allows local police chiefs 
the discretion to deny or revoke a permit if they decide an applicant 
is not “suitable.”86 
E. The Current Litigation Over Carry Rights 
The basic question raised by the current constitutional litigation 
over handgun carry laws is whether the Second Amendment protects 
presumptive carry rights, non-presumptive carry rights, or no carry 
rights. 
The current litigation challenges jurisdictions with non-
presumptive, special threat-based carry statutes such as Maryland87 
and California,88 as well as the pure no carry jurisdictions of Illinois89 
and the District of Columbia.90  The plaintiffs seek to establish that 
the Second Amendment protects presumptive carry rights, in the 
sense used here.91  They request an invalidation of provisions that 
                                                          
 85. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c) (West 2011). 
 86. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(a), (d)–(f) (2007). 
 87. See Complaint at 6, Woollard v. Sheridan, No. 1:10-cv-02068-JFM (D. Md. July 
29, 2010) (contending that individuals cannot be required to show a level of 
apprehended danger as a prerequisite for their Second Amendment right to carry a 
handgun). 
 88. Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, No. 2:09-cv-01235 MCE-DAD, 2011 WL 1885641, at 
*1 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (discussing a challenge to the California requirement 
that applicants for concealed carry permits provide good cause for applying and 
demonstrate good moral character); Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 
1106, 1109–10, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (determining that California and county non-
presumptive carry regime does not violate the Second Amendment). 
 89. Complaint at 3–4, Shepard v. Madigan, No. 3:11-CV-00405-WDS-PMF (S.D. 
Ill. May 13, 2011); Complaint at 1, Moore v. Madigan, No. 3:11-CV-03134-SEM-CHE 
(C.D. Ill. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter Moore Complaint]; see also People v. Aguilar, 944 
N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (rejecting a Second Amendment challenge to 
Illinois’s ban on public handgun carrying), leave for appeal granted, 949 N.E.2d 1099 
(Ill. 2011). 
 90. See Palmer Complaint, supra note 7, at 3 (contending that “[t]he District of 
Columbia may not completely ban the carrying of handguns for self-defense . . . or 
impose regulations on the right to carry handguns that are inconsistent with the 
Second Amendment”). 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 5 (claiming that the plaintiff would carry a functional handgun 
but for the District’s licensing restrictions, and should be presumed to be able to do 
608 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:585 
prevent most citizens from carrying a functional handgun for self-
defense.  The relief sought by the plaintiffs is generally framed so that 
defendant jurisdictions are left with flexibility in choosing how to 
implement presumptive carry rights:   
Plaintiffs enjoy an individual Second Amendment right to carry a 
handgun for purposes of self-defense.  Plaintiffs make no claim for 
a right to carry concealed handguns, any more than they claim a 
right to carry handguns openly.  The right is merely to carry 
handguns for self-defense, and as the precedent makes clear, either 
mode of carrying, open or concealed, satisfies the interest in self-
defense.92 
In short, the current litigation seeks to compel state and local 
governments to recognize presumptive carry rights, but does not seek 
to constitutionalize the choice of how to recognize that right.93  The 
guiding idea is functional:  the Second Amendment requires some 
clear path by which a typical citizen can opt to carry a handgun in 
most places and times, in a way that is practically useful for self-
defense.  The best reading of the Supreme Court’s two recent 
landmark Second Amendment decisions indicates that these 
arguments deserve to prevail. 
II. CARRY RIGHTS AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A. District of Columbia v. Heller 
Famously, District of Columbia v. Heller struck down the District of 
Columbia’s ban on handgun possession and its prohibition on 
keeping operable firearms in the home, holding that each of these 
laws violated the Second Amendment.94  McDonald v. City of Chicago 
held that the Second Amendment right was fully applicable to the 
                                                          
so under current constitutional law). 
 92. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, 
Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. 1:09-cv-01482 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2009).  Similarly, 
the Plaintiffs in Moore asserted:   
Plaintiffs do not seek to establish that the State should enact a licensing 
program, or any particular licensing program, nor do Plaintiffs contend that 
the State should in some other manner amend its laws. . . .  Whatever the 
contours of a constitutional scheme might be, the Second Amendment 
renders a ban on carrying guns impermissible. 
Moore Complaint, supra note 89, at 2. 
 93. Palmer Complaint, supra note 7, at 3 (asserting that a jurisdiction “basically 
respect[s] the Second Amendment rights to carry a handgun for self-defense” as long 
as “the right to carry a handgun is either unregulated, or regulated to the extent that 
individuals passing a background check and completing a gun safety course are, as a 
matter of course, licensed to carry handguns”). 
 94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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states,95 likely rendering Chicago’s municipal ban on handgun 
possession unconstitutional as well.  The laws challenged in Heller and 
McDonald did not specifically govern the carrying of firearms outside 
the home.96  However, three features of the opinions indicate that the 
Second Amendment does protect defensive handgun carrying 
outside the home. 
1. The centrality of self-defense 
First, Heller adopted a view of the Second Amendment that places 
individual self-defense at the heart of the amendment’s protection.  
This was a critical aspect of the Heller opinion, and it marked a 
fundamental difference between the Court’s interpretation of the 
right to keep and bear arms and the dissenters’ position.  Justice 
Stevens’s dissent, drawing upon the Second Amendment’s prefatory 
clause reference to the desirability of a “well regulated Militia,” 
argued that the right codified by the amendment was solely a right to 
use weapons “for certain military purposes.”97  Accordingly, he 
rejected the view that the Second Amendment “protects the right to 
possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and 
personal self-defense.”98  Justice Breyer’s dissent similarly emphasized 
that “[t]he Second Amendment’s language, while speaking of a 
‘Militia,’ says nothing of ‘self-defense.’”99  Thus, for Justice Breyer, 
self-defense was “not the primary interest, but at most a subsidiary 
interest, that the Second Amendment seeks to serve.”100 
The majority, in contrast, held that the amendment protects a 
traditional right to own and use firearms for a variety of personal 
purposes, including self-defense.101  The majority acknowledged that 
pressure leading to the inclusion of the right to arms in the proposed 
Bill of Rights stemmed from concern about federal disarmament of 
the militia.  However, that political motivation for amending the 
                                                          
 95. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); id. at 3058 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 96. See id. at 3026 (majority opinion) (describing the invalidated statues as one 
that “effectively ban[s] handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside 
in the City”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75 (describing the invalidated statute as 
generally prohibiting handgun possession and requiring lawful handguns to be 
“‘unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device’ unless 
they are located in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational 
activities” (citation omitted)). 
 97. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 636–37. 
 99. Id. at 714 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 628 (majority opinion) (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been 
central to the Second Amendment right.”). 
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Constitution to protect the right did not alter the traditionally 
understood content of the right, including the keeping and use of 
arms for personal defense:   
[T]he Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the 
purpose for which the right was codified:  to prevent elimination of 
the militia.  The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving 
the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; 
most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense 
and hunting. . . .  Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-
defense is merely a ‘subsidiary interest’ of the right to keep and 
bear arms . . . is profoundly mistaken.  He bases that assertion 
solely upon the [prefatory clause]—but that . . . can only show that 
self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; it was the 
central component of the right itself.102 
Accordingly, Heller likened the Second Amendment to state 
constitutional provisions that protected “the right of the people to 
‘bear arms in defence of themselves and the State,’” or “the even 
more individualistic phrasing that each citizen has the ‘right to bear 
arms in defence of himself and the State.’”103  The Court relied upon 
these self-defense-based state constitutional provisions as support for 
its analogous interpretation of the Second Amendment.104 
Holding that the central component of the right to bear arms is 
self-defense suggests that the right has application outside the home, 
since the need for self-defense commonly arises there.  Indeed, most 
violent crimes are committed outside the home.  Less than one in 
                                                          
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 585 n.8, 602 (citing PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776) (“That the 
people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state . . . .”); 
VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 15 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the 
defence of themselves and the State . . . .); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 23 (“That 
the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State shall not 
be questioned . . . .”); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 20 (“That the people have a 
right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State . . . .”); IND. CONST. of 
1816, art. I, § 20 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of 
themselves and the State . . . .”); MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen has a 
right to bear arms, in defence of himself and the State.”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 
I, § 17 (“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defence of himself and the state . . . 
.”); ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen has a right to bear arms in 
defence of himself and the State . . . .”); MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 3 (“[T]hat 
[the people’s] right to bear arms in defence of themselves and of the State cannot be 
questioned . . . .”)). 
 104. See id. at 603 (“That of the nine state constitutional protections for the right 
to bear arms enacted immediately after 1789 at least seven unequivocally protected 
an individual citizen’s right to self-defense is strong evidence that that is how the 
founding generation conceived of the right.”); cf. id. at 602 (describing early state 
constitutional right-to-arms provisions as “Second Amendment analogues”). 
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eight armed robberies occurs in the victim’s dwelling.105  Thus, a 
restrictive view that the constitutional right to bear arms for self-
defense applies only inside the home106 would deny protection to the 
great majority of potential armed robbery victims.  Even extending 
the scope of the right to the curtilage and the street near the victim’s 
home encompasses less than one in three armed robberies,107 still 
leaving most potential victims unprotected.  The statistics are similar 
for the crime of armed assault:  less than in one in five armed assaults 
occur within the victim’s home, and less than two in five occur in or 
near the victim’s home.108  Only half of rapes and other sexual assaults 
occur in or near the victim’s home.109  More broadly, the amount of 
all violent crimes that occur in or near the victim’s home is less than 
forty percent.110 
If the “central component” of the right to bear arms is self-defense, 
then it is directly relevant to the right’s scope that most violent crimes 
occur outside the home—including the types of serious crimes 
against which a would-be victim can typically lawfully defend herself 
with a firearm.  There is certainly a valid sense in which, as Heller 
stated, the need for armed self-defense is “most acute” in the home.111  
The home is a high-value target; a defender’s loved ones and 
valuables will usually be concentrated there.  Moreover, some 
                                                          
 105. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.62 (2010) 
[hereinafter DOJ 2007 STATISTICS], available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cvus07.pdf (combining armed robberies that occur in the home, 
near the home, and on the street near the home amounts to only 31.6% of armed 
robberies; similarly, armed assaults in the same locations amount to 38.9% of the 
total).  A mere 12.2% of armed robberies occur inside the home.  Id.  
 106. Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, No. 2:09-cv-01235 MCE-DAD, 2011 WL 1885641, at 
*3 n.4 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (interpreting the scope of Heller and McDonald as 
limited to the possession of firearms in the home for self-defense); Williams v. State, 
10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011) (claiming that Heller and McDonald apply only “to 
statutory prohibitions against home possession,” and ignoring McDonald’s statement 
that the right extends further as dicta), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011); State v. 
Knight, 218 P.3d 1177, 1189 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (interpreting Heller as “turn[ing] 
solely on the issue of handgun possession in the home”), aff’d, 241 P.2d 120 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2010). 
 107. DOJ 2007 STATISTICS, supra note 105, tbl.62 (combining armed robberies that 
occur in the home (12.2%), near the home (17.3%), and on the street near the 
home (2.1%) amounts to 31.6% of all armed robberies). 
 108. Id.  The DOJ statistics separate crimes “near home” from those committed 
“on the street near home.”  Id.  I count both categories as crimes occurring near the 
victim’s home. 
 109. Id. tbl.61 (48.9%). 
 110. Id. (35.6%). 
 111. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (referring to the 
home as a place “where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute”). 
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constitutional provisions suggest a special privacy interest in the 
home112—although most of these provisions single out the home for 
protection by name,113 while the Second Amendment contains no 
reference to the home, a fact that differentiates it from some of its 
state analogues.114  More than sixty percent of home invasion, or 
“hot,” burglaries (that is, those that occur when the home’s 
occupants are present) occur at night,115 when potential victims are 
likely to be asleep or otherwise unwary, which makes these intrusions 
especially dangerous. 
Yet as public concern about “street crime” should make plain, 
there are multiple reasons why the world outside the home is also a 
critical zone for armed self-defense.  The most important reason, as 
previously discussed, is that most violent crime is committed outside 
the home.  An interpretation of the Second Amendment that 
imposes a home-based limitation upon the amendment’s “right of the 
people to bear arms” renders the right useless to defend against most 
serious criminal violence, surely a paradoxical outcome.  
Furthermore, individuals can obtain some protection from unlawful 
assaults in the home without using weapons, by fortifying the home 
with fences, locks, door and window bars, electronic alarms, 
surveillance cameras, or other devices, or keeping dogs as guardians 
and warning providers.116  No such barricading strategy is possible 
when traveling about and carrying out daily activities.  Defensive 
weapons accordingly take on even greater utility outside the home. 
                                                          
 112. The classic example is the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure.  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) 
(“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat 
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
 113. U.S. CONST. amend. III (providing that “[n]o soldier shall, in time of peace 
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner” (emphasis added)); id. 
amend. IV (protecting “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” (emphasis 
added)). 
 114. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II (recognizing a “right of the people to . . . bear 
Arms” without any qualification as to location), with COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13 (“The 
right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, and property, . 
. . shall be called into question . . . .” (emphasis added)), MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12 
(similar), and MO. CONST. art. I, § 23 (similar). 
 115. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMIZATION DURING 
HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 6 tbl.9 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vdhb.pdf.  To be precise, from 2003 to 
2007, an estimated 61.3% of robberies of occupied dwellings occurred between 6:00 
PM and 6:00 AM.  Id.  An estimated annual average of 626,150 of these nighttime 
“hot” burglaries occurred during that five year period.  Id. 
 116. See generally STAN WASILIK, ESSENTIAL HOME SECURITY:  A LAYMAN’S GUIDE 
(2010). 
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2. The definition of “bear arms” 
Heller concluded that the natural meaning of the phrase “bear 
arms” was to “wear, bear, or carry [weapons] upon the person or in 
the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of . . . being armed and 
ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with 
another person.”117  That phrase has the same meaning, the Court 
concluded, when it appears in the Second Amendment.118  It verges 
on the superfluous to note that this passage supports the 
interpretation that the Second Amendment protects a right to carry a 
handgun outside the home to have it available for self-defense against 
unlawful assault:  the passage is essentially an announcement of that 
interpretation. 
The Court offered a congruent description of the right to bear 
arms later in the Heller opinion, concluding that the Second 
Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to . . . carry weapons 
in case of confrontation.”119  Again, an individual who carries a 
defensive handgun during everyday activities can be described in 
natural language as carrying a weapon in case of confrontation, much 
as one may carry a flashlight in case of darkness, or a spare cell phone 
battery in case of battery failure. 
One would predict that lower courts analyzing claims that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms includes defensive carry 
rights would begin, as a matter of course, by examining the passages 
in Heller that discuss the meaning of “bear arms.”  Unfortunately, 
some of the post-McDonald lower court opinions that reject carry 
rights do not quote or discuss these passages from Heller, and would 
not even disclose the passages’ existence to an attentive reader.120  
The Heller Court’s discussion of the right to bear arms suggests that 
carrying in the home is, at most, a subset of a right that extends 
presumptively to individuals who must move among other persons in 
public to live, and who accordingly face the possibility of 
                                                          
 117. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (quoting Muscarello 
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (ellipses 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 592. 
 120. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113, 1117 (S.D. 
Cal. 2010) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to California county sheriff’s 
refusal to treat the desire to carry a handgun for lawful self-defense as good cause for 
the issuance of a concealed carry permit); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1168–69 
(Md. 2011) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to Maryland concealed carry 
permit system that requires a special justification beyond the desire to carry for 
lawful self-defense for issuance of a handgun carry permit), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 
(2011). 
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“confrontation” that the Supreme Court emphasized.121 
3. The focus on handguns 
Heller held that handguns are a major category of arms commonly 
owned and used for personal defense and that, therefore, a handgun 
ban violates the Second Amendment.122  The Court rejected the 
District of Columbia’s argument that long guns (rifles and shotguns) 
were a constitutionally adequate substitute with which to exercise the 
right, emphasizing several functional advantages that handguns 
possess in a defensive scenario:  they are easier to store in a way that is 
accessible in an emergency; they are what defensive trainers call 
“retainable,” that is, more difficult than a long gun to wrest away from 
a defender during a struggle; they are light in weight; and they leave 
the defender with an arm free to perform other tasks, such as dialing 
the police.123 
Although the Heller Court focused on the functional advantages of 
handguns for defense in the home, most of these traits apply with 
equal or greater force outside the home.  The handgun’s ease of 
storage and light weight reflect its special advantage as a defensive 
tool:  it is the carryable firearm.  Handguns are the only firearms that 
can be conveniently “stored,” and indeed concealed, on the user’s 
person for long periods.  This is their most important advantage over 
long guns.124  Likewise, the handgun’s retainability in a struggle, and 
the user’s ability to deploy the handgun while keeping another hand 
free, are especially important in a confrontation outside the home.  
                                                          
 121. Accord United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(opinion of Niemeyer, J.) (noting that Heller held the Second Amendment protects a 
right to “carry weapons in case of confrontation,” and concluding that “[b]ecause 
‘self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be,’ it follows that the 
right extends to public areas beyond the home” (quoting Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:  An Analytical Framework and 
a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1515 (2009))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 
(2011); Ex parte Nido Lanausse, No. G PA2010-0002, 2011 WL 1563927, at *7 (P.R. 
Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (holding that petitioner who expressed a desire to protect his 
personal safety outside the home had a fundamental Second Amendment right to 
obtain a Puerto Rico permit to carry a handgun that could not be restricted in non-
sensitive public places). 
 122. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. 
 123. Id. at 629. 
 124. See JOHN S. FARNAM, THE FARNAM METHOD OF DEFENSIVE HANDGUNNING 38–39 
(2d ed. 2005) (“Of all firearms, handguns are probably the most useful in the 
domestic [i.e. nonmilitary] defensive role.  They are made for those situations where 
an innocent person is attacked suddenly at close range and without warning or 
provocation. . . .  A handgun is an instantly reactive defensive firearm.  It makes a 
poor offensive weapon. . . .  A handgun has the advantage of being able to be 
comfortably carried concealed on one’s person.” (emphases omitted)). 
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The defender in a violent assault on the street is far less likely than a 
home defender to be able to put walls, barriers, or cover between 
herself and her attacker.  A home defender will often have at least a 
few seconds of warning that an intruder is present, and thus can 
often face an assailant from a strong, braced position behind 
furniture or other cover or concealment.125  A light-weight, retainable, 
portable firearm is less likely to be necessary in this kind of 
confrontation, although a handgun may still present useful 
advantages for many users.  In contrast, the defender outside the 
home faces a very different situation, and the advantages of the 
handgun rise to paramount importance.  The defender requires a 
compact, easily stored firearm, because it can be carried regularly 
while performing other tasks.  The defender is likely to need the 
firearm instantly, in a sudden and unexpected confrontation, and 
thus needs a one-handed weapon that can be drawn rapidly while the 
other hand fends off the attack. 
In short, inside the home, the handgun’s primacy in self-defense is 
equivocal.  It has both pros and cons compared to a long gun, such as 
a repeating shotgun or semiautomatic carbine; it is not clearly 
superior to these other common firearms.126  Outside the home, 
however, the handgun is the only viable option.  The strong 
protection that Heller extends to ownership of handguns is at least 
suggestive evidence that the defensive role for which handguns are 
uniquely suited—routine carry outside the home—is also 
constitutionally protected. 
4. The use of regulation of public weapons carrying as an example of 
 regulation of the conduct protected by the right 
Heller acknowledges that some forms of regulation of the right to 
keep and bear arms have historically been treated as constitutional.127  
                                                          
 125. See NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N OF AM., NRA GUIDE TO THE BASICS OF PERSONAL 
PROTECTION IN THE HOME 71–73 (2000) (discussing recommended strategies for self-
defense with a firearm in the home, and stating that taking cover or concealment is 
the “most immediate tactical response” a defender should take). 
 126. Long guns typically deliver more ballistic energy than handguns, and thus 
can have greater “stopping power” against an assailant than a handgun does.  Some 
users also find long guns easier to aim accurately than handguns, because a long gun 
is held with both hands and braced against the shoulder when fired.  However, long 
guns, especially shotguns, often have heavy recoil that makes them uncomfortable 
for some people to use and practice with.  See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS 
LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  REGULATION, RIGHTS AND POLICY ch. 1 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 127. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (stating that, “[f]rom Blackstone through the 19th-
century cases,” legal commentators and court decisions agreed that the right to bear 
arms was not absolute). 
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The Second Amendment right is “not a right to keep and carry any 
weapon whatsoever in any manner and for whatever purpose.”128  But 
what sort of regulation is envisioned?  The Court’s first historical 
example of permissible regulation involves the public carrying of 
weapons; the Court notes that “the majority of the 19th-century 
courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying 
concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment.”129  As 
authority for this proposition, the Court cites an 1850 Louisiana 
Supreme Court case and an 1846 Georgia Supreme Court case.130  
Each of these opinions upheld the prohibition on concealed carry on 
the basis that, while the Second Amendment does protect a right to 
carry defensive weapons, the right extends to carrying them in public 
in an open manner, such as in a visible holster or scabbard; it does not 
protect concealed carrying.131  Thus, to illustrate the constitutionality 
of restrictions on concealed handgun carry, the Court chose 
examples of cases that do affirm a right to carry a defensive handgun 
in some mode.  The Court suggests through these examples that 
defensive weapons carrying is part of the scope of the Second 
Amendment right, and may be regulated, but not frustrated, in its 
exercise. 
To similar effect is the Court’s discussion of other permissible 
traditional forms of regulation:   
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.132 
                                                          
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489–90 (1850); Nunn v. State, 1 
Ga. 243, 251 (1846)).  The first reported American right-to-arms case, Bliss v. 
Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), held that a prohibition on the carrying of 
concealed weapons violated the right to bear arms provision of the Kentucky 
Constitution. 
 130. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (citing Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489–90; Nunn, 1 Ga. at 
251). 
 131. See Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490 (concluding that a statute banning concealed 
carry was constitutional because such a law “interfere[s] with no man’s right to carry 
arms . . . in full open view, which places men upon an equality” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251 (“[S]o far as the act . . . seeks to suppress the 
practice of carrying certain weapons secretly, . . . it is valid, inasmuch as it does not 
deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms.  But . . . so much of it, as contains a prohibition against bearing 
arms openly, is in conflict with the Constitution, and void . . . .”). 
 132. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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Again, what is significant is that the Court does not sanction 
general prohibitions on carrying firearms in public, but only limited 
forms of regulation of such carrying, namely bans on carrying in 
special “sensitive places.”133  While the list of presumptively valid 
regulations is not exhaustive,134 the list suggests that weapons carrying 
outside the home is a basic part of the conduct protected by the 
right, which may be regulated by restricting carry in some places, but 
not to the extent that “under the pretence of regulating, [the 
regulation] amounts to a destruction of the right.”135 
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago 
The invalidation of the District of Columbia’s handgun ban in 
Heller set the stage for a parallel constitutional challenge to the gun 
laws of Chicago, the only other significant American jurisdiction that 
maintained a prohibition on the private ownership of handguns.  
Plaintiffs’ counsel in Heller filed the complaint in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago in federal district court on the same day the Supreme Court 
handed down the Heller decision.136  The plaintiffs in the suit were 
Chicago residents who desired to keep a handgun in their residences 
for self-defense;137 one was a resident of a high-crime neighborhood 
who had been threatened by drug dealers, and another had been the 
victim of a home burglary.138  Because Chicago’s handgun ban was 
essentially identical to the District of Columbia ban struck down in 
Heller,139 the only issue in the case was whether the individual right to 
keep and bear arms recognized by the Second Amendment was made 
applicable, or “incorporated,” against state and local governments by 
                                                          
 133. Id.; see also United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 468 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(opinion of Niemeyer, J.) (reasoning that Heller’s explicit mention of “sensitive 
places” implies a right to carry handguns in at least some non-sensitive places outside 
the home), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011). 
 134. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
 135. Id. at 629 (quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–17 (1840)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 136. Compare Complaint at 1, McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-CV-3645, 2008 
WL 5111112 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2008) [hereinafter McDonald Complaint] (complaint 
filed on June 26, 2008), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 570 (decided June 26, 2008). 
 137. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); McDonald 
Complaint, supra note 136, at 3–4. 
 138. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3027; McDonald Complaint, supra note 136, at 1–2. 
 139. Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75 (explaining that the District of Columbia 
regulations at issue prohibited both the registration of handguns and the carrying of 
an unregistered handgun), with McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (detailing how the 
Chicago ordinances required a “valid registration certificate” for lawful possession of 
firearms, and “then prohibit[ed] registration of most handguns” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.140 
Ultimately, a majority of the Supreme Court141 agreed that the 
Second Amendment “right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of 
self-defense” is a fundamental constitutional right that is protected, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, against infringement by state 
or local governments to the full extent that the Second Amendment 
protects the same right against federal infringement.142  In an opinion 
for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Samuel Alito concluded that the 
right to keep and bear arms was made applicable against the states by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.143  The 
plurality followed the Fourteenth Amendment “selective 
incorporation” due process framework developed in the mid-
twentieth century, which the Warren Court had previously used to 
incorporate numerous provisions of the Bill of Rights against the 
states.144  In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas 
concluded that it was the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than its Due Process Clause, that 
rendered the right to keep and bear arms applicable against the 
States.145 
Because McDonald focused on the issue of incorporation, the 
plurality and concurring opinions discussed the scope of the right to 
arms at less length than Heller did.  Nevertheless, what McDonald did 
say about the right is fully consistent with the reading of Heller 
presented above.  Justice Alito begins by stating broadly that Heller 
                                                          
 140. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026, 3028. 
 141. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion of the Court.  Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy joined Justice Alito’s 
opinion in full, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined it in part.  Id. at 3026.  Justice 
Scalia also wrote a separate concurring opinion, id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring), 
and Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment, id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 142. Id. at 3042 (majority opinion); see also id. at 3026 (“[T]he Second 
Amendment right is fully applicable to the States.”); id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I agree with the Court that 
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to keep and bear arms set forth in the 
Second Amendment ‘fully applicable to the States.’”). 
 143. Id. at 3050 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 3042 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is 
clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right 
to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty.”).  The Due Process Clause states:  “No state shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
 144. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3044–50 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 3032–36 
(majority opinion) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 & n.14 (1968)). 
 145. Id. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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“held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and 
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.”146  At the same time, the 
opinion notes that Heller applied that right to strike down laws 
prohibiting handgun possession and the defensive use of firearms in 
the home.147  Justice Thomas’s concurrence carefully repeated Justice 
Alito’s broad description of Heller’s holding:  “Heller . . . held that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear 
arms for the purpose of self-defense,” and then applied that broad 
right in the context of the home.148 
The five-Justice McDonald majority agreed that the right to keep 
and bear arms for self-defense had deep roots in English and 
American history, and that this interest emerged as the most 
important single component of the Second Amendment’s right to 
arms.149  While the colonial militia system had decayed considerably 
by the mid-nineteenth century, the right to keep and bear arms was 
still “highly valued for purposes of self-defense.”150  The Court 
examined the post-Civil War Black Codes enacted by many Southern 
states, which contained provisions prohibiting African-American 
freedmen and other free blacks from possessing weapons.151  It 
concluded that these provisions were seen as violating the 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, and that 
protecting that right was one of the principal purposes of both 
Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation and the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself.152  McDonald also reinforced the connection 
between the Second Amendment and state constitutional guarantees 
of bearing arms in self-defense.  To support its holding that the right 
protected by the Second Amendment is a fundamental right that fully 
binds the states, the Court observed that, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868, “[q]uite a few . . . state 
constitutional guarantees . . . explicitly protected the right to keep 
and bear arms as an individual right to self-defense.”153 
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a free-wheeling, separate dissenting 
opinion that sought to frame the question before the Court as an 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 3026 (majority opinion). 
 147. See id. (“In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the right to 
possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a 
District of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in the home.”). 
 148. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 149. Id. at 3036–42 (majority opinion). 
 150. Id. at 3038. 
 151. Id. at 3038–40, 3043. 
 152. Id. at 3038–42. 
 153. Id. at 3042. 
620 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:585 
independent, substantive due process question that turned not on 
whether the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states, 
but on whether the liberty claim made by the plaintiffs—which 
Justice Stevens described as an individual right to possess a functional 
handgun within the home—should be deemed a matter of 
fundamental fairness protected by the Due Process Clause.154  Justice 
Stevens’s opinion rejected much of the post-1960 consensus on how 
to carry out the incorporation inquiry, yet he sought somehow to 
preserve the results of all the Court’s major incorporation cases155—a 
source of obvious intellectual strain which Justice Scalia criticized at 
length in his own separate concurrence.156  The Stevens dissent also 
expressed concern that the majority opinions in Heller or McDonald 
might be read to recognize a right to carry defensive firearms outside 
the home.157  Justice Stevens urged that the holdings of the cases be 
read as strictly confined to home possession and use.158 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissenting opinion, which spoke for three 
Justices,159 expressed doubt that the Second Amendment protects a 
right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of personal defense.160 
Justice Breyer went on to argue that, even assuming the correctness 
of Heller’s adoption of a self-defense-centered Second Amendment, 
the right should not be treated as sufficiently fundamental to be 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.161  The Breyer dissent 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 3088–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Justice Scalia sharply criticized Justice Stevens’s approach, stating:   
Rights that pass [Justice Stevens’s] test include not just those ‘relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing 
and education,’ but also rights against ‘[g]overnment action that shocks the 
conscience, pointlessly infringes settled expectations, trespasses into sensitive 
private realms or life choices without adequate justification, [or] perpetrates 
gross injustice.’  Not all such rights are in, however, since only ‘some 
fundamental aspects of personhood, dignity, and the like’ are protected.  
Exactly what is covered is not clear.  But whatever else is in, he knows that the 
right to keep and bear arms is out, despite its being as ‘deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition’ as a right can be. . . .  I can find no other 
explanation for such certitude except that Justice Stevens, despite his 
forswearing of ‘personal and private notions,’ deeply believes it should be 
out.” 
Id. at 3051 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
 157. Id. at 3104 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that “[t]he majority opinion [in 
Heller] contained some dicta suggesting the possibility of a more expansive arms-
bearing right, one that would travel with the individual to an extent into public 
places, as ‘in case of confrontation’”). 
 158. Id. at 3104–05. 
 159. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor also joined Justice 
Breyer’s dissent.  Id. at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 3120–22. 
 161. Id. at 3120. 
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also discussed the possible recognition of Second Amendment carry 
rights in the aftermath of Heller and McDonald.162  Justice Breyer 
offered a noticeably brief discussion of American case law and 
commentary on the right to arms during the antebellum period, the 
critical years spanning the ratifications of the Second Amendment 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.163  Justice Breyer simply asserted 
that during this period, “[s]tates began to regulate the possession of 
concealed weapons,” and that “[s]tate courts repeatedly upheld the 
validity of such laws.”164 
As I will document in Part III, this description does not adequately 
reflect the state decisional law of the antebellum period—especially 
as it relates to the question in McDonald.  Most state courts of that 
period treated the constitutional right to bear arms as an important 
individual right that was significantly concerned with personal 
defense, including carrying common weapons outside the home.165 
Justice Breyer’s dissent also emphasized that state constitutions and 
judicial decisions in the postbellum, late-nineteenth century period 
allowed for considerable regulation of weapons carrying.166  However, 
Part III will show that most of these deferential judicial decisions 
rested upon a conclusion that the right to bear arms was not 
concerned with individual self-defense, but was instead intended only 
to serve civic purposes such as deterring governmental tyranny.167  
Because Heller explicitly rejected this narrow, civic-focused 
conception of the right to arms, these authorities are of little 
persuasive value in interpreting the self-defense-focused Second 
Amendment right that Heller recognized.168 
To summarize:  McDonald explicitly instructs that Heller “held” the 
Second Amendment protects the individual “right to . . . bear arms 
for the purpose of self-defense.”169  Heller concluded that the meaning 
of “bear arms” is to “wear, bear, or carry [weapons] upon the person 
or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed 
and ready . . . in a case of conflict with another person.”170  The Court 
                                                          
 162. Id. at 3126. 
 163. Id. at 3123–24. 
 164. Id. at 3132. 
 165. See infra Part III.A. 
 166. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3132–34 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 167. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 168. See infra Part III.B (discussing the postbellum era). 
 169. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026; id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 170. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (citation omitted) 
(ellipsis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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therefore concluded that the Second Amendment right to “bear 
arms” is an “individual right” to “carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”171  The “central component” of the right to bear arms, 
Heller holds, is self-defense.172  It is a statistical truth that most violent 
crimes that can be lawfully defended against with firearms occur 
outside the home, not in or near the home.173  Moreover, Heller holds 
that handguns—the only type of firearm practical to carry outside the 
home for self-protection—are protected against prohibition under 
the Second Amendment, and that handguns are “overwhelmingly 
chosen” by Americans for the purpose of self-defense.174  Finally, as an 
example of permissible regulation of the Second Amendment right, 
the Court approvingly cites nineteenth-century cases holding that 
certain modes of public carry of handguns can be prohibited when 
other modes are allowed.175 
Thus, even when confining one’s attention to the four corners of 
the two landmark opinions, there is a strong case that Heller and 
McDonald protect an individual right to carry handguns outside the 
home for self-defense.  The decisions hold the Second Amendment 
protects the individual right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of 
self-defense—and then apply that right to a specific set of facts:  the 
bans on home handgun possession and use that were challenged in 
those cases.  The question now raised by the carry rights litigation is 
simply how the kind of right recognized in Heller and McDonald 
should be applied to defensive handgun carrying outside the home.  
Rather than asserting the supposed intractability of this question, 
courts should follow ordinary, precedent-based constitutional 
methods to resolve it.  The next Part of this Article seeks to 
demonstrate that the type of right-to-arms recognized in Heller has 
been commonplace in state constitutions for more than two 
centuries.  A large body of relevant precedent affirms that the right to 
bear arms extends outside the home.  Thus, courts already have many 
of the resources they need to resolve the carry rights cases. 
 
                                                          
 171. Id. at 592. 
 172. Id. at 599. 
 173. See supra notes 105–116 and accompanying text. 
 174. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 175. Id. at 610–14. 
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III. THE TWO TRADITIONS:  PRE- AND POST-RATIFICATION SOURCES ON 
THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO CARRY ARMS 
The case for carry rights becomes most persuasive when Heller and 
McDonald are read against the backdrop of two centuries of American 
case law on the individual right to bear arms.  This Part surveys that 
history, analyzing the major decisions, and several important historic 
commentators, in light of the taxonomy of carry rights defined in 
Part I.  How often, and in what circumstances, have American jurists 
concluded that the existence of a right to bear arms entails 
presumptive carry rights?  What about non-presumptive carry rights?  
No carry? 
While I will discuss cases from the entire historical span between 
the Founding era and today, my discussion will focus chiefly upon two 
eras.  The first is the antebellum, or “early Republic” period from the 
ratification of the Bill of Rights through the beginning of the Civil 
War in 1861.  The second is the postbellum period, encompassing 
Reconstruction in the South and the early Jim Crow era, stretching 
from the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 to 
approximately the 1930s.  This period effectively culminates with the 
United States Supreme Court’s ambiguous 1939 decision in the 
Second Amendment case United States v. Miller. 
A. The Antebellum Period:  1791–1860176 
1. Case law 
a. Cases construing the right to bear arms for self-defense 
Seventy-seven years separate the ratification of the Second 
Amendment in 1791 from the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868.  During this period, most courts interpreting 
constitutional guarantees of the right to bear arms concluded that it 
encompassed presumptive carry rights:  in other words, citizens were 
constitutionally entitled to carry common weapons outside the home.  
Every court of this period that interpreted the right to bear arms in 
the same way Heller interpreted the Second Amendment—as a 
personal right concerned with self-defense—viewed it as including 
public weapons carrying, and the clear weight of this authority 
supported the presumptive carry model. 
                                                          
 176. Further background on this period is presented in JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 
126, ch. 5. 
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Kentucky 1822.  The strongest expression of this view appeared in 
the first published appellate decision on the right to arms, Bliss v. 
Commonwealth,177 an 1822 opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 
then the state’s highest court.178  The court struck down a state statute 
that prohibited the concealed carrying of weapons, holding that it 
violated the “right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of 
themselves and the state” as recognized in the Kentucky 
Constitution.179  The Kentucky court viewed the right to bear arms as 
a categorical right to carry personal weapons in any manner the 
owner deemed appropriate, whether concealed or openly. 
That the provisions of the act in question do not import an entire 
destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of 
themselves and the state, will not be controverted by the court; for 
though the citizens are forbid wearing weapons concealed in the 
manner described in the act, they may, nevertheless, bear arms in 
any other admissible form.  But . . . whatever restrains the full and 
complete exercise of that right, though not an entire destruction of 
it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the constitution. . . .  
The right [adopted in] the constitution . . . consisted in nothing 
else but in the liberty of the citizens to bear arms. . . .  For, in 
principle, there is no difference between a law prohibiting the 
wearing concealed arms, and a law forbidding the wearing such as 
are exposed; and if the former be unconstitutional, the latter must 
be so likewise.180 
Tennessee 1833.  The second published opinion to analyze the right 
to bear arms was Simpson v. State,181 an 1833 decision of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court.182  Simpson appeared in public “arrayed in a warlike 
                                                          
 177. 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822), cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 585 n.9. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 91, 93; see KY. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 23 (“[T]he rights of the citizens 
to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State shall not be questioned.”).  In 
1850, Kentucky adopted a new constitution with a right to bear arms provision that 
allowed the legislature to ban concealed carry.  KY. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25 
(“[T]he rights of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State 
shall not be questioned; but the General Assembly may pass laws to prevent persons 
from carrying concealed arms.”). 
 180. Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) at 91–92. 
 181. 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356 (1833), cited in Heller, 554 U.S. 603, 615. 
 182. A case decided in the same year as Simpson, State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 
(Ind. 1833), upheld an Indiana statute banning concealed carrying of weapons, 
against a claim that it violated the right of “the people . . . to bear arms for the 
defence of themselves, and the state.”  IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 20.  The Mitchell 
opinion was a single sentence that upheld the statute without analysis.  3 Blackf. at 
229.  Thus, there is no way to discern how broadly the Indiana Supreme Court 
viewed the scope of carry rights in this early decision, other than that it viewed 
prohibiting concealed carry as constitutional.  As discussed below, many courts of 
this era interpreted the right to bear arms as a right to presumptive carry, yet still 
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manner,” that is, armed, and was convicted for the common law 
crime of affray.183  However, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed 
his conviction.184  It concluded that the crime of affray required proof 
of acts of actual violence involving two or more people, and thus 
quashed the indictment against Simpson.185  This holding was in 
tension with an important eighteenth-century English treatise that 
asserted there could be an affray without actual violence, such as 
“whe[n] a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in 
such a manner as will naturally cause terror to the people.”186 
The court rejected a broad view of the offense of affray, giving two 
reasons.  First, it argued, the relevant common law authorities did not 
support the broad view.187  But, second, if the common law did allow 
one to be criminally punished merely for being armed in public, then 
it was abrogated by the Tennessee Constitution, which guaranteed 
the right of freemen to “keep and to bear arms for their common 
defence.”188  Simpson described the right to bear arms in terms similar 
to the Kentucky decision in Bliss—as a broad, even unqualified, right 
of citizens to carry weapons:   
[T]his clause of our constitution fully meets and opposes the 
passage or clause in Hawkins, of “a man’s arming himself with 
dangerous and unusual weapons,” as being an independent 
ground of affray . . . .  By this clause of the constitution, an express 
power is given and secured to all the free citizens of the state to 
keep and bear arms for their defence, without any qualification 
whatever as to their kind or nature . . . neither, after so solemn an 
instrument hath said the people may carry arms, can we be 
permitted to impute to the acts thus licensed such a necessarily 
consequent operation as terror to the people to be incurred 
thereby; we must attribute to the framers of it the absence of such a 
view.189 
                                                          
upheld bans on concealed carry, on the theory that the ability to carry arms openly 
for self-defense was sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements.  Cf. Walls v. State, 
7 Blackf. 572, 573 (Ind. 1845) (suggesting that a defendant would not be in violation 
of Indiana law if “he exhibited his pistol so frequently that it could not be said to be 
concealed”). 
 183. Simpson, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) at 357. 
 184. Id. at 363. 
 185. Id. at 357 (“[A]ffrays . . . are the fighting of two or more persons, in some 
public place, to the terror of his majesty’s subjects . . . .”). 
 186. Id. at 358 (quoting WILLIAM HAWKINS, TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 
135 (1716)). 
 187. Id. at 359–61. 
 188. Id. at 360 (quoting TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 189. Id. 
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Thus, the Tennessee court agreed with the earlier Kentucky 
decision that the right to carry arms must remain unabridged. 
Alabama 1840.  The Alabama Supreme Court weighed in next, 
taking a similar view of the right to bear arms, but also allowing for a 
significant degree of regulation of the right’s exercise.  State v. Reid190 
upheld an 1839 Alabama ban on the concealed carrying of pistols 
and Bowie knives as a permissible regulation of the right of “[e]very 
citizen . . . to bear arms, in defence of himself and the State.”191  In 
the court’s view, the legislature retained considerable discretion to 
regulate “the manner in which arms shall be borne”;192 thus, it could 
require that firearms be carried openly, on the rationale that keeping 
one’s weapons concealed from view “is calculated to exert an 
unhappy influence upon the moral feelings of the wearer, by making 
him less regardful of the personal security of others.”193 
Reid takes a less categorical view of the right to bear arms for self-
defense than the cases before it.  There are some passages in Reid that 
might suggest the court viewed the right to carry weapons as limited 
to situations of special necessity,194 a reading that would place it under 
the category of non-presumptive carry rights, as used in this Article.  
However, other parts of Reid are more suggestive of presumptive 
carry, particularly when the opinion refers to bearing arms for self-
defense as synonymous with “wearing” them in some “manner.”195  
Importantly, Reid states that a law would violate the right to bear arms 
if it restricted the bearing of weapons in a way that frustrated the 
ability to use them effectively in self-defense:   
We do not desire to be understood as maintaining, that in 
regulating the manner of bearing arms, the authority of the 
Legislature has no other limit than its own discretion.  A statute 
which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction 
of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render 
                                                          
 190. 1 Ala. 612 (1840), cited in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585 
n.8, 629 (2008). 
 191. Id. at 614–15 (quoting ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 23) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 192. Id. at 616. 
 193. Id. at 617. 
 194. The court states that concealed carry is unnecessary for defense because 
when “the emergency is pressing” there would not be time to conceal one’s weapons 
anyway.  Id. at 621; cf. id. at 616 (“The right guaranteed to the citizen, is not to bear 
arms upon all occasions and in all places, but merely ‘in defence of himself and the 
State.’”). 
 195. Id. at 617. 
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them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly 
unconstitutional.196 
Thus, Reid is compatible with the presumptive carry mainstream of 
the antebellum nineteenth century, in which concealed carry can be 
banned if open carry is respected.  However, Reid is closer to non-
presumptive carry than the other cases in this line; it contemplates a 
greater license for legislative regulation of the exercise of carry rights 
than some other defense-based decisions do. 
Georgia 1846.  No case, historic or recent, is discussed more 
prominently or positively in Heller than the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
1846 decision in Nunn v. State.197  Heller describes Nunn as “perfectly 
captur[ing]” the relationship between the Second Amendment’s 
operative clause and its prefatory clause;198 it cites Nunn as an 
example of permissible regulation of the right to arms;199 and it also 
cites Nunn as an example of the willingness of courts to enforce 
Second Amendment limits on gun control legislation that goes too 
far.200 
Nunn affirmed presumptive carry rights in strong terms.  It 
involved a constitutional challenge to an 1837 Georgia statute that 
made it unlawful for individuals “to keep or have about their persons” 
any pistol.201  Because Georgia’s constitution lacked a right-to-arms 
provision at that time, the case was decided directly under the Second 
Amendment.202  The court concluded that the Second Amendment 
protected a broad right of all citizens to keep and bear a wide variety 
of arms:   
The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and 
boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every 
description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall not 
be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest 
degree . . . .  Our opinion is, that any law, State or Federal, is 
                                                          
 196. Id. at 616–17. 
 197. 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 198. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 612 (2008). 
 199. Id. at 626. 
 200. Id. at 629. 
 201. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 202. Nunn thus rejected the doctrine of Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 
243 (1833), which stated that the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights did not 
apply, of their own force, to the states.  See Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250 (asserting that the 
Second Amendment applies to both federal and state governments).  For a 
discussion of Nunn as a leading instance of the minority tradition of “Barron 
contrarianism” in some antebellum state courts, see AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 145–56 (1998). 
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repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which contravenes this 
right . . . .203 
The court made clear that “bear arms” meant “carrying weapons,” 
and concluded that a prohibition on carrying handguns openly for 
self-defense violated the Second Amendment:   
[S]o far as the act of 1837 seeks to suppress the practice of carrying 
certain weapons secretly, . . . it is valid, inasmuch as it does not 
deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  But . . . so much of it, 
as contains a prohibition against bearing arms openly, is in conflict 
with the Constitution, and void . . . .204 
Given Nunn’s place of honor in Heller, and its obvious relevance to 
the question of whether the Second Amendment protects a right to 
carry handguns for self-defense, it is regrettable to note that one state 
supreme court recently issued a twenty-three page opinion 
concluding that the Second Amendment has no application outside 
the home, that omits any mention of Nunn or the other nineteenth 
century weapons carrying cases upon which the Supreme Court 
relied in Heller.205  Another lower court that recently upheld 
restrictions of carry rights incorrectly quoted, as if they were Nunn’s 
views, a passage from a different court’s opinion that Nunn discussed, 
but did not follow on this point.206 
                                                          
 203. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 (2011).  
The Williams decision also omits discussion of the portions of Heller in which the 
United States Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of “bear arms” in the Second 
Amendment.  In one of these passages, the Court described the right to bear arms as 
“the individual right to . . . carry weapons in case of confrontation.”  Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 592.  In another, it concluded that to “bear arms” means to “wear, bear or carry 
[them] . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of 
being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with 
another person.”  Id. at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted).  These portions of 
Heller were not discussed in a case in which the lower court’s task was to decide 
whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms includes an individual right to 
carry a gun on one’s person for self-defense.  Williams, 10 A.3d at 1177 (“If the 
Supreme Court . . . meant its holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need 
to say so more plainly.”); see also Richards v. Cnty. of Yolo, No. 2:09-cv-01235 MCE-
DAD, 2011 WL 1885641, at *2–4 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (upholding, against 
Second Amendment challenge, a discretionary concealed carry scheme that denies 
individuals the ability to carry a loaded handgun for self-defense until an 
“‘immediate, grave’” danger arises, without discussing any of the right-to-carry cases 
relied upon in Heller, any state case law, or any case decided prior to 2008). 
 206. In United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 756 (2011), a panel of the Fourth Circuit held that, if the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms extends outside the home, it is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.  In support of the view that “a lesser showing is necessary with 
respect to laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside of the home,” 
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Nunn’s holding that the open carry of a handgun was 
constitutionally protected was affirmed by the same court fifteen 
years later, in a decision that reversed a conviction for openly wearing 
a loaded handgun before witnesses.207 
Louisiana 1850.  The Louisiana Supreme Court took a track similar 
to Nunn a few years later, upholding a ban on concealed carry but 
interpreting the Second Amendment to protect the carrying of 
weapons for self-defense.208  In State v. Chandler,209 a homicide 
prosecution, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected a proposed jury 
instruction stating that both the concealed and open carry of 
weapons were constitutionally protected in Louisiana.210  Like 
Georgia, Louisiana had no state constitutional right-to-arms provision 
until after the Civil War, so the case directly involved the federal 
Constitution.211  The court upheld Louisiana’s 1813 ban of concealed 
carry, holding that it was consistent with the Second Amendment.212  
However, the court made clear that presumptive carry rights were 
protected:   
                                                          
the Court cited Nunn as “one of the principal cases relied upon in Heller,” and 
averred that Nunn upheld a state concealed carry law “after applying review of a 
decidedly less-than-strict nature.”  Id. at 470–71.  It then quoted a passage that 
appeared in Nunn, as if it reflected the Nunn court’s views:   
“[A] law which is merely intended to promote personal security, and to put 
down lawless aggression and violence, and to this end prohibits the wearing 
of certain weapons in such a manner as is calculated to exert an unhappy 
influence upon the moral feelings of the wearer, . . . does not come in 
collision with the Constitution.” 
Id. (quoting Nunn, 1 Ga. at 249).  Unfortunately, this passage was not penned by the 
Nunn court, but by the Alabama Supreme Court in State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840), 
and the Georgia court made it clear that it was merely quoting Reid as part of a survey 
of the various views of carry rights that had been expressed by different prior 
courts—not adopting or agreeing with it.  See Nunn, 1 Ga. at 247–48 (“This question 
has occasionally come before the courts of the Union for adjudication. . . .  [I]n the 
State vs. Reid, the same question came up, but was differently adjudged . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
 When the Nunn court expressed its own view of Second Amendment scrutiny—
the point for which the Fourth Circuit cited it as supporting a deferential level of 
review outside the home—the Georgia court expressed the opposite view of Reid:  
Nunn upheld the right to carry a wide range of weapons for self-defense, and stressed 
that the Second Amendment right was a “comprehensive” and “valuable” right that 
must not “be . . . curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree.”  Id. at 251.  
That is not the language of deference, or even of intermediate scrutiny. 
 207. See Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227 (1861) (reasoning that, since Georgia 
had banned concealed carry, to disallow the open, holstered carry of a loaded 
handgun “would be to prohibit the bearing of those arms altogether, and to bring 
the Act within the decision in Nunn’s case”). 
 208. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850). 
 209. 5 La. Ann. 489 (1850), cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 613, 626. 
 210. Id. at 489. 
 211. See id. at 490; LA. CONST. of 1852 (lacking a right-to-arms provision). 
 212. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489–90. 
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This law [banning concealed carry] . . . interfere[s] with no man’s 
right to carry arms . . . ‘in full open view,’ which places men upon 
an equality.  This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and 
noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their country, 
without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly 
assassinations.213 
United States 1857.  Even the infamous decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford214 indirectly suggested that the Constitution protected 
presumptive carry rights.  Scott held that blacks could not be United 
States citizens, and that a slave-owner’s right to property in human 
slaves was constitutionally protected against legislative abrogation.215  
The Scott Court supported this conclusion, in part, by what it viewed 
as a reductio ad absurdum argument:  it enumerated several important 
“privileges and immunities” enjoyed by American citizens, and 
argued that it would be inconceivable that blacks would enjoy such 
liberties; therefore, blacks could not be citizens.216  The Court’s list of 
liberties that blacks would enjoy if they were citizens included “the 
full liberty of speech in public and private upon all subjects upon 
which . . . citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon 
political affairs,” and the right “to keep and carry arms wherever they 
went”217—a strong colloquial expression of presumptive carry rights.  
As Justice Thomas argued in McDonald,218 one of the purposes of the 
                                                          
 213. Id.  The Louisiana court echoed this view in State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 
(1858), which upheld a revised version of the concealed weapon statute against a 
similar Second Amendment challenge.  See id. at 399–400 (“The statute . . . 
prohibit[s] only a particular mode of bearing arms which is found dangerous to the 
peace of society.” (citing Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489)). 
 A similar approach is implied by the mention of the constitutional right of the 
people “to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State,” MO. CONST. of 1820, 
art. XIII, § 3, in State v. Schoultz, 25 Mo. 128 (1857), cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 585 n.9.  
Schoultz was convicted of capital murder after he tried to goad one Inkamp into 
assaulting him at a bar, failed, and then drew a pistol and shot Inkamp.  Schoultz at 
130.  The Missouri court held that Schoultz was not entitled to an instruction 
reminding the jury of his constitutional right to bear arms because the only issue was 
whether the shooting was in self-defense:  “This right is known to every jury man in 
our State, but nevertheless the right to bear does not sanction an unlawful use of 
arms.  The right is to bear arms in defense of ourselves.”  Id. at 155. 
 214. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 215. See id. at 404, 425–26 (declaring that blacks are not “citizens,” but the 
property of owners whose constitutional property rights should be protected). 
 216. Id. at 417–18. 
 217. Id. at 417. 
 218. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060, 3068 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that, as the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s initial Citizenship Clause undoes Scott’s holding that blacks were not 
American citizens, similarly, its Privileges or Immunities Clause should be 
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Fourteenth Amendment was to overturn the Scott decision.  Scott’s list 
of fundamental liberties that were to be withheld from black 
Americans provides evidence of rights that were considered 
fundamental, and what the Fourteenth Amendment would logically 
be understood as securing for all.219  In offering what it saw as a 
relatively uncontroversial list of important American liberties, Scott 
included the personal carrying of arms outside the home. 
Texas 1859.  In the final antebellum case, Cockrum v. State,220 the 
Texas Supreme Court upheld a presumptive right to carry arms for 
defense, including even the Bowie knife, “the most deadly of all 
weapons in common use.”221  Cockrum upheld a statute providing that 
all unlawful killings committed with a Bowie knife would be punished 
as murder, the most serious degree of criminal homicide, rather than 
manslaughter.222  The court’s opinion reflected serious concern about 
the destructive capacity of the Bowie knife, yet still affirmed the right 
to carry it, and other common weapons, for use in self-defense.223  
The legislature could impose special penalties for the misuse of 
particularly dangerous weapons, but even this sort of regulation 
would become unconstitutional if it deterred individuals from 
exercising the right to carry a constitutionally protected weapon. 
The right to carry a bowie-knife for lawful defense is secured, and 
must be admitted. . . .  [A]dmonitory regulation of the abuse [of 
the right] must not be carried too far.  It certainly has a limit.  For 
if the legislature were to affix a punishment to the abuse of this 
right, so great, as in its nature, it must deter the citizen from its 
lawful exercise, that would be tantamount to a prohibition of the 
right.224 
                                                          
understood to ensure that they, like other American citizens, enjoy the characteristic 
rights of citizens, including the right to bear arms). 
 219. See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU 
L. REV. 1359, 1435 (“The purpose in discussing Dred Scott is not to cite it as binding 
precedent, but to acknowledge it as one of several nineteenth-century Supreme 
Court cases involving the right to arms . . . which . . . treat the Second Amendment as 
an individual right.”). 
 220. 24 Tex. 394 (1859). 
 221. Id. at 403.  The case involved a constitutional challenge under the Texas right 
to bear arms.  See TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. I, § 13 (“Every citizen shall have the right 
to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself and the State.”). 
 222. Cockrum, 24 Tex. at 401, 403. 
 223. Id. at 395, 402. 
 224. Id. at 403.  Cockrum also presented a challenge involving the Second 
Amendment.  The Texas court viewed the Second Amendment as primarily 
concerned with perpetuating a free government by keeping up an armed populace 
as a deterrent to tyranny, rather than the personal defense central to the Texas right-
to-arms provision.  Id. at 401–02.  This reading would become more popular in the 
postwar nineteenth century, see infra Part III.B, but was rejected by Heller. 
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Cockrum illustrates the thesis that, when an antebellum court 
concluded that a constitutional right to bear arms had a self-defense 
component, then this normally entailed presumptive carry rights, 
even as applied to a very potent and dangerous weapon such as the 
Bowie knife. 
b. Cases recognizing a right to bear arms that did not include 
 self-defense 
Three other important weapons carrying cases of the period reflect 
a different stance.225  They affirm wide (although not necessarily 
unlimited) authority to regulate the carrying of handguns and other 
weapons outside the home.  But most importantly, each of these cases 
rejected the central conclusion adopted in Heller:  that the 
constitutional right to bear arms was closely connected with 
individual self-defense.  Their rejection of that connection was a key 
premise for their rejection of broad carry rights.  Some of these 
courts emphasized language in constitutional provisions that limited 
the right to bear arms to civic purposes by stating that only firearms 
“for the common defense” or “in defense of the state” were 
protected.  Some concluded that the provisions did not protect 
personal rights of any kind.  Thus, these cases did not address the 
question now facing post-Heller courts:  whether a right to bear arms 
that is individual and closely connected with self-defense accordingly 
encompasses a right to presumptive carry. 
Tennessee 1840.  The most thoughtful antebellum opinion in this 
line is the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1840 decision in Aymette v. 
State.226  Aymette is the origin of the so-called “hybrid-right” view of the 
constitutional right to bear arms, which exercised wide influence 
during some periods of American history.  As discussed in more 
detail in Part III.B of this Article, the hybrid-right view construed the 
right to bear arms as a genuinely individual right, protecting certain 
kinds of weapons possession and use by citizens, even when they were 
not directly participating in a state-regulated military organization.  
Yet this view also construed the right as intended to serve purely civic 
purposes rather than personal ones, and it deemed those civic 
                                                          
 225. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 
(1842); Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840). 
 226. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840), distinguished by District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 613, 623 (2008). 
2012] MODELING THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT 633 
purposes to imply limits on both which firearms could be kept and 
how they could be borne.227 
Aymette upheld a prohibition on the concealed carrying of any 
“bowie knife, or Arkansas tooth-pick”228 against a claim that the act 
violated the right-to-arms provision of the Tennessee Constitution of 
1834, which provided that “the free white men of this State have a 
right to keep and to bear arms for their common defence.”229  The 
Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the “common defence” 
language of the state constitutional guarantee showed that the right’s 
primary purpose was civic in nature—namely, ensuring the ability to 
deter and resist tyrannical acts of government:  “[t]he object . . . for 
which the right of keeping and bearing arms is secured is the defence 
of the public . . . to protect the public liberty, to keep in awe those 
who are in power, and to maintain the supremacy of the laws and the 
constitution.”230  Aymette thus viewed collective defense, rather than 
“private defen[s]e,” as the primary purpose of the right.231 
The Aymette court concluded that the civic-only purpose of the 
right to arms meant that citizens enjoyed the right to keep only such 
weapons “as are usually employed in civilized warfare, and that 
constitute the ordinary military equipment.”232  This category 
included swords, muskets, and rifles, but it excluded non-military 
weapons “usually employed in private broils,” such as a spear 
concealed in a cane—or, evidently, the Bowie knife that Aymette was 
convicted for carrying.233 
Similarly, Aymette concluded that the carrying of concealed 
weapons could constitutionally be prohibited because such 
prohibitions would not interfere with the kinds of arms bearing 
necessary for the people to act in their common defense.   
                                                          
 227. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 228. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 155.  The term “Arkansas tooth pick” is far 
from exactly defined, but was generally used in the nineteenth century to refer to a 
long-bladed, formidable type of dagger, narrower and more sharply pointed than the 
typical “Bowie knife.” 
 229. TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I, § 26.  This was one of a handful of Southern 
state constitutional right to arms provisions that expressly confined the right to “free 
white men.”  See also ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21 (same); FLA. CONST. of 1838, 
art. I, § 21 (same).  These provisions were all adopted in the decade following Nat 
Turner’s bloody 1831 slave rebellion in Virginia and its suppression.  See Mosby v. 
Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1060–61 & n.46 (R.I. 2004) (Flanders, J., dissenting) 
(describing Aymette’s historical context and criticizing the majority opinion’s reliance 
on the case). 
 230. Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158 (emphasis added). 
 231. Id. at 157. 
 232. Id. at 158. 
 233. Id. at 159–61. 
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The citizens may bear [arms] for the common defence; but it does not 
follow that they may be borne by an individual, merely to terrify the 
people or for purposes of private assassination.  And, as the 
manner in which they are worn and circumstances under which 
they are carried indicate to every man the purpose of the wearer, 
the Legislature may prohibit such manner of wearing as would 
never be resorted to by persons engaged in the common defence.234 
This language holds concealed carry to be unprotected but is 
ambiguous as to whether open carrying—the manner “resorted to” by 
soldiers and militiamen—might be protected in some circumstances, 
as long as the purpose was not for “terrifying the people” or 
assassination.235  However, Aymette’s emphasis that carrying for the 
common defense means for “the defense of the public” suggests that a 
legislature would have considerable authority to restrict carrying for 
the defense of the individual, regardless of whether weapons were 
carried openly or concealed. 
Aymette thus marked a considerable shift from the same court’s 
opinion in Simpson v. State seven years earlier, which interpreted the 
right to bear arms provision of the Tennessee Constitution as 
protecting a broad right of the people to “carry weapons.”236  Aymette 
argued that the contrary passages from Simpson had merely been 
dicta.237  However, this was an inaccurate description of the earlier 
opinion.  Simpson had interpreted the crime of affray narrowly to 
avoid a conflict with the constitutional right to bear arms, and the 
constitutional issue was one of two alternative grounds that the court 
offered to justify its holding.238 
Aymette would exercise considerable influence on other courts in 
the decades following the Civil War, but it represented a minority 
position among antebellum courts,239 and its holding depended on 
the conclusion that the right to bear arms was not concerned with 
private defense. 
Arkansas 1842.  Arkansas’s state constitutional right to arms, which 
                                                          
 234. Id. at 160 (emphasis added). 
 235. Id. 
 236. See supra notes 183–189 and accompanying text. 
 237. See Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 161 (arguing that the contrary passages 
from Simpson were simply “an incidental remark of the judge who delivered the 
opinion”). 
 238. Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356, 359–60 (1833); see District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613–14 (2008) (rejecting Aymette’s interpretation of 
the right to bear arms and noting that Aymette conflicted with Simpson on this point). 
 239. See also State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 633 (1856) (opining that the Second 
Amendment protects only “arms . . . such as are borne by a people in war, or at least 
carried openly”). 
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was similar to Tennessee’s, protected only the right of “free white 
men . . . to keep and bear arms for their common defence.”240  In State 
v. Buzzard,241 a divided Arkansas Supreme Court held that the state’s 
prohibition of the concealed carrying of pistols and large knives 
(except by travelers) did not violate either the state constitution or 
the Second Amendment.242 
The two judges in the majority, writing separately, concluded that 
the right to bear arms did not protect individual defense.243  One 
judge took the same view as Aymette, denying that either the Second 
Amendment or the Arkansas Constitution enabled the individual “to 
protect and defend by individual force his private rights against . . . 
illegal invasion.”244  To the contrary, the “sole object” of the right to 
arms was “to provide, beyond the power of legal control, adequate 
means for the preservation and defence of the State and her 
republican institutions.”245  The second judge went further, writing 
that the Second Amendment did not secure individual rights at all; it 
was merely “an assertion of that general right of sovereignty 
belonging to independent nations, to regulate their military force.”246 
Meanwhile, the dissenting judge concluded that the constitutional 
right to bear arms was concerned with individual self-defense, and 
therefore—as we might predict by now, having examined the judicial 
consensus of the era—went on to conclude that it protected 
presumptive carry rights.247  The dissent took the same broad view of 
the right to bear arms for self-defense as the Kentucky court in Bliss v. 
Commonwealth:  it was a liberty to carry any personal weapon for 
defense, and the individual could carry the weapon openly or 
concealed.248 
North Carolina 1843.  In State v. Huntly,249 the North Carolina 
Supreme Court expressed hostility to presumptive carry, but it noted 
                                                          
 240. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21. 
 241. 4 Ark. 18 (1842). 
 242. Id. at 18, 28 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.). 
 243. Id. at 24; id. at 32 (opinion of Dickinson, J.). 
 244. Id. at 22 (opinion of Ringo, C.J.). 
 245. Id. at 27.  
 246. Id. at 32 (opinion of Dickinson, J.).  
 247. Id. at 40, 43 (opinion of Lacy, J.).  The dissent argued that the government 
already possessed an inherent power to arm the militia.  Thus, the concurrence’s 
interpretation of the right to bear arms as protecting government power rendered 
the right “valueless and not worth preserving; for the State unquestionably possesses 
the power, without the grant, to arm the militia, and direct how they shall be 
employed . . . .  [W]hy give that which is no right in itself, and guaranties a privilege 
that is useless?”  Id. at 35. 
 248. Id. at 43. 
 249. 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418 (1843). 
636 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:585 
that not all carry of firearms was illegal.  Huntly was a poor claimant 
for constitutional protection:  he had taken to the public roads on 
horseback, armed with “a double barrelled gun,” and had uttered 
threats to kill one Ratcliff and his family members in a dispute over 
title to slaves.250  The North Carolina Supreme Court easily upheld 
Huntly’s conviction for “going about armed with unusual or 
dangerous weapons, to the terror of the people,” which it equated 
with the common law offense of affray.251  The court noted that the 
North Carolina Constitution guaranteed the right of the people “to 
bear arms for the defence of the State”252—a form of language that, 
like the Tennessee and Arkansas constitutions, arguably excluded 
bearing arms for the defense of the individual.  The court interpreted 
the provision as serving civic purposes only.253 
What if Huntly had not been carrying his gun for what was evidently 
an intended criminal assault, but instead had been carrying merely 
for lawful self-defense?  The Huntly opinion acknowledges that “the 
carrying of a gun, per se, constitutes no offence,”254 but expresses a 
skeptical view of the routine carrying of a gun for self-defense. 
It has been remarked that a . . . gun, cannot in this country come 
under the description of “unusual weapons,” for there is scarcely a 
man in the community who does not own and occasionally use a 
gun of some sort.  But we do not feel the force of this criticism. A 
gun is an “unusual weapon,” wherewith to be armed and clad.  No 
man amongst us carries it about with him, as one of his every day 
accoutrements—as a part of his dress—and never we trust will the 
day come when any deadly weapon will be worn or wielded in our 
peace loving and law-abiding State, as an appendage of manly 
equipment.255 
Huntly states that there are some lawful purposes to carry a gun, 
such as “business or amusement,” but makes no express mention of 
self-defense. 
It is difficult to read Huntly as supporting presumptive carry, and 
this is as we might expect, given the court’s narrow focus on the civic 
                                                          
 250. Id. at 418–19. 
 251. Id. at 420–22. 
 252. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 17. 
 253. See Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) at 422 (“While it secures to him a right of which 
he cannot be deprived, it holds forth the duty in execution of which that right is to be 
exercised:  If he employ those arms, which he ought to wield for the safety and 
protection of his country, to the annoyance and terror and danger of its citizens, he 
deserves but the severer condemnation for the abuse of the high privilege, with 
which he has been invested.”). 
 254. Id. at 422–23. 
 255. Id. at 422. 
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purpose of the North Carolina right to bear arms.  The case conforms 
to the pattern we have seen in the antebellum case law.  In the 
decades between the ratification of the Second Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the judicial consensus was that if the right 
to bear arms had the purpose of self-defense, then it included 
presumptive carry rights.256  If a given right to bear arms did not serve 
the purpose of self-defense, then it permitted a more sweeping 
regulation of weapons carrying. 
2. Commentators 
a. St. George Tucker 
The first major academic commentator on the American 
Constitution was St. George Tucker, a William & Mary law professor 
and future federal district court and Virginia Court of Appeals 
judge.257  Tucker’s American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Common Law of England258 was published in 1803, a dozen years 
after the ratification of the Second Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
looked to Tucker as a source for the original understanding of the 
Second Amendment in both Heller and McDonald.259 
Tucker viewed the American right to arms as an individual right 
importantly concerned with self-defense, and one that encompassed 
the public carrying of firearms.260  He advocated the exercise of 
judicial review to ensure that legislation remained in conformity with 
the Constitution.261  As a hypothetical example of an unconstitutional 
statute that would require a federal court to intervene, Tucker chose 
a statute “prohibiting any person from bearing arms.”262 
                                                          
 256. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 257. See St. George Tucker, THE COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG OFFICIAL HISTORY SITE, 
http://www.history.org/almanack/people/bios/biotuck.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2012). 
 258. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES:  WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE 
TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; 
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & 
Abraham Small 1803). 
 259. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010) (citing Tucker’s 
description of the right to arms as “‘the true palladium of liberty’” in support of the 
conclusion that the right is fundamental); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 594–95, 606 (2008) (citing Tucker’s view that the right-to-arms provision was 
based on the principle of individual self-defense). 
 260. See TUCKER, supra note 258, vol. 1, pt. 1, app., at 300 (arguing that “the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms” is the “true palladium of liberty” and that the 
right of self-defense is the “first law of nature”). 
 261. Id. at 289. 
 262. Tucker believed that courts should actively enforce the requirement that 
Congressional statutes be “necessary and proper” for carrying out an enumerated 
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Elsewhere, Tucker offered a concrete illustration of the “bearing 
arms” protected by the Second Amendment:  an individual carrying a 
firearm outside the home for hunting or self-defense.263  The 
illustration arose in a discussion of the law of treason.  Tucker noted 
that English law imposed a rebuttable presumption that any 
gathering of men where weapons were present was motivated by 
treason.264  But Tucker doubted that it would be proper for the 
bearing of weapons to give rise to such a presumption in America, 
“where the right to bear arms is recognized and secured in the 
constitution itself.”265  Tucker observed that “[i]n many parts of the 
United States, a man no more thinks, of going out of his house on 
any occasion, without his rifle or musket in his hand, than a 
European fine gentleman without his sword by his side.”266 
Tucker thus perfectly fits the antebellum pattern:  early American 
sources that treated self-defense as an important purpose of the right 
to bear arms accordingly viewed it as protecting presumptive carry 
rights. 
b. William Rawle 
The next major constitutional commentator, the prominent 
Pennsylvania lawyer and former United States Attorney William 
Rawle, published his A View of the Constitution of the United States of 
America in 1825; the second edition appeared in 1829.267  Rawle 
viewed the Second Amendment as an individual right to possess 
weapons, which served the purpose of enabling citizens to protect 
their liberties and the civic order.268  He viewed the use of forest and 
game laws in England to “disarm[] the people” as an example of 
                                                          
power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, and that a statute infringing upon important 
liberties could not be deemed constitutionally “proper,” even if it was intended to 
achieve a laudable purpose.  TUCKER, supra note 258, vol. 1, pt. 1, app., at 288–89.  
He elaborated:  “If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person 
from bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts, under 
the construction of the words necessary and proper, here contended for, would be 
able to pronounce decidedly upon the constitutionality of these means.”  Id. at 289. 
 263. TUCKER, supra note 258, vol. 5, app., n.B, at 19. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA (Philadelphia, Philip N. Nicklin, 2d ed. 1829). 
 268. See id. 125–26 (distinguishing between the clause of the Second Amendment 
that relates to a “well regulated Militia,” and the clause that states that the right of 
the people to bear arms “shall not be infringed,” implying that the former is a 
collective expression of the right and the latter is more individual). 
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infringement of the right to arms.269  Rawle believed the Second 
Amendment was enforceable to restrain not only federal laws, but 
also state laws that attempted to disarm the people.270 
It is less clear whether Rawle thought personal defense was an 
important component of the right.  Rawle believed legislatures had 
authority to regulate the carrying of weapons to prevent the right to 
bear arms from being “abused to the disturbance of the public 
peace.”271  Yet he stopped short of affirming legislative authority to 
enact a general prohibition of carrying weapons in public for self-
defense.  Instead, Rawle merely argued that carrying could be 
restricted when it occurred in circumstances objectively suggesting an 
unlawful purpose:   
An assemblage of persons with arms, for an unlawful purpose, is an 
indictable offence, and even the carrying of arms abroad by a 
single individual, attended with circumstances giving just reason to 
fear that he purposes to make an unlawful use of them, would be 
sufficient cause to require him to give surety of the peace.  If he 
refused he would be liable for imprisonment.272 
Rawle’s analysis is consistent with defensive carry rights, but it does 
not affirm them in Tucker’s clear fashion. 
c. Joseph Story 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, perhaps the leading 
constitutional commentator of the first half of the nineteenth 
century, discussed the Second Amendment in his 1833 Commentaries 
on the Constitution of the United States273 and in his 1840 A Familiar 
Exposition of the Constitution of the United States.274  Story does not discuss 
defensive weapons carrying, or the permissible scope of carrying 
regulation.  Instead, his exposition of the right to bear arms focuses 
mainly upon the civic purposes served by an armed and trained 
                                                          
 269. Id. at 126. 
 270. See id. at 125–26 (“No clause in the Constitution could . . . be conceived to 
give to congress a power to disarm the people.  Such a flagitious attempt could only 
be made under some general pretence by a state legislature.  But if in any blind 
pursuit of inordinate power, either should attempt it, this amendment may be 
appealed to as a restraint on both.”). 
 271. Id. at 126. 
 272. Id. 
 273. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833). 
 274. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Boston, Marsh, Capen, Lyon, & Webb 1840). 
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populace in deterring both “domestic insurrections, and domestic 
usurpations of power by rulers.”275 
Yet Story makes clear that the right is individual.276  Like Rawle, he 
describes a tyrant’s action of “disarming the people, and making it an 
offence to keep arms” as a paradigmatic violation of the right to 
arms.277  Story’s exposition of the Second Amendment is compatible 
with a right that includes a strong component of individual self-
defense, but his focus on civic purposes makes it most natural to read 
Story as a leading academic proponent of the hybrid-right view of 
Aymette v. State.  Indeed, both Story and Aymette were drawn upon 
extensively decades later in Andrews v. State,278 an 1871 decision that 
was the most influential postbellum expression of the hybrid-right 
view.279 
3. Summary 
The foregoing encompasses the body of American case law, and 
the three most important constitutional commentators, addressing 
the nature and scope of the constitutional right to bear arms between 
the ratification of the Second Amendment in 1791 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  As we have seen, every court in this 
era that interpreted a federal or state constitutional right to bear 
arms as an individual right closely connected with self-defense—as 
the Supreme Court did when it interpreted the Second Amendment 
in Heller—also interpreted the right as protecting a right to carry 
outside the home, and most also clearly viewed it as protecting 
presumptive carry rights.  Within this consensus, courts did differ 
about the permissible scope of regulation of the right:  most, but not 
all, judges concluded that concealed carrying of common weapons 
could be prohibited as long as open carry remained legal,280 while a 
few believed concealed carry was also protected.281 
                                                          
 275. Id. at 264–65.  However, Story’s Commentaries cite Tucker’s criticisms of 
English laws that Tucker believed had narrowed the right to arms. See STORY, supra 
note 273, at 747 (citing Tucker for the proposition that “under various pretences the 
effect of [the English right to arms] has been greatly narrowed; and it is at present in 
England more nominal than real, as a defensive privilege”).  This brief reference 
suggests that Story did contemplate a self-defense component to the right to arms. 
 276. See STORY, supra note 274, at 264–65 (stating that the right of citizens to bear 
arms is a fundamental liberty of individuals in a free nation by “offer[ing] a strong 
moral check against the usurpations and arbitrary powers of rulers”). 
 277. Id. 
 278. 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165 (1871). 
 279. Id. at 183–85. 
 280. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. 
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There is a discernible tendency for the earliest American courts 
and commentators to affirm defensive carry rights in the strongest, 
most categorical terms.  As decades passed, a somewhat greater scope 
for regulation was recognized, though still within the presumptive 
carry paradigm.  Finally, a minority of courts embodied the obverse 
side of the antebellum consensus:  they concluded that the right to 
bear arms did not relate primarily to private self-defense—and 
accordingly, rejected presumptive carry.282  In rare cases, these courts 
rejected individual rights altogether.283 
The methods of originalist constitutional interpretation adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald suggest that the 
antebellum period is an especially valuable source for interpreting 
the Second Amendment as made enforceable against the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  This period is doubly relevant because it is 
simultaneously the immediate post-enactment history of the Second 
Amendment and the pre-enactment history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  It illuminates what Americans thought they had done 
in 1791 by adopting a constitutional right to bear arms in the Bill of 
Rights, and what kind of right they understood themselves to be 
making enforceable against the states by adopting the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868.  Thus, it is no surprise that the Heller Court 
devoted nearly nine full pages of the United States Reports to 
examining antebellum case law and commentary.284  This material is 
especially relevant to applying the right to bear arms to defensive 
weapons carrying:  that was the most common subject the antebellum 
courts addressed. 
B. The Postbellum Era:  The Late-Nineteenth and Early-Twentieth 
Century285 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, judicial interpretations of the 
right to bear arms began to shift, especially in the South.286  A new era 
began, enduring for perhaps half a century before its foundations 
began to shift again in the early-twentieth century.287  During this 
                                                          
 282. See supra notes 228–233, 252–253 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 243–246 and accompanying text. 
 284. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605–14 (2008) (examining 
antebellum sources “to determine the public understanding of [the Second 
Amendment] in the period after its enactment or ratification” and describing this 
inquiry as “a critical tool of constitutional interpretation”). 
 285. Further background on this period is presented in JOHNSON, ET AL. supra note 
126, ch. 6. 
 286. Id.; Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 38, at 1324–33. 
 287. One may think of this era as approximately bookended by the important 
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postbellum period, the presumptive carry consensus received its first 
major challenge; numerous courts adopted views of the right that 
protected only a non-presumptive right to carry.  Many state 
constitutions, especially in the South, were amended after the war by 
adding provisos that allowed more restrictions on weapons carrying.288  
Decisions increasingly held that legislatures could impose significant 
limits on the situations in which individuals could carry, on the places 
where individuals could carry, and/or on the mode in which 
defensive arms could be carried. 
1. Cases applying a hybrid right 
Most of these postbellum cases, however, do not bear closely on the 
question Heller raises—whether a right to bear arms for self-defense 
includes presumptive carry rights—because they did not interpret the 
right to bear arms as importantly concerned with self-defense.  
Instead, most of this era’s decisions followed a distinctive conception 
of the right to bear arms that does not exactly fit either the typical 
pro-individual rights attitude or the typical pro-regulation attitude of 
today.  Adopting a term of David Hardy’s, one may call it the hybrid 
view.289 
According to the hybrid view, the chief function of the right to 
bear arms was to support civic purposes such as military readiness,290 
and/or to deter tyrannical acts by government.291  Because the right 
                                                          
decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 
165 (1871), and the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222 
(N.C. 1921), a half century later.  
 288. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, §26 (“[T]he citizens of this State have a right to 
keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, 
by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime.” (emphasis added)); 
TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep and bear 
arms, in the lawful defence of himself or the State, under such regulations as the 
Legislature may prescribe.” (emphasis added)). 
 289. See David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies:  Toward a Jurisprudence of the 
Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 618 (1986) (defining the “‘hybrid’ 
interpretation” of the constitutional right to arms as recognizing an individual right, 
but one that is limited to the private possession or use of arms that are suited for 
military or militia use).  Hardy identifies the postbellum decades as “the period of 
ascendancy of the ‘hybrid’ interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms.”  Id. 
 290. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 476 (1874) (“The right to bear arms [exists] 
in order that the state may, when its exigencies demand, have at call a body of men, 
having arms at their command, belonging to themselves and habituated to the use of 
them, [but] is in no fair sense a guarantee that the owners of these arms may bear 
them at concerts, and prayer-meetings, and elections.”); Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 
at 177–78 (“What was the object held to be so desirable as to require that its 
attainment should be guaranteed by being inserted in the fundamental law of the 
land?  It was the efficiency of the people as soldiers, when called into actual service 
for the security of the State, as one end . . . .”). 
 291. See, e.g., Carlton v. State, 58 So. 486, 488 (Fla. 1912) (asserting that the state 
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was closely tied to these civic purposes, they implied certain 
limitations on the scope of the right’s protection.  The main 
limitations, as I discuss below, concerned the types of weapons 
protected by the right, and the carrying of weapons for personal 
defense.  Under the hybrid right, only those small arms appropriate 
for use in civilized warfare were protected.292  The right to carry 
weapons for self-defense outside the home was subject to substantial 
regulation.293  Nevertheless, courts following this view treated the 
right to arms as a genuine individual right:  it extended to members 
of the entire citizenry and protected certain kinds of personal 
keeping and use.  This feature differentiated the postbellum courts’ 
approach from the “collective right” and “sophisticated collective 
right” views of post-New Deal federal courts, which sought to justify a 
“right of the people” that left most of the people with no protection 
of their ability to own or use firearms.294 
The hybrid view, in the hands of some courts, was capable of 
exercising constraint on legislation.  It was not inherently a mere 
make-weight or pretext for upholding any kind of regulation.  The 
most widely influential postwar judicial expression of the hybrid right 
came in Andrews v. State, an 1871 decision of the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee.295  In many ways, Andrews is a clarification of the same 
court’s antebellum decision in Aymette v. State, the first hybrid-right 
case.296  As the most careful articulation of the hybrid view of the right 
to arms, particularly as it applies to handgun carrying, Andrews 
deserves a full examination. 
                                                          
constitutional right to bear arms “was intended to give the people the means of 
protecting themselves against oppression and public outrage”); Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 
564, 566 (1882) (“The constitutional provision sprung from the former tyrannical 
practice, on the part of governments, of disarming the subjects, so as to render them 
powerless against oppression.  It is not intended to afford citizens the means of 
prosecuting, more successfully, their private broils in a free government.”); Andrews, 
50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 184–85 (“‘If the citizens have these arms in their hands, they 
are prepared in the best possible manner, to repel any encroachments upon their 
rights by those in authority.’” (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 
(1840))). 
 292. See, e.g., English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 477 (1872) (distinguishing the holster 
pistol of the cavalry and the sidearm of the artilleryman from “dirks, daggers, 
slungshots, sword-canes, brass-knuckles and bowie knives”); Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 
Heisk.) at 179 (holding that “the rifle of all descriptions, the shot gun, the musket, 
and repeater” are constitutionally protected). 
 293. See, e.g., Haile, 38 Ark. at 566 (stating that the “habitual” carrying of arms in 
public is unnecessary for the “‘common defense,’” and may therefore be regulated). 
 294. See generally O’Shea, supra note 74, at 354–57. 
 295. Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, cited in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 608, 614, 629 (2008). 
 296. See supra notes 226–235 and accompanying text for a discussion of Aymette. 
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The decision reversed a conviction obtained under an 1870 statute 
that forbade the carrying of handguns except by police officers and 
travelers.297  Andrews challenged the carry ban as a violation of the 
Second Amendment and of Tennessee’s postwar Constitution of 
1870, which eliminated the racially discriminatory language of the 
former constitution and provided instead that “the citizens of this 
State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common 
defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the 
wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime.”298 
The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the Second 
Amendment did not bind the states of its own force.299  However, it 
viewed the Second Amendment and the Tennessee right-to-arms 
provision as equivalent in nature and scope, and so interpreted them 
together.300  The court’s analysis embraced every major feature of the 
hybrid-right view.  First, the right to arms is mainly intended to 
preserve military readiness and the public liberty.  Second, this 
purpose implies limitations on the scope of the right, specifically:  (1) 
only militia-useful weapons are protected, and (2) carrying weapons 
for individual self-defense against crime is peripheral to the right, not 
central to it, so carrying can be heavily regulated.  Third, the right to 
have arms nevertheless belongs to each individual citizen, not only to 
militiamen. 
What was the object held to be so desirable as to require that its 
attainment should be guaranteed by being inserted in the 
fundamental law of the land?  It was the efficiency of the people as 
soldiers, when called into actual service for the security of the State, 
as one end; and in order to this, they were to be allowed to keep 
arms.  What, then, is involved in this right of keeping arms?  It 
necessarily involves the right to purchase and use them in such a 
way as is usual, or to keep them for the ordinary purposes to which 
they are adapted; and . . . the right to practice their use, in order to 
attain to . . . efficiency.301 
The underlying theory of the right to keep arms, as Andrews saw it, 
was that a people whose members own common weapons and 
                                                          
 297. The act made it unlawful “for any person to publicly or privately carry a dirk, 
sword-cane, Spanish stiletto, belt or pocket pistol or revolver”.  Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 
Heisk.) at 171. 
 298. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 299. See Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 177 (stating that the federal and state 
constitutions stand together, providing the same rights for the same reasons and 
protecting them from invasion by both the federal and state legislatures). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 177–78. 
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practice with them will be skilled in their use and able to function 
effectively as a popular militia when the good of the polity demands 
it.302 
As a consequence, Andrews followed the earlier conclusion in 
Aymette that not all hand-carried weapons were constitutionally 
protected.  Only those useful in “civilized warfare” fell within the 
scope of the right.303  This category included “the rifle of all 
descriptions, the shot gun, [and] the musket”—the major categories 
of long guns.304  It also included, in an important development for 
later cases, the “repeater,” which the court defined as a large, 
military-type handgun—presumably such as the Colt Army and Navy 
revolvers that had played prominent roles in cavalry actions during 
the Civil War.305 
Thus, the constitutional right to keep arms included the right to 
own, acquire, and practice with weapons useful in “civilized warfare,” 
including some handguns.  What about the right to “bear arms,” 
which antebellum courts had frequently deemed to protect individual 
carrying of weapons for self-defense?  Andrews saw the matter 
differently:   
It is insisted by the Attorney General, that the right to keep and 
bear arms is a political, not a civil right.  [T]his . . . fails to 
distinguish between the nature of the right to keep, and its 
necessary incidents, and the right to bear arms for the common 
defense.  Bearing arms for the common defense may well be held 
to be a political right, or for protection and maintenance of such 
rights, intended to be guaranteed; but the right to keep them . . . is 
                                                          
 302. Id. at 178, 194. 
 303. Compare id. at 179 (finding that constitutionally protected arms are those a 
soldier uses and trains with), with Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 
(1840) (concluding that the right to bear arms encompasses only those weapons that 
“are usually employed in civilized warfare”). 
 304. Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 179.  Note that when Andrews was decided, 
“the rifle of all descriptions” included rapid-firing, repeating rifles with large 
ammunition capacities, such as the Henry and Spencer lever-action rifles, which had 
gained prominence on the battlefield in the last years of the Civil War, and were 
commercially manufactured by Winchester after the war.  See O’Shea, supra note 74, 
at 381–83. 
 305. See Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 179, 186–87. 
As to the pistol designated as a revolver, we hold this may or may not be such 
a weapon as is adapted to the usual equipment of the soldier, or the use of 
which may render him more efficient as such . . . .  We know there is a pistol 
of that name which is not adapted to the equipment of the soldier, yet we 
also know that the pistol known as the repeater is a soldier’s weapon—skill in 
the use of which will add to the efficiency of the soldier.  If such is the 
character of the weapon here designated, then the prohibition of the statute 
is too broad to be allowed to stand . . . . 
Id. at 186–87. 
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a private individual right, guaranteed to the citizen, not the 
soldier.306 
If “bear arms” was a “political right” referring to participation in 
the common defense, then the right to carry handguns for personal 
defense was not protected by the right to bear arms.  But it could only 
be protected by the personal right to “keep arms.”  Andrews 
concluded that the right to keep arms did include a right to carry 
full-sized, military-type handguns in some circumstances.  
Accordingly, to the extent the challenged statute prohibited all 
carrying of all handguns, it was unconstitutional.307 
Andrews went on to say quite a bit about the circumstances in which 
gun carrying was likely to be constitutionally protected, reflecting a 
distinctly narrower view of the right to carry than most antebellum 
cases recognized.  A citizen could be prohibited from carrying 
firearms to church, or to other “public assemblages,” since such 
carrying was neither appropriate “nor necessary in order to his 
familiarity with them, and his training and efficiency in their use.”308  
On the other hand, the right to carry a handgun “on his own 
premises” was likely protected:  one’s own land thus differed from a 
public assemblage.309  Andrews, however, declined to resolve the issue 
of when a citizen was entitled to carry a handgun off of his own 
premises for self-defense.  The court admitted the issue was 
difficult,310 but it suggested that the right did not protect habitual 
carrying of a handgun.311  Instead, some sort of unusual situation of 
necessity had to exist for handgun carrying to be protected.  For 
example, a man could carry a revolver into the street “to shoot a 
rabid dog that threatened his child.”312  Likewise, an individual who 
could make a sufficient showing of a threat to life likely would be 
entitled to carry and use a handgun for self-defense, but this would 
be subject to a requirement that the threat be sufficiently specific and 
imminent.313  In general, the Andrews court stressed, the individual 
                                                          
 306. Id. at 182. 
 307. Id. at 180–81, 192. 
 308. Id. at 182. 
 309. Id. at 187. 
 310. Id. at 188. 
 311. See id. at 190 (explaining that, because Andrews had been in the habit of 
carrying a gun, he could not prove that he was in imminent danger and was 
therefore unprotected by the right to bear arms). 
 312. Id. at 187. 
 313. The court considered Andrews’s argument that “there was a set of men in the 
neighborhood” who were “seeking the life of the defendant.” Id. at 190 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  It noted that the evidence suggested he had carried a 
pistol habitually for several years, which (in the court’s view) tended to undermine 
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must trust the government to provide protection and safety, rather 
than providing for his own safety by carrying defensive weapons in 
routine activities.314 
The opinion embodies each key idea of the model of the right to 
bear arms that I have termed non-presumptive carry.  Even under this 
model, as Andrews demonstrates, the notion that the right to arms is 
confined to the interior of the home is rejected.  Outdoor locations 
such as one’s curtilage and other private “premises” are strong 
candidates for protection of carry rights.  Habitual carry in public 
locations is not protected, but public carrying is likely to be justified 
when the carrier can show a special threat to personal (or a 
dependent’s) safety, perhaps subject to an imminence requirement.  
The Andrews view of the right-to-arms left the government with broad 
powers to prohibit handgun carrying in “public assemblages,” 
variously defined. 
The canonical expression of the hybrid view in the scholarly 
literature was Justice Thomas Cooley’s General Principles of 
Constitutional Law, originally published in 1880 and subsequently 
revised.315  In this work, Cooley cited Andrews v. State prominently and 
adopted a similar view of the right.316  He understood the Second 
                                                          
his claim of self-defense.  Id.  But it declined to decide whether under what 
circumstances an individual could make a showing that he was “in peril of life or 
limb or great bodily harm, so imminent as to present [an] element of self-defense in 
justification of his carrying his pistol.”  Id. at 190–91. 
 314. Id.  In a partial concurrence, two judges rejected the majority’s adoption of 
the hybrid view, and argued for a self-defense-based right to bear arms that included 
presumptive carry rights.  In the concurrence’s view, Tennessee’s right to bear arms 
encompassed carrying all common weapons, not just militia-type weapons.  See id. at 
194 (Nelson, J., concurring in part) (“The word ‘bear’ was not used alone in the 
military sense of carrying arms, but in the popular sense of wearing them in war or in 
peace.  The word ‘arms,’ means ‘instruments or weapons of offense or defense,’ and 
is not restricted, by any means, to public warfare.”). 
 Adhering to the antebellum consensus, the concurrence acknowledged that 
the legislature could require that weapons be carried “in a public manner,” that is, 
openly, id. at 195, but denied that it could prevent individuals from carrying weapons 
regularly for self-defense.  See id. at 197 (“I hold that when a man is really and truly 
endangered by a lawless assault, and the fierceness of the attack is such as to require 
immediate resistance in order to save his own life, he may defend himself with any 
weapon whatever, whether seized in the heat of the conflict, or carried for the 
purpose of self-defense. . . .  It is deeply to be regretted that any peaceful citizen 
should be placed in a condition making it necessary for him to carry arms for his own 
protection . . . .  But some of the most important elements in nature, such, for 
example, as fire and water, may be . . . misused and perverted.  Yet we do not 
prohibit or destroy their use.  We endeavor only to regulate it.”). 
 315. THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Alexis C. Angell ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 2d ed. 
1891). 
 316. Id. at 282–83. 
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Amendment right to arms as centrally concerned with deterring 
government tyranny.  As Cooley explained, the amendment was 
adopted from the English Bill of Rights of 1688, which “was meant to 
be a strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power 
of rulers, and as a necessary and efficient means of regaining rights 
when temporarily overturned by usurpation.”317 
Yet, Cooley stressed, the right was one enjoyed by all individuals, 
and it protected their ownership and use of a delimited class of 
common weapons adapted to civilized warfare.318  Cooley viewed the 
individual right to “bear arms” as a right to practice and train with 
one’s personal weapons. 
The Right is General.—It may be supposed from the phraseology of 
this provision that the right to keep and bear arms was only 
guaranteed to the militia; but this would be an interpretation not 
warranted by the intent. . . .  The meaning of the provision 
undoubtedly is, that the people, from whom the militia must be 
taken, shall have the right to keep and bear arms, and they need no 
permission or regulation of law for the purpose.  But this enables 
the government to have a well-regulated militia; for to bear arms 
implies something more than the mere keeping; it implies the 
learning to handle and use them in a way that makes those who 
keep them ready for their efficient use . . . . 
What Arms may be kept.—The arms intended by the Constitution are 
such as are suitable for the general defence of the community 
against invasion or oppression, and the secret carrying of those 
suited merely to deadly individual encounters may be prohibited.319 
Neither Andrews nor Cooley’s Principles rules out protection for the 
defensive carrying of firearms.  Yet much of the case law—especially 
Southern—of this half century moved away from presumptive carry 
rights, and toward recognizing narrower, circumstantially limited 
non-presumptive carry rights.  In some ways, the hybrid-right 
conception naturally leads to such a result, since it conceives the right 
                                                          
 317. Id. at 281–82. 
 318. Id. at 282–83. 
 319. Id.  In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily upon Cooley’s 
quoted analysis of the corollary implications of the right to arms, and struck down a 
Chicago municipal ordinance banning firing ranges from the city as 
unconstitutional.  651 F.3d 684, 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting the above passage 
from Cooley’s General Principles for the proposition that the right to keep and bear 
arms “implies the learning to handle and use them . . .; it implies the right to meet 
for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the laws of public order” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Ezell court mistakenly 
attributed the quote to Cooley’s famous treatise on Constitutional Limitations 
published in 1868.  Id. at 704. 
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to arms as defined and limited by civic, not personal, purposes.  If 
individual defense against violence is not a central purpose of the 
right, then the routine bearing of arms outside the home for defense 
is also only peripheral to the right.  Accordingly, the bearing of arms 
may be regulated to a greater extent. 
The cases following in Andrews’s wake reflect this logic.  Again and 
again, postbellum courts upheld heavy restrictions on weapons 
carrying on the basis that the right (in their view) was ultimately 
intended to protect the common defense, not personal defense.  
An 1874 Georgia decision opined that the legislature could 
constitutionally require one’s firearms to be “borne” unloaded, or 
strapped to the back, so as to be useless for self-defense.320  Such a 
restriction would be constitutional, according to the court, because 
the purpose of the right to arms was military familiarization, not 
personal defense.321 
The Arkansas Supreme Court in 1882 upheld a statute that banned 
carrying any handgun except for an army pistol, and required that 
the army pistol be carried “uncovered in the hand” only.322  (A similar 
statute was also enacted, and sustained against constitutional 
challenge, in Tennessee.323)  In effect, the provision made it 
impossible for a law-abiding citizen to carry a pistol for any extended 
period of time, since the gun could not legally be holstered.324  
However, the user was able to carry the pistol for brief periods near 
his dwelling, in response to a perceived necessity.  Again, the basis for 
this decision was that, although the right to arms protected individual 
firearms possession, it was founded upon civic purposes rather than 
                                                          
 320. Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 481 (1874). 
 321. See id. (“[N]o act is in violation of [the right] that leaves the citizen the right 
to keep arms, and so to carry and use them as will render him familiar with their use, 
so . . . that he will be prepared for public service as a militiaman when needed.”).  
The court stressed the distinction between self-defense and militia participation:   
[T]he object of the provision was to secure to the state a well regulated 
militia.  The simple right to carry arms upon the person, either openly or 
secretly, would not answer the declared purposes in view.  Skill and 
familiarity in the use of arms was the thing sought for.  The right to “tote” 
them, as our colored people say, would be a bootless privilege, fitting one, 
perhaps, for playing soldier upon a drill ground, but offering no aid in that 
knowledge which makes an effective . . . shooting solider. 
Id. at 480.  Hill’s disdain for the carrying of firearms by nonwhites displays a further 
leitmotif of the postbellum cases:  their connection with the reimposition of white 
racial domination in the South.  See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 38, at 1325, 1333. 
 322. Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 566–67 (1882). 
 323. State v. Wilburn, 66 Tenn. 57, 62 (1872). 
 324. See Haile, 38 Ark. at 566 (explaining that carrying pistols uncovered in the 
hand is “a very inconvenient mode of carrying them habitually”). 
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private ones:  personal defense was not an important aspect of the 
right.325 
Eight years later, a West Virginia decision interpreted the Second 
Amendment as reflecting the hybrid right:  its core purpose was the 
preservation of “the public liberty,” as reflected by the reference in its 
prefatory clause to a well regulated militia.326  The court therefore 
upheld, against constitutional challenge, a state statute that 
criminalized all handgun carrying unless the defendant could prove 
that he was a quiet and peaceful citizen of “good character and 
standing,” and had “good cause to believe . . . he was in danger of 
death or great bodily harm.”327 
2. Cases substituting a hybrid (or even collective) right for a broad right 
The pull of the hybrid view in this period was so strong that a few 
courts adopted it even when the text of the constitutional provisions 
they were applying specified a broad, self-defense-based right.  The 
Texas Supreme Court initially interpreted Texas’s postwar 
constitution using the hybrid view, though the text protected the 
right of each person “to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defence of 
himself,” suggesting that the right would encompass weapons 
appropriate for self-defense.328  In the 1872 decision English v. State,329 
the Texas court held that only militia-suitable firearms were 
protected by the right, leaving most handguns and knives 
constitutionally unprotected.330  It upheld a far-reaching ban on 
                                                          
 325.  Id. at 566.  The Arkansas Supreme Court made clear that its holding turned 
on the distinction between self-defense and the common defense.   
The constitutional provision sprung from the former tyrannical practice . . . 
of disarming the subjects, so as to render them powerless against oppression. 
. . .  It would be a perversion of its object, to make it a protection to the 
citizen, in going, with convenience to himself . . . prepared at all times to 
inflict death upon his fellow-citizens, upon the occasion of any real or 
imaginary wrong.  The “common defense” of the citizen does not require 
that. 
Id. 
 326. State v. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 372–73 (1891). 
 327. Id. at 371–73 (“The second amendment . . . should be construed . . . in 
consonance with the reason and spirit of the amendment itself, as defined in what 
may be called its ‘preamble.’ . . .  The keeping and bearing of arms, therefore, which 
at the date of the amendment was intended to be protected . . . was such a keeping 
and bearing as the public liberty and its preservation commended as lawful, and 
worthy of protection.”). 
 328. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13 (“Every person shall have the right to keep 
and bear arms, in the lawful defence of himself or the State, under such regulations 
as the Legislature may prescribe.”). 
 329. 35 Tex. 473 (1872), cited in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 
(2008). 
 330. Id. at 476–77. 
2012] MODELING THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT 651 
weapons carrying in an opinion that suggested there was little social 
value in armed self-defense.331 
The court first suggested that the statute was constitutional because 
it regulated, rather than prohibited, the bearing of arms, but the 
court then appeared to recoil from the idea that carrying weapons for 
self-defense might enjoy any constitutional protection, despite the 
words of the Texas Constitution.332  The judges in English repeatedly 
protested (perhaps too much) that the decision was not the result of 
a personal hostility to the traditional practice of carrying weapons.333  
A few decades later, in Ex parte Thomas,334 the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court superimposed hybrid-right limitations on self-defense-based 
constitutional language.  Although the Oklahoma Constitution 
protected the “right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of 
his home, person, or property,”335 the state supreme court, relying 
exclusively on hybrid-right case law, concluded that only militia 
                                                          
 331. See id. at 479–80 (“The law under consideration has been attacked upon the 
ground that it was contrary to public policy, and deprived the people of the necessary 
means of self-defense; that it was an innovation upon the customs and habits of the 
people, to which they would not peaceably submit.  We do not think the people of 
Texas are so bad as this, and we do think that the latter half of the nineteenth 
century is not too soon for Christian and civilized states to legislate against any and 
every species of crime.”). 
 Some scholars have suggested that English’s hostility to weapons carrying 
reflected a reaction to the violent disturbances that shook Texas in the immediate 
aftermath of the Civil War.  See David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court 
Standards of Review for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 
1146–47 (2010). 
 332. English, 35 Tex. at 478–79. 
Our constitution . . . confers upon the legislature the power to regulate the 
privilege.  The legislature may regulate it without taking it away—this has 
been done in the act under consideration.  But we do not intend to be 
understood as admitting for one moment, that the abuses prohibited [i.e., 
carrying handguns and other concealable weapons] are in any way protected 
either under the state or federal constitution. . . .  [I]t appears to us little 
short of ridiculous, that any one should claim the right to carry upon his 
person any of the mischievous devices inhibited by the statute, into a 
peaceable public assembly . . . . 
Id. at 478. 
 333. Id. at 479 (“It is not our purpose to make an argument in justification of the 
law.  The history of our whole country but too well justifies the enactment of such 
laws.”).  The court continued its criticism of weapons carrying:  “We are far from 
believing that the ultimate results of the law under consideration will not be 
beneficial to the people of the state.  But however much we might desire to sustain 
the law on the grounds of public policy and expediency, such is not our reason for 
sustaining it.”  Id. at 480. 
 334. 97 P. 260 (Okla. 1908). 
 335. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in 
defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when 
thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein 
contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.”). 
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firearms useful for the common defense were protected.336  It then 
concluded that “pistols” were not militia firearms, and thus were not 
constitutionally protected.337  While the cases the court relied upon 
had held that full-sized, military handguns were protected arms,338 the 
Oklahoma courts later read the Thomas decision as holding that all 
handguns were categorically unprotected.  Thus, not surprisingly, the 
state’s courts went on to uphold draconian restrictions on handgun 
carrying as constitutional.339 
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the state’s prohibition 
of concealed carrying of handguns against a challenge under the 
state’s constitutional right to arms, which used clear self-defense 
based language.340  While this result was likely defensible under a self-
defense-based conception of the right to arms (as long as open carry 
was allowed), the court went further, suggesting that the Florida right 
to arms was not based in self-defense, but was instead a hybrid right 
“intended to give the people the means of protecting themselves 
against oppression and public outrage,” with the limits suggested by 
its civic purposes.341 
One court of the period went to still greater lengths.  In 1905, the 
Kansas Supreme Court avoided applying a broadly worded, defense-
based individual right to bear arms by effectively reading the relevant 
provision out of the state constitution.  That court declared in City of 
Salina v. Blaksley342 that the Kansas Bill of Rights provision stating that 
“[t]he people have the right to bear arms for their defense and 
                                                          
 336. Thomas, 97 P. at 262. 
 337. Id. at 264–65. 
 338. See, e.g., Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455, 460–61 (1876) (distinguishing protected 
military “repeater” handguns from unprotected small pistols that may be concealed 
on the person); English, 35 Tex. at 476 (limiting the definition of “arms” to military 
weapons, but including the cavalryman’s “holster pistols” and the artilleryman’s “side 
arms” in that definition). 
 339. See Pierce v. State, 275 P. 393, 394–96 (Okla. Crim. App. 1929) (rejecting 
defendant’s constitutional challenge to his conviction for openly carrying a Colt 
revolver in the curtilage of his own home and citing Thomas for the proposition that 
handguns could be completely banned); Shepherd v. State, 192 P. 235, 236 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1920) (per curiam) (citing Thomas, 97 P. 260) (upholding a conviction 
for the concealed carrying of a Colt Army revolver). 
 340. Carlton v. State, 58 So. 486, 488 (Fla. 1912); see FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. I, § 
20 (“The right of the people to bear arms in defence of themselves and the lawful 
authority of the State, shall not be infringed, but the Legislature may prescribe the 
manner in which they may be borne.”). 
 341. Carlton, 58 So. at 488.  The court concluded that the right to bear arms “was 
not designed as a shield for the individual man, who is prone to load his stomach 
with liquor and his pockets with revolvers or dynamite, and make of himself a 
dangerous nuisance to society.”  Id. 
 342. 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905). 
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security”343 did not confer any individual rights, but was a mere 
recognition of the government’s power to organize the militia.344  
(Kansans regained a meaningful state constitutional right to arms in 
2010, when they voted to ratify a newly worded, broad individual right 
to bear arms provision by a margin of nearly eight to one.345) 
Decisions like English, Thomas, Carlton and Blaksley have little 
relevance to determining the scope of Second Amendment carry 
rights today.  Even when confronted with constitutional language that 
seemed to compel a defense-based reading, courts of this period 
sometimes substituted a hybrid right to arms, or nullified the right 
altogether.346  But the question presented by current carry litigation is 
whether firearms that are constitutionally protected, as Heller holds 
handguns to be, may be carried outside the home pursuant to a 
constitutional right to bear arms that is not a hybrid individual right 
(let alone a fictive “collective right” as in Blaksley), but instead is 
centrally concerned with self-defense.347 
3. Cases applying a defense-based right 
Most of the postbellum period’s decisions arose from the South, 
which remained the center of American gun control laws.348  
However, a handful of decisions were issued from Northern and 
Western states, which tended to adhere to the pre-war tradition of 
presumptive carry. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that both the Second Amendment and the Idaho Constitution’s 
right to bear arms were violated by a state law that prohibited the 
                                                          
 343. KAN. CONST. of 1859, Bill of Rights § 4. 
 344. See Blaksley, 83 P. at 620 (stating that the provision “deals exclusively with the 
military,” and that “[i]ndividual rights are not considered in this section”). 
 345. See KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4 (“A person has the right to keep and bear 
arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, for lawful hunting and 
recreational use, and for any other lawful purpose . . . .”); Jan Biles, Kansans Back Two 
Amendments, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL (Nov. 2, 2010, 10:31 PM), 
http://cjonline.com/news/local/2010-11-03/kansans_back_two_amendments 
(noting that the measure amending the right to arms received 88% support). 
 At least one Kansas Supreme Court decision from the later twentieth century 
also suggested an individual right to bear arms in the Kansas Constitution, 
notwithstanding Blaksley.  City of Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1150–51 
(Kan. 1979) (applying constitutional overbreadth analysis to a local gun control law). 
 346. Or, as in Blaksley, a spurious right drained of any individual protections at all.  
See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra Part I.E for a discussion of the issues currently pending in carry 
rights litigation. 
 348. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 38, at 1333 (providing a background of 
the history of postbellum gun-control case law). 
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carrying of handguns in cities, towns, or villages.349  The court treated 
the constitutional violation as straightforward:  the legislature could 
regulate the exercise of the right by requiring that defensive 
handguns be carried openly, but it had “no power to prohibit a 
citizen from bearing arms in any portion of the state of Idaho,” 
whether inside a city or not.350 
The next year, the Vermont Supreme Court struck down a 
municipal law requiring a permit to carry a concealed handgun, 
holding the law violated the constitutional right to bear arms for self-
defense.351  As a result, the legal, permitless carrying of a concealed 
handgun often takes the colloquial name of “Vermont carry.”352 
The Ohio Supreme Court upheld a World War I-era prohibition on 
concealed carry of handguns, even prohibiting a citizen from wearing 
a concealed handgun within the interior of a private residence.353  
However, the court noted that open carry of handguns was still legal, 
and that the statute contained an exception that allowed for 
concealed carry when circumstances justified a prudent person in 
carrying a handgun for self-defense.354  It characterized the 
prohibition on concealed carrying as a regulation, but not a 
prohibition, of the constitutional right to bear arms for self-defense.355 
One of the few post-Civil War Southern courts to address the 
defense-based right to arms was the Texas Supreme Court in State v. 
Duke,356 an 1875 decision upholding a conviction for carrying a 
revolver.357  Duke adjudicated a challenge under the postwar Texas 
                                                          
 349. In re Brickey, 70 P. 609 (Idaho 1902); see IDAHO CONST. of 1889, art. I, § 11 
(“The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense; but the 
legislature shall regulate the exercise of this right by law.”). 
 350. Brickey, 70 P. at 609.  The “no power to prohibit . . . in any portion” passage is 
important to parse correctly.  The court’s point was not merely that the law was 
overbroad, i.e., that the statute went too far by banning individuals from carrying in 
any portion of the state—a sense that might have been consistent with non-
presumptive carry.  That was not the meaning of the Brickey opinion, because, as the 
court noted, the challenged law did not forbid carrying everywhere in Idaho; it 
applied only in cities, towns, and villages.  Id.  Thus, Brickey’s point was that the right 
to bear arms for self-defense extends to both urban and rural locales, and cannot be 
prohibited in either.  It affirms presumptive carry as the constitutional norm. 
 351. State v. Rosenthal, 55 A. 610, 611 (Vt. 1903); see VT. CONST. art. I, § 16 
(“[T]he people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State 
. . . .”). 
 352. DAVID NASH, UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF HANDGUNS FOR SELF-DEFENSE 14 
(2011). 
 353. State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 664 (Ohio 1920). 
 354. Id. at 664. 
 355. Id.; see OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The people have the right to bear arms for 
their defense and security . . . .”). 
 356. 42 Tex. 455 (1875). 
 357. Id. at 460–62. 
2012] MODELING THE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT 655 
constitution, which, as noted before, recognized an individual right 
to bear arms for self-defense, but with the restrictive proviso that the 
right was subject to “such regulations as the Legislature may 
prescribe.”358  The statute challenged in Duke did not entirely ban 
handgun carrying outside the home; it allowed carrying a handgun 
on one’s own land and one’s own place of business, and it also 
allowed an individual to openly carry a handgun for self-defense 
when there were “reasonable grounds for fearing an unlawful attack 
on his person” that were “immediate and pressing.”359  In other words, 
the statute reflected the non-presumptive carry model:  strong carry 
rights in one’s curtilage and business property, and public carry 
rights conditioned on an individual showing of necessity.  Notably, 
the Texas court appeared to quietly apply a limiting construction on 
the statute, imposing a somewhat less severe requirement of necessity:  
it glossed the statute as allowing defensive handgun carrying by 
anyone “having reasonable grounds to ‘fear an attack.’”360 
The Duke court upheld the statute thusly interpreted, reasoning 
that it was constitutional because it “respected the right to carry a 
pistol openly when needed for self-defense . . . and the right to have 
one at the home or place of business.”361 Therefore, even Duke, an 
outlier which marks perhaps the most restrictive interpretation that 
any nineteenth-century court gave to the defense-based right to bear 
arms, implicitly rejected no-carry laws as unconstitutional and held 
that the right to bear arms for self-defense entails at least non-
presumptive carry rights.362 
In summary, the case law of the postbellum period was dominated 
by the hybrid conception of the right to bear arms, under which 
individual defense is not a central purpose of the right. Many 
decisions from this era upheld substantial restrictions on weapons 
carrying, but to reach that result, they relied explicitly on the premise 
that self-defense was only a peripheral aspect of the right.363  Heller 
                                                          
 358. TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. I, § 13. 
 359. Duke, 42 Tex. at 456–57. 
 360. Id. at 460. 
 361. Id. at 459.  Duke abrogated the earlier holding in English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 
(1872), that the Texas Constitution protected only a hybrid right to arms.  Duke, 42 
Tex. at 459.  Duke declared that pistols were protected arms, at least such “as are not 
adapted to being carried concealed.”  Id. at 458. 
 362. Duke, 42 Tex. at 458 (holding that citizens have the right to keep and bear 
“such arms as are commonly kept . . . and are appropriate for open and manly use in 
self-defense”). 
 363. Even under this view, most courts agreed that non-presumptive carry rights 
were protected; an outright ban on handgun carrying in public was unconstitutional.  
See id. 
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unambiguously rejected that premise, adopting the broad view of the 
right to bear arms, for which self-defense is a central purpose, and 
dismissing the hybrid view.364 
Second, many state constitutions were weakened in the postwar era 
(particularly in the South) by the addition of textual provisos that 
affirmed heightened legislative authority over the right to carry arms.  
Courts often relied on these provisos in upholding severe carry 
restrictions.  The Second Amendment, however, dates from an earlier 
period and lacks a proviso of this sort. 
Only a few postbellum opinions applied a broad right to bear arms 
grounded in self-defense.  Of those that did, several affirmed 
presumptive carry rights, in continuity with the antebellum 
consensus.  The others affirmed at least non-presumptive carry rights, 
and these more limited interpretations arose in states whose 
constitutions had been amended to include anti-carry provisos.  Not a 
single decision from the first 130 years of American history supports 
the proposition that no-carry laws are constitutionally permissible as 
applied to a protected category of weapons (which Heller holds 
includes handguns), under a defense-centered individual right to 
bear arms. 
4. Interlude:  A requiem for the hybrid right to arms 
What made the hybrid right so compelling?  Having examined its 
postbellum heyday, we should grapple with this question, because 
Heller’s rejection of the hybrid right has important consequences for 
the scope of Second Amendment carry rights. 
The source of the hybrid right’s rise is not simple, and probably 
depended upon a combination of interests, some invidious and some 
legitimate.  It seems likely that racial conflict contributed to the 
hybrid right’s reception by courts of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century American South.  Professors Cottrol and Diamond 
note that “[t]he South’s history of slavery, its passage of post-war 
black codes, and its collective resistance to racial equality render 
suspicious” the changes in the understanding of the right’s purposes 
that followed Reconstruction in many Southern states.365  And some 
of the implications of the hybrid conception of the right to arms had 
disparate effects on whites and blacks.  Limiting protection to war 
weapons, such as full-sized revolvers (the “repeaters” of Andrews v. 
                                                          
 364. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599, 613 (2008). 
 365. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 38, at 1327. 
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State366), had the predictable effect of “render[ing] safe the high 
quality, expensive, military issue handguns that many former 
Confederate soldiers still maintained but that were often out of 
financial reach for cash poor freedmen.”367  At the same time, the 
move to a civic-purpose focus may have also reflected a race-neutral 
concern about the prevalence of armed violence in Southern 
society;368 by removing self-defense from the core of the right, courts 
could clear the way for wider restrictions on weapons carrying by all 
segments of society.369 
Causes of the hybrid right’s rise are not confined to past cultural 
influences, pernicious or otherwise.  Textually, it is a plausible 
interpretation of those right-to-arms provisions that confine their 
purpose to “the common defense.”  And perhaps it is also a textually 
plausible interpretation of the Second Amendment, which secures a 
right of the people that is not immediately limited as to purpose (in 
fact, a provision limiting the right to the “common defence” was 
proposed and rejected during the debate over the Second 
Amendment in Congress370)—but does contain a prefatory reference 
to the importance of the militia. 
The hybrid interpretation protects individual possession of militia-
useful weapons, with the purpose of protecting the public liberty.  
This gives clear, easily explained legal meaning and effect to both the 
prefatory clause reference to a “well regulated Militia” as the “security 
of a free State,” and the operative clause’s recognition that the right 
“to keep and bear arms” inheres in the people, not state 
governments.371  From a textual standpoint, the hybrid right is 
noticeably more persuasive than any of the various collective-rights 
theories adhered to by gun rights skeptics.  The Heller dissenters, and 
academic critics of the decision, would have a stronger position if 
they had set aside the “sophisticated collective right” position of 
                                                          
 366. See supra text accompanying note 305. 
 367. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 38, at 1333. 
 368. Id. at 1323, 1327 (citing DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., VIOLENCE AND CULTURE IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979)). 
 369. In this respect, the two authors also find suggestive the proliferation of anti-
dueling laws and even anti-dueling constitutional provisions in the postbellum South, 
as “dueling was a problem among whites and not blacks in the South.”  Id. at 1328. 
 370. Specifically, the proposal was to add the words “for the common defence” 
after “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” in what became the Second 
Amendment.  The proposal was considered and rejected by the United States Senate.  
S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 71, 77 (1789). 
 371. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (expressly distinguishing the powers that the 
Constitution reserves to “the States” from those reserved to “the people”). 
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Justice Stevens’s dissent372 and focused on the hybrid right as a 
proposed alternative to the majority’s adoption of the defense-based 
right. 
In fact, the Heller dissenters did also join Justice Breyer’s dissent, 
which espoused a form of the hybrid right under which firearms 
possession enjoyed some protection, but self-defense was not a 
primary purpose.373  Yet Justice Breyer’s application of the hybrid 
right in his Heller dissent was far from rigorous.  Even the hybrid-right 
tradition usually held that a ban on handgun possession was 
unconstitutional,374 but Justice Breyer concluded that the prevalence 
of handguns in crime was a sufficient basis to ban them.375  A more 
historically grounded application of the hybrid view would have 
acknowledged the unconstitutionality of the District of Columbia’s 
blanket ban on handguns, though it might have sought to uphold the 
ban on loaded firearms in the home on the ground that individual 
self-defense was not a core purpose of the right.376  This might have 
been a powerful intellectual counterweight to the majority opinion. 
The scarcity of hybrid-right adherents today, relative to the 
plausibility of the view, is probably due to perceived pragmatic 
considerations.  If militia utility is the primary criterion of 
                                                          
 372. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 651 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Second Amendment only secures “a right to use and 
possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia” (emphasis added)).  
The difference is that the hybrid right, in its classical nineteenth-century form, 
protects the keeping and practicing with arms by the citizenry in general, not only 
those serving in an organized militia.  See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 
165, 182 (1871) (reasoning that, although the purpose of the right to arms is to 
ensure a citizen militia, and bearing arms for self-defense can therefore be restricted, 
“the right to keep [arms], with all that is implied fairly as an incident to this right, is . . 
. guaranteed to the citizen, not the soldier” (emphasis added)). 
 373. Heller, 554 U.S. at 681–82, 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Amendment’s “first and primary objective” was to preserve the militia).  The 
dissenting Justices argued this view in the alternative, as a fallback from the weaker, 
sophisticated collective right.  Id. at 682. 
 374. See, e.g., State v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921) (adopting hybrid view, 
and affirming right to own a military handgun and carry it under some 
circumstances); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557, 560 (1878) (same); Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 
Heisk.) at 186–87, 192 (same).  But see Ex parte Thomas, 97 P. 260, 260, 264–65 (Okla. 
1908) (holding that “pistols” were not militia firearms, and thus were not subject to 
constitutional protection). 
 375. Heller, 554 U.S. at 714–19 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 376. However, leading hybrid right sources do affirm a constitutional right to use 
handguns for self-defense in and around the home.  See, e.g., Andrews, 50 Tenn. (3 
Heisk.) 165; supra text accompanying notes 308–314 (noting that the right to arms 
would protect an individual who carried a full-sized handgun outdoors to protect his 
child from an attacking dog).  It is a measure of the weakness of the dissenting 
position in Heller that even the more limited hybrid-right tradition offers only 
doubtful support for the dissenters’ conclusions. 
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constitutional protection, then it is at least arguable that the sweeping 
federal restrictions on private possession of machine guns377 violate 
the Second Amendment.  The United States government took this 
possibility seriously enough to devote large portions of its amicus 
brief in Heller to arguing against it.378  Moreover, while the emblematic 
violation of a self-defense-based right to arms is a ban on handguns, as 
in Heller, the exemplary violation of a hybrid right in the twenty-first 
century would be so-called “assault weapons” bans restricting the 
ownership of modern semiautomatic rifles such as the AR-15.379  
These are commonly owned, less destructive versions of the standard 
American military rifle used today; their utility for a popular militia is 
clearer than that of any other firearm.380 
These feared pragmatic consequences, as well as the strong support 
that many state cases and constitutions give to the self-defense 
component of the right, may have influenced the Heller majority to 
reject the hybrid right in clear terms. 
C. The Modern Era:  1930–2008 
For similar reasons, perhaps, the hybrid view disappeared in the 
state courts around 1930.  This change may have been motivated in 
                                                          
 377. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006) (criminalizing the private possession of any 
machinegun that was not registered with the federal government prior to the 
statute’s effective date of May 19, 1986).  
 378. See O’Shea, supra note 74, at 360–62 (discussing the role of the “machine gun 
specter” in the Heller litigation, where the presence of the precedent in United States 
v. Miller raised the prospect that the Supreme Court would affirm a hybrid right to 
arms). 
 379. See id. at 380 (discussing the “uniquely powerful claim to Second Amendment 
protection” that modern semi-automatic rifles would enjoy under the hybrid 
approach); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. 
L. REV. 461, 480 (1995) (“[T]he much-vilified ‘assault rifle’ would be protected 
under this interpretation—not in spite of its military character, but because of it.”). 
 Note that there are still serious arguments for the protection of these arms 
under a self-defense-based approach because they are commonly owned by private 
citizens and police officers for that purpose.  O’Shea, supra note 74, at 380–93.  
However, the shift from hybrid right to self-defense-based right moves the 
constitutionality of “assault weapons” bans from clearly invalid to a close question.  
Compare Heller v. District of Columbia, No. 10-7036, 2011 WL 4551558, at *12–16 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny and holding that the 
District’s post-Heller ban on the AR-15 and most other modern semi-automatic rifles 
does not violate the Second Amendment as construed in Heller), with id. at *35–41 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that semi-automatic rifles are an important 
category of arms in common use for self-defense and other legitimate purposes, and 
thus, a ban on them is analogous “to a ban on a category of speech” under the First 
Amendment, and is violative of the Second Amendment under Heller). 
 380. Andrews supplies powerful categorical language for this point.  The court 
there stressed that “the rifle of all descriptions” is a protected arm under the hybrid 
right.  50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) at 179 (“[T]he right to keep such arms, can not be 
infringed or forbidden by the Legislature.”). 
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part by technological advancement in hand-held firearms.  Some of 
the perceived advantages that postbellum courts might have seen in 
adopting the hybrid right—allowing considerable regulation of 
carrying concealable firearms, melee weapons, etc.—were 
increasingly outweighed by the potentially alarming implication that 
individuals might have a right to own the formidable and destructive 
new small firearms that were being developed, such as individually 
portable machine guns. 
1. United States v. Miller 
The history of nineteenth and early-twentieth century cases does 
much to illuminate Heller’s predecessor, the Supreme Court’s 1939 
decision in United States v. Miller.381  Miller involved a constitutional 
challenge to the first major federal gun control statute, the National 
Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA).382  The NFA reflected the growing 
concern over technological advancements in personal weaponry by 
imposing highly restrictive taxation and registration requirements on 
weapons such as machine guns and short-barreled shotguns, as well 
as firearms accessories such as silencers.383  In Miller, the Supreme 
Court reversed a lower federal court’s decision that dismissed an NFA 
prosecution for possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun on 
the ground that the NFA violated the Second Amendment.384  The 
Court concluded that the Second Amendment had to be both 
“interpreted and applied” with reference to the militia purpose 
referred to in its preface,385 and thus the individual possession or use 
of weapons would not be constitutionally protected unless it had 
“some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a 
well regulated militia.”386  Miller did not specify what the “reasonable 
relationship” standard required, but the Court did observe that the 
defendant had not presented evidence that his sawed-off shotgun 
“[wa]s any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use 
could contribute to the common defense.”387 
                                                          
 381. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 382. National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (currently codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2006)). 
 383. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845, 5861. 
 384. See Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 48, 55–60 (2008) (recounting the procedural history of Miller, including 
suggestions that it was a collusive “test case” involving a district court judge who was 
actually a strong political supporter of gun control). 
 385. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840)). 
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Miller faithfully reflected the trends of the case law in decades 
leading up to the decision.  It showed clear influence of the hybrid 
view of the right to bear arms that had been adopted by many 
postbellum courts.388  In fact, the only case relied upon as authority in 
the Supreme Court’s opinion was Aymette v. State, the 1840 Tennessee 
decision that gave birth to the hybrid interpretation.389  Yet Miller also 
contained a number of ambiguities and even contrary signals, 
reflecting the breakdown of the hybrid-right consensus that was also 
occurring at the time.390  It is difficult to read Miller’s discussion of the 
Second Amendment as strong support for presumptive carry, but the 
most plausible reading of the case is that Miller supported an 
individual, hybrid right that included at least non-presumptive carry 
rights.391 
Whatever the Supreme Court really meant in Miller, the decision 
was seized upon in a way that effectively removed the federal courts 
from the task of applying and interpreting the individual right to 
bear arms for self-defense.392  For six decades, lower federal courts 
consistently read Miller in a narrow fashion, either as reducing the 
Second Amendment to a collective right, or as recognizing only a 
narrow individual right to participate in a government-organized 
militia.393 
                                                          
 388. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 389. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; see also supra notes 226–231 and accompanying text for 
a discussion of Aymette’s significance. 
 390. In a cryptic footnote titled “Concerning The Militia,” Miller string-cited an 
eclectic group of cases that reflected varying (not to say incompatible) aspects of the 
right-to-arms tradition that had developed over the preceding hundred years.  Some 
were hybrid-right cases:  State v. Workman, 14 S.E. 9 (W. Va. 1891), Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 
455 (1876), and Aymette itself.  See Miller, 307 U.S. at 182 n.3.  Two were defense-based 
cases, including one that construed the right to bear arms to protect only non-
presumptive carry rights. See id. (citing People v. Brown, 235 N.W. 245 (Mich. 1930) 
(upholding a prohibition on possession of a blackjack, and stating that the 
possession and use of ordinary handguns was constitutionally protected, but that the 
legislature retained power to “reasonably regulate” handgun carrying under the 
police power); State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455 (1875) (upholding the constitutionality of 
a statute that banned carrying handguns except on one’s own property or business 
premises, or in response to a specific and pressing danger)).  Finally, the Court cited 
one pure collective rights case, City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619 (Kan. 1905), leaving 
the implications of the cited body of cases profoundly unclear. 
 391. O’Shea, supra note 74, at 352–62. 
 392. Cf. Denning, supra note 74, at 352–62 (arguing that some lower courts strayed 
from the likely meaning of Miller to the point of being intellectually dishonest, and 
that Second Amendment case law was not as settled pre-Heller as some commentators 
believed). 
 393. Id. at 971–72, 988; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 
n.24 (2008) (noting that after Miller, many lower federal courts concluded that the 
Second Amendment did not protect individual rights, but responding that if so, 
those courts simply “overread Miller” and “[t]heir erroneous reliance upon an 
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2. Modern state case law applying a defense-based right 
Yet even as the federal courts removed themselves, the defense-
centered, individual right to bear arms became the clear majority 
position of state constitutions in the mid- and late-twentieth century.  
Nineteen states have adopted new constitutional right-to-arms 
provisions since 1930.394  Thirteen of these new provisions expressly 
protect the right to bear arms for self-defense,395 bringing the total 
number of state constitutions that expressly protect a defense-based 
right to bear arms to thirty.396 
The modern cases have generally remained consistent with the 
norms of previous eras.  At a minimum, it remains a widely affirmed 
principle that no-carry laws violate the right to bear arms for self-
defense:  governments must allow the carrying of defensive weapons 
outside the home in some circumstances.  State and local bans on 
weapons carrying have been frequently litigated, and remain the type 
of gun restriction most often struck down under state constitutions.397  
As in previous eras, the real point of controversy has been deciding 
whether the individual right to bear arms protects presumptive carry 
                                                          
uncontested and virtually unreasoned case cannot nullify the reliance of millions of 
Americans (as our historical analysis has shown) upon the true meaning of the right 
to keep and bear arms”).  
 394. See Johnson, supra note 46, at 735–44.  Since Professor Johnson’s article was 
published, Kansas has also adopted a new constitutional right to bear arms that 
clearly protects the broad right.  See KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 4 (“A person has 
the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, for 
lawful hunting and recreational use, and for any other lawful purpose . . . .”). 
 395. See Volokh, supra note 13, at 193–204.  This compendium of state provisions 
lists the twelve states of Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin as 
having adopted constitutional provisions after 1930 that expressly protect a right to 
“bear arms” for “self-defense,” for “the defense of [one]sel[f],” for “defense of 
[one]’s home, person, and property,” or other similar language.  Id. 
 Kansas’s 2010 constitutional provision protects the right of each person to 
“bear arms for the defense of self, family, home and state.”  KAN. CONST. BILL OF 
RIGHTS § 4. 
 396. See Volokh, supra note 13, at 193–204.  The seventeen states whose current 
constitutional right-to-arms provisions were adopted before 1930 and explicitly protect 
the bearing of arms for self-defense are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. 
 397. See State v. Hamdan, 665 N.W.2d 785, 799–810 (Wis. 2003) (striking down a 
ban on carrying a concealed handgun in one’s place of business; suggesting that 
individuals may have a right to concealed carry in public under certain 
circumstances); State ex rel. City of Princeton v. Buckner, 377 S.E.2d 139, 141–49 (W. 
Va. 1988) (striking down requirement of a discretionary, “may issue”  permit in order 
to carry a handgun in public); State v. Delgado, 692 P.2d 610, 610–14 (Or. 1984) (en 
banc) (striking down ban on possessing a switchblade knife in public); City of 
Junction City v. Mevis, 601 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Kan. 1979) (striking down municipal 
ban on handgun carrying); City of Las Vegas v. Moberg, 485 P.2d 737, 738 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1971) (same). 
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rights, or only the geographically and situationally limited model of 
non-presumptive carry rights. 
On the presumptive carry side, several courts have specifically 
endorsed the right of citizens to carry handguns, either without a 
permit or subject to a shall-issue permit system.398  At the same time, 
most courts upheld regulations of the right to bear arms for self-
defense that do not frustrate the practical ability to exercise the right, 
such as requirements that defensive weapons be carried openly,399 or 
prohibiting the carrying of weapons by persons who are intoxicated400 
or engaged in threatening or violent behavior.401 
A handful of courts applying a defense-based right have taken a 
more limited view of carry rights.  One Texas decision upheld a state 
handgun carrying ban with exceptions that brought it into non-
presumptive carry territory:  the statute allowed carrying on one’s 
own property and in cases of pressing need.402  The decision followed 
the holding of a postbellum-era decision by the state supreme 
court,403 and involved a state constitutional provision with an anti-
carry proviso.404 
                                                          
 398. Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 705 (Ind. 1990) (recognizing that 
right to bear arms gave citizens a constitutionally protected interest in obtaining a 
concealed handgun carrying permit on “shall issue” terms); Buckner, 377 S.E.2d at 
141–49 (striking down “may issue” carry permit requirement on the ground that it 
threatened to “frustrate” the ability to carry a handgun for self-defense, and 
suggesting that shall-issue permit requirement would be constitutional); Schubert v. 
DeBard, 398 N.E.2d 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (explaining that the right to bear 
arms gave citizens a constitutionally protected interest in obtaining a concealed carry 
permit on a “shall issue” basis); see also Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that defense-based state constitutional right to bear arms 
gave citizen a constitutionally protected due process interest in the resolution of his 
handgun carry permit application). 
 399. See, e.g., Klein v. Leis, 795 N.E.2d 633, 637–38 (Ohio 2003) (upholding 
concealed carry ban as a regulation of the right to bear arms); State v. McAdams, 714 
P.2d 1236, 1236 (Wyo. 1986) (same); State v. Hart, 157 P.2d 72, 73 (Idaho 1945) 
(same). 
 400. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 853 P.2d 126, 129 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that 
a defendant’s constitutional right to bear arms was not infringed when evidence 
indicated he was intoxicated and a potential danger to the public); People v. Garcia, 
595 P.2d 228, 230–31 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (“It is clearly reasonable for the 
legislature to regulate the possession of firearms by those who are under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs.”). 
 401. See, e.g., State v. Enos, C.A. No. 8251, 1977 WL 198812, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 23, 1977) (holding that a “[d]efendant cannot claim the protection of the 
constitution when his bearing of arms is done under such circumstances as give rise 
to a clear and present danger that his conduct” will cause the evil the challenged 
regulation seeks to avoid). 
 402. Collins v. State, 501 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
 403. State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 456 (1875). 
 404. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear 
arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have 
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime.”). 
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Finally, one Missouri intermediate appellate court squared the 
circle in 1994.405  The court upheld a municipal statute that 
prohibited all handgun carrying, on the theory that it was a “time, 
place, and manner” restriction on the right to bear arms for self-
defense.406  Postbellum-era Missouri decisions had upheld authority to 
prohibit concealed carrying in certain public gatherings,407 and 
carrying when intoxicated,408 but the appellate court’s holding passed 
over into nullification of the individual right.409 
3. Cases applying a non-defense-based or otherwise restricted right 
Another set of carrying decisions reflects non-defense-based 
conceptions of the right to bear arms.  One state court, taking a cue 
from lower federal court Second Amendment decisions, denied that 
the right to bear arms was an individual right at all.410  Illinois’s state 
constitutional right to bear arms is saddled with the most pro-
restriction proviso in American constitutional history, expressly 
declaring the right to arms to be subordinate to “the police power.”411  
Unsurprisingly, in light of this unique constitutional language, the 
state supreme court held that the Illinois Constitution allowed 
handguns to be banned, which would also imply the constitutionality 
of a ban on their carrying.412 
Finally, one recent Rhode Island decision harkened back to the 
                                                          
 405. City of Cape Girardeau v. Joyce, 884 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
 406. Id. at 35. 
 407. See State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528, 531 (1881) (“[W]e . . . hold the act in 
question to be valid and binding, and as intending only to interdict the carrying of 
weapons concealed.”). 
 408. See State v. Shelby, 90 Mo. 302, 305 (1886) (holding that, if the legislature 
may regulate the manner in which arms are borne, it may also regulate the condition 
of the bearer). 
 409. In a passage that is difficult to see as reflecting an adequate respect for an 
enumerated constitutional right, the Joyce court went on to state that the defendant’s 
right to bear arms for self-defense was not violated by the ban because he could wear 
his handgun in public—as long as he left all of its ammunition at home.  884 S.W.2d 
at 35. 
 410. Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 847, 849 (Mass. 1976) (interpreting the 
Massachusetts Constitution’s right-to-arms provision as “not directed to guaranteeing 
individual ownership or possession of weapons”); see also Sandidge v. United States, 
520 A.2d 1057, 1058 (D.C. 1987) (upholding conviction for handgun carrying under 
District of Columbia law on the basis that Second Amendment protected only a 
“collective right” of state governments), abrogation recognized by Herrington v. United 
States, 6 A.3d 1237, 1246 n.33 (D.C. 2010). 
 411. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“Subject only to the police power, the right of the 
individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”). 
 412. See Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 268–69, 278–79 
(Ill. 1984) (upholding a village ordinance banning “the possession of all operable 
handguns” after determining the right to bear arms is not fundamental, and 
therefore applying a rational basis test). 
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nineteenth century, adopting the hybrid view of the state 
constitutional right to arms.  In Mosby v. Devine,413 the state supreme 
court concluded that the right to “bear arms” in Rhode Island’s 
constitution referred only to military participation, and thus did not 
connote the carrying of weapons for personal defense.414  
Interestingly, however, the court did not hold weapons carrying to be 
completely unprotected, but instead evaluated the state’s handgun 
carrying laws for conformity with what it described as “an individual 
right flowing to the people to keep and bear arms.”415  It held that the 
state’s discretionary “may issue” handgun carry permitting statute was 
constitutional, though it stressed that, to give effect to the right to 
arms, the Attorney General’s application of discretionary permit 
criteria—such as whether the applicant had demonstrated a need to 
carry a handgun, and was a “suitable person” to receive a permit—
must be subject to judicial review.416  “The constitutional right to bear 
arms would be illusory, of course, if it could be abrogated entirely on 
the basis of an unreviewable unrestricted licensing scheme.”417 
As with other cases decided outside the dominant, defense-based 
individual rights paradigm, the cases in this subsection offer little 
guidance on the scope of the defense-based right to bear arms 
because they did not consider it.  The Mosby case is a notable example 
of a pattern that has been pointed out before:  even under the hybrid 
right, which is less carry-protective than the defense-based right 
adopted by Heller, the right to arms in no sense terminates at one’s 
doorway.  The existence of an individual right to bear arms, of any 
stripe, entails that carrying outside the home cannot be prohibited. 
IV. LESSONS FROM THE STATE COURT TRADITION 
The Supreme Court’s method of interpretation in Heller and 
McDonald suggests that the most important period of American 
history for determining the scope of the Second Amendment right to 
bear arms is the early-nineteenth century, which spans the time 
between the ratifications of the Second Amendment in 1791 and the 
                                                          
 413. 851 A.2d 1031 (R.I. 2004). 
 414. Id. at 1041–42.  Mosby’s hybrid-view credentials were unmistakable:  it 
identified the right to “keep arms” with individual gun ownership, but “bear arms” 
only with military activity, one of the distinctions characteristic of the hybrid right.  
Id. at 1040–42.  Moreover, Mosby relied upon the 1840 Tennessee decision that 
birthed the hybrid view.  Id. at 1041 (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 
(1840)). 
 415. Id. at 1043, 1047–51. 
 416. Id. at 1048–51. 
 417. Id. at 1050. 
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Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  This period is, simultaneously, the 
immediate post-ratification history of the Second Amendment and 
the immediate pre-ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
During this period, most sources treated the right to bear arms as the 
right recognized by Heller, an individual right importantly concerned 
with self-defense.418  The majority of sources recognizing a defense-
based right viewed it as protecting the right to carry arms in public; 
indeed, they viewed it as protecting presumptive carry. 
What about the Reconstruction and early Jim Crow eras—the post-
ratification history of the Fourteenth Amendment?  Few authorities 
from this period turn out to be relevant to the scope of Second 
Amendment carry rights after Heller and McDonald.  This is because 
the American tradition has included not one, but two basic views of 
the individual right to arms:  the broad/defense-centered right and 
the hybrid right.  From 1870 to 1920, numerous courts and 
commentators adopted the view that the constitutional right to arms 
was a hybrid right.419  This meant that the constitution protected 
individual arms ownership to preserve the public liberty, but was not 
primarily motivated by a concern for individual self-defense.  These 
postbellum courts upheld many restrictions on personal weapons 
carrying because they adopted the premise that self-defense was, at 
most, a secondary and peripheral aspect of the constitutional right to 
arms.  Heller considered and explicitly rejected the hybrid view. 
Many later twentieth century authorities support presumptive carry 
rights, consistent with the antebellum nineteenth-century tradition.420  
Presumptive carry is also the position most consistent with the 
holdings and reasoning of Heller and McDonald.  Finally, at the level of 
statutory law, it is the supermajority position of American 
jurisdictions today.421 
This survey of state court practice holds lessons for legal scholars 
and for historians of the right to bear arms.  Most importantly, it 
holds lessons for post-Heller courts applying the Second Amendment, 
and I shall conclude this Article by discussing those lessons. 
                                                          
 418. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of Heller. 
 419. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the hybrid view of the right to bear 
arms in the postbellum period. 
 420. See supra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of modern state case law that applies a 
defense-based right supporting presumptive carry. 
 421. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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A. For Legal Scholars 
Some recent scholarly discussions of the Second Amendment and 
carry rights are undermined by their failure to engage with the 
constitutional tradition of the individual right to bear arms for self-
defense. 
Darrell Miller contends that “[t]he home is a fault line that runs 
deep within the text, context, and history of the Second 
Amendment.”422  But the text of the Second Amendment does not say 
anything about the home.423  Indeed, a naïve textualist might think 
that the most significant feature of the Second Amendment’s text for 
carry rights is that it recognizes a right of the people to “bear arms,” 
expressly distinguishing that from their correlative right to “keep 
arms,” which suggests that what is meant is a right not only to possess 
arms at home, but also to carry them somewhere else.424  Miller, 
however, argues that the right to bear arms to defend oneself should 
terminate as soon as one goes to a place where one is likely to 
encounter other people:  it “should extend no further than the front 
porch.”425  He likens the private possession of firearms for self-defense 
to the private possession of obscene sexual material and, noting that 
the Supreme Court has held that governments cannot enforce 
obscenity bans against the simple possession of such material in the 
home,426 suggests that this would also be appropriate as a measure of 
the Second Amendment’s protection. 
As others have pointed out, however, the premise of the First 
Amendment obscenity-in-the-home doctrine is not that the materials 
in question are generally valuable; rather, they are protected in the 
home because allowing their seizure is too severe an intrusion on 
other interests that we value, such as individual dignity and privacy.427  
                                                          
 422. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut:  Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1310 (2009). 
 423. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”). 
 424. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago:  Which 
Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
85, 90 n.32 (2010)  (“Whatever the merits of [Prof. Miller’s home-only] view in terms 
of policy, however, it is hard to reconcile with Heller’s textualism.  As we have seen, 
Heller defined the right to bear arms to include carrying them for purposes of 
confrontation, and it does not seem particularly plausible to understand this analysis 
of the text as recognizing only a right to ‘bear’ arms from the bedroom to the living 
room.”). 
 425. Miller, supra note 422, at 1282. 
 426. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 427. See Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 97, 98 (2009) (“Guns as Smut does something peculiar:  It analogizes a core 
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But the premise of a constitutional amendment protecting the right 
to keep and bear arms is that arms are valuable.428  A further problem 
with Miller’s thesis is that the relationship of defensive gun ownership 
to privacy is at best limited and indirect.  The consumer of 
controversial written or filmed literature can derive the full value of 
the material, whatever that may be, while literally “sitting alone in his 
own house.”429  But the purpose of defensive firearms is to respond to 
external threats from others, collapsing the privacy analogy.  This is 
why there is such a paradoxical quality to the claim that the right to 
bear arms for self-defense should exclude the places where most 
violent crimes occur—in public, away from the home and its 
curtilage. 
Miller engages somewhat with the state judicial tradition, but his 
discussion is patchy and impressionistic.  He writes that his concern is 
“the federal Second Amendment right, not . . . state constitutional 
rights to keep and bear arms, which may be more expansive.”430  But 
the Second Amendment was in a deep freeze for most of American 
history, especially in the federal courts.  In the pre-incorporation era, 
it had little work to do because there were no national gun laws.  
Next, the Supreme Court issued the opaque Miller decision in 1939, 
then withdrew from the field for seven decades while the lower 
federal courts invoked Miller to reject every claim to an individual 
Second Amendment right.  Thus, to understand the elaboration of 
the American right to arms as an individual guarantee, one has to 
look elsewhere.  The state court tradition is not the only possible 
source of guidance, but it is an essential one.  Engagement with the 
state court tradition is not optional.  This Article has shown that there 
is a great deal of American constitutional law about carrying arms for 
                                                          
category of private arms to one of the least protected and marginal categories of 
speech (obscenity).  It’s hard to see any justification for such an analogy, other than 
a purely instrumental one.”); see also Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564–65 (“[I]n the context of 
this case—a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the 
privacy of a person’s own home—th[e] right takes on an added dimension.  For also 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from 
unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy. . . .  Whatever may be the 
justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into 
the privacy of one’s own home.”). 
 428. Cf. Miller, supra note 422, at 1278 n.* (“I do not use the word ‘smut’ 
pejoratively, or as a term of contempt, but rather because it stimulates interest, and 
because obscenity jurisprudence fairly describes what the resulting doctrinal limits of 
a home-bound Second Amendment would look like.  I could have used the word 
‘obscenity,’ but frankly it just isn’t as catchy.”).  Most users of the language would 
also recognize “obscenity” as a term of contempt, of course. 
 429. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565. 
 430. Miller, supra note 422, at 1280 n.4. 
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self-defense.  Indeed, carrying in public has been the single most 
litigated and discussed aspect of the right.  Not all the courts that 
addressed the topic have thought the right protected self-defense, but 
those that did have overwhelmingly rejected the notion that the 
home was a “fault line” beyond which the right vanished. 
A plausible list of the leading state cases on the individual right to 
bear arms, based on their influence, the extent to which later 
authorities discuss them, and whether Heller relied on them, might 
include Bliss, Reid, Aymette, Nunn, Chandler, Andrews, Workman, Kerner, 
and probably one of the twentieth-century Oregon cases.431  Not every 
scholar would agree completely with this list, but most would accept 
its general outlines.  Only one of these sources is mentioned in 
Miller’s Guns as Smut:  Chandler appears in footnote 396.432  Likewise, 
Miller’s article does not mention St. George Tucker, William Rawle, 
or Thomas Cooley, to name three of the four leading nineteenth-
century commentators on the right to arms, each of whom discussed 
the practice of weapons carrying.433  The fourth, Joseph Story, is 
mentioned in passing, not for the discussion of the Second 
Amendment in his Commentaries and Popular Exposition, but for his 
participation in treason trials arising from Dorr’s Rebellion.434 
A final serious omission in the article is any realistic discussion of 
the manner in which firearms are actually carried for self-defense 
today.  Guns as Smut rings with references to topics such as 
insurrections,435 Confederate secession,436 shooting law enforcement 
agents,437 Klan rampages,438 the dissolution of the social compact,439 
the Oklahoma City bombing,440 and recurrent musings on whether 
enforcing the Second Amendment might end up protecting a right 
to own “tactical nuclear ordnance and nerve gas,”441 or to own 
                                                          
 431. See supra Parts III.A–C. 
 432. Miller, supra note 422, at 1341 n.396.  Miller also discusses two hybrid-right 
cases, State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. 418 (1843), and English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872), 
both of which are notable for their unusually pronounced hostility to weapons 
carrying.  He also mentions State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 459 (1875), a fairly important 
defense-based case.  Miller, supra note 422, at 1341 n.396, 1344–45. 
 433. See supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of Tucker and Rawle; supra notes 315–
318 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cooley. 
 434. Miller, supra note 422, at 1316 n.237. 
 435. Id. at 1315–50. 
 436. Id. at 1328–29. 
 437. Id. at 1316 & n.236. 
 438. Id. at 1331–32. 
 439. Id. at 1308–09. 
 440. Id. at 1314 n.228. 
 441. Id. at 1294 n.117. 
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“landmines, hand grenades, shoulder-fired missiles, anthrax,”442 or 
perhaps “armor piercing rounds,” “dynamite” or “rocket 
launchers.”443  But there is glaringly little discussion of the actual 
handgun carrying practices of Americans today, or of the experiences 
of the states—encompassing a supermajority of the American 
population—where all citizens without a serious criminal record have 
a clear path to lawfully carrying a handgun.  Yet this shall-issue, 
permit-based approach is one of the most likely forms that a Second 
Amendment right to bear arms outside the home for self-defense is 
likely to take.  That this social practice is already an everyday fact in 
most of America gives the article’s predictions of chaos an air of 
unreality. 
Law professors are privileged to engage in provocative flights of 
imagination.  In doing so, however, it is possible to lose sight of the 
concrete issue at hand.  Miller’s lurid dialectics ignore the ordinary 
clerk, parent, or pizza deliverer in a rough part of Chicago, D.C., or 
Los Angeles who would like to carry a firearm for protection while 
walking home from shopping or from a place of employment.444  If 
these jurisdictions were constitutionally required to adopt some kind 
of presumptive carry law, as thirty-nine other states have already done 
without problem, then those individuals could have protection 
without risking arrest and jail.  Pretty simple.  Authors who argue for 
the non-enforcement of half of the Second Amendment, from a fear 
of possible dire consequences to democracy if millions of Americans 
begin carrying firearms in public, should bear in mind that millions 
of Americans already carry firearms in public.445 
                                                          
 442. Id. at 1314 n.227. 
 443. Id. at 1353–54 n.474. 
 444. There is also an odd quality to Miller’s inveighing about the antidemocratic 
implications of a possible “right to freely brandish firearms.”  Id. at 1310.  
“Brandishing” typically means drawing and holding, as with a sword, not mere 
carrying.  See, e.g., Mich. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 7101 (Feb. 6, 2002) (defining 
brandishing as “waving or displaying in a threatening manner” and concluding that 
holstered carry is not brandishing).  Brandishing is illegal (outside of self-defense 
situations) in most right-to-carry states.  See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-7-11 (2011).  For 
that matter, it is common knowledge that the vast majority of Americans who carry 
defensive handguns prefer to carry them concealed.  They are not interested in 
“brandishing,” or even exposing, anything. 
 445. A recent report estimates six million licensed carriers, and that does not 
include all the residents of the states that allow permitless carry.  Mike Stuckey, Record 
Numbers Licensed to Pack Heat:  Millions Obtain Permits to Carry Concealed Guns, 
MSNBC.COM (June 24, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34714389 
/ns/us_news-life/t/record-numbers-licensed-pack-heat/#.  I agree with Eugene 
Volokh’s appraisal:   
Guns as Smut . . . argues that “the presence of a gun in public has the effect 
of chilling or distorting . . . public deliberation and interchange.”. . .  This is 
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B. For Historians 
A second lesson is that historians ignore the state judicial tradition 
at their peril.  It should be uncontroversial that when historical claims 
are made about the existence or nonexistence of a particular 
tradition in American legal history, the decisions and opinions of 
American courts are important evidence of that tradition.  Thus, it is 
surprising to read a new publication by an academic historian that 
charges that the Heller majority “has rewritten the past,” has 
“invent[ed] a version of the past and anoint[ed] it as ‘tradition,’” and 
has emulated “societies [that] distort history to create ‘a suitable 
historic past’” by recognizing an individual right to arms for self-
defense446—yet does not substantiate this charge by discussing any 
pre-Heller judicial opinions on the constitutional right to keep and 
bear arms.447  Words like “rewrite,” “invent,” and “distort” usually 
mean to fabricate, to make up something that is not there.  But this 
Article has documented generations of American court decisions, 
stretching from the 1820s to the 1990s, that support the 
interpretation of the right to arms adopted in Heller.  This tradition 
was not hidden behind the scenes in Heller; the Court relied upon 
many of these sources at length.  To criticize Heller’s historicism as 
“invented” while saying nothing about its most powerful source of 
support in American legal history reflects a serious gap in knowledge, 
or an abuse of language and the presumed authority of the 
historian.448 
                                                          
an intriguing speculation. . . .  But fortunately we don’t need speculation; we 
have ample experience.  In Vermont, people have long been free to carry 
concealed weapons without a license.  In New Hampshire and the state of 
Washington, law-abiding adults have been legally entitled to concealed carry 
licenses for over 50 years.  Today, law-abiding adults can get such licenses in 
[forty] states . . . .  In many states, . . . law-abiding adults may carry guns 
openly, even without licenses.  Is public debate on balance especially 
inhibited in any of these categories of states? . . .  I know of no evidence for 
this, and Guns as Smut doesn’t point to any. 
Volokh, supra note 427, at 102–03. 
 446. David Thomas Konig, Heller, Guns, and History:  The Judicial Invention of 
Tradition, 3 NORTHEASTERN U. L.J. 175, 176–77 (2011). 
 447. In fact, the only pre-2008 cases mentioned in this twenty-two-page article with 
even a roundabout connection to the Second Amendment are an 1877 Indiana 
Supreme Court decision on the criminal law of self-defense and a 1903 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision on the same topic.  Neither discusses the right to arms.  See id. at 192 
nn.81–84 (citing Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921); Runyan v. State, 57 
Ind. 80 (1877)).  Then there is the article’s discussion of the Dred Scott case.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 451–453. 
 448. Parts of the article withdraw from the implications of words like “invent” and 
“distort,” suggesting instead a process, perhaps inevitable, of selection and emphasis 
rather than fabrication.  See Konig, supra note 446, at 176 (approving a historian’s 
definition of “invented tradition” as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly 
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Professor Konig also attempts to draw a parallel between Heller and 
the infamous decision in Dred Scott.449  However, the most obvious 
relationship between the two cases is that Scott acknowledged 
American citizens generally had the right to bear arms in public—in 
Chief Justice Taney’s phrase, “to carry arms wherever they went”450—
                                                          
or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behavior,” often by “attempt[ing] to establish continuity 
with a suitable historic past” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
But this nuance soon passes, and the article reverts to criticism of the Heller Court for 
inventing traditions that assertedly fail to reflect “the reality of the past.”  Id. at 179. 
 Different, more measured and supported criticisms of Heller’s use of history are 
presented by the same author in an earlier article, David Thomas Konig, Why the 
Second Amendment Has a Preamble:  Original Public Meaning and the Political Culture of 
Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295 (2009).  The 
argument there is that in the late-eighteenth century culture, constitutions played an 
important role as exhortations to participation in civic institutions such as the militia 
and the jury, and their preambles and explanatory provisions expressed norms of 
republican governance that were addressed to the people as a whole, not merely, or 
primarily, to judges.  Accordingly, originalists should hesitate to adopt a view of an 
eighteenth-century provision that gives its preamble a sharply different legal effect 
from that given to its enacting or operative clause—which is arguably what Heller did 
with the Second Amendment.  Id. at 1317–37.  That is an interesting and thoughtful 
observation—though it is a leap to say it supports a “collective right” interpretation 
of the Second Amendment such as the one in Justice Stevens’s Heller dissent.  See id. 
at 1299, 1321.  Why not the hybrid view of the right, which combines a militia purpose 
with a personal guarantee against disarmament, thereby treating the Second 
Amendment “right of the people” in the same way the other rights of the people in 
the Bill of Rights have been treated?  See supra Part III.B.  The hybrid view is 
conspicuously absent from the arguments of many of Heller’s critics, even in contexts 
where it would seem to offer a powerful alternative. 
 In any event, the earlier article concedes that in the nineteenth century, the 
right to keep and bear arms was widely conceived as an individual right; it claims that 
this reflected a switch from the view of the Founding.  Konig, supra, at 1338 (“The 
need felt by nineteenth-century Americans to articulate what that right had 
become—an individual right—proves what that right had not been when ratified in 
1791.”). 
 If there was a switch, it must have occurred soon indeed after the ratification of 
the Bill of Rights.  Konig cites the work of Saul Cornell as having “moved th[e] 
change [from a collective to an individual right] back several decades [from 
Reconstruction] to the years after the War of 1812.”  Id.  In fact, the broad individual 
right is evident much earlier than that:  the prominent early constitutional 
commentator St. George Tucker employed the example of an individual’s carrying a 
gun for self-defense or hunting to illustrate the constitutional “bear[ing of] arms” in 
his Commentaries of 1803.  See supra text accompanying notes 258–266. 
 But if we take the “switch” thesis of Konig’s earlier article as true, then it makes 
it puzzling to read the claim, in Konig’s later article, that the Heller majority 
perniciously invoked an “invented tradition” that lacks a basis in reality.  See Konig, 
supra note 446, at 189.  After all, what is the switch asserted by Konig and Cornell, if it 
is not the emergence of an American tradition—not an “invented” one, but an actual 
one—that supports the holding in Heller? 
 449. See Konig, supra note 446, at 179 (arguing that Heller reflects an “invented 
tradition” of gun rights analogous to the invented tradition of racism in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV). 
 450. Scott, 60 U.S. at 417. 
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but used this conclusion as the basis for a supposed reductio ad 
absurdum argument that blacks, therefore, could never be American 
citizens.  Heller and McDonald, of course, reached a conclusion 
diametrically opposed to Scott’s holding:  they held that the individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense belongs to all Americans, 
regardless of race.  Indeed, the leitmotif of Justice Thomas’s 
McDonald concurrence is that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause (on his reading) completed the 
Reconstruction Republicans’ deliberate undoing of Scott, by 
guaranteeing both black and white Americans the privileges and 
immunities of American citizenship, including the right to bear 
arms.451  How does this affect the alleged parallel between Heller and 
Scott?  We are not told:  the author does not tell the reader what Scott 
said about race and the right to carry arms, or that Heller and 
McDonald categorically rejected that view. 
These omissions of relevant evidence, in the form of legal sources, 
are serious enough to vitiate the historical claims that depend upon 
those omissions.452  Criticism of Heller’s adherence to the technical 
tenets of 1791-focused, “original public meaning” originalism will 
continue,453 and may prove merited.  But if there is one thing the 
Heller Court demonstrably did not need to “invent” to bolster its 
holding, it is a supportive tradition in American history.  Rather, the 
Court found such a tradition, strongly in existence. 
C. For Courts 
Finally, it is incorrect to describe the individual right to bear arms 
for the purpose of self-defense as a novel or unexplored 
constitutional topic, a “vast terra incognita” in the words of one recent 
circuit opinion.454  Quite the contrary:  the right recognized in Heller 
                                                          
 451. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060, 3068, 3083 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 452. Cf. Mike Rappaport, History Office Law, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 27 2010, 
12:37 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2010/12/ 
recently-i-linked-to-this-op-ed-by-distinguished-historian-pauline-meier-the-piece-
defended-justice-breyers-comments-on-the.html (criticizing the lack of sophistication 
of some academic historians’ efforts to engage with the originalist arguments in 
Heller by stating “[h]istorians can complain all they want to about ‘law office history,’ 
but at least as big a problem in this area is ‘history office law’”). 
 453. See, e.g., Konig, supra note 446, at 178.  Such criticisms are not limited to 
opponents of the individual right to keep and bear arms.  See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The 
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343 (2009). 
 454. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (declining 
to decide whether the Second Amendment right exists outside the home), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 756 (2011); see also id. at 476 (opining that “[i]f ever there was an 
occasion for restraint, this would seem to be it”). 
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and McDonald has been recognized and applied by a vast number of 
state courts and other sources throughout the past two centuries.  
Courts that undertake this task have routinely concluded that the 
right protects the ability to carry handguns for self-defense outside 
the home.  Decisions confining the right to the home have been 
unusual outliers.  From the standpoint of judicial tradition, the real 
question to be addressed after Heller and McDonald is not whether the 
right to bear arms for self-defense applies outside the home; that is 
one of the right’s most firmly established features.  At most the 
debate should center upon how broadly Second Amendment carry 
rights extend:  do they follow the model of presumptive carry or non-
presumptive carry?  Either way, post-Heller lower court opinions that 
assert that the Supreme Court “defin[ed] the protected right to be to 
keep and bear arms in the home for the purpose of self-defense,”455 or 
that prohibitions on handgun carrying are “outside of the scope of 
the Second Amendment, as articulated in Heller and McDonald,”456 
reflect a serious misunderstanding of what Heller and McDonald said 
and did. 
It is particularly disturbing to note that post-Heller lower courts 
confining the Second Amendment to the walls of the home have not 
done so based on a reasoned consideration and rejection of the 
judicial tradition.  Instead, they have simply ignored it.  Recent 
decisions of the Maryland Court of Appeals457 and the Illinois 
Appellate Court458 have announced no-carry interpretations of the 
Second Amendment in opinions that (1) omit an analysis of 
                                                          
 455. People v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598, 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), appeal denied, 942 
N.E.2d 457 (Ill. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2880 (2011). 
 456. Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1178 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 93 
(2011). 
 457. Id.  The United States Supreme Court’s decision not to grant certiorari in 
Williams is likely explained by the procedural features of the case.  The defendant in 
Williams was convicted for carrying a handgun without a permit, but he had never 
attempted to apply for a handgun carrying permit under Maryland’s restrictive (non-
presumptive) permit issuance statute.  Id. at 1169.  Thus, the case presented a 
standing problem; Williams’s failure to seek a permit arguably foreclosed him from 
mounting a Second Amendment attack on Maryland’s permit issuance requirement.  
Cf. id. at 1169–70.  Similarly, the defendant in Dawson carried a firearm in 
conjunction with an illegal shooting where he opened fire on an occupied vehicle—
conduct prohibitable on any conception of the right to bear arms.  See supra note 
455. 
 458. People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), leave for appeal 
granted, 949 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2011); Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598.  The author is the 
principal writer of a brief amici curiae in the Aguilar case now before the Illinois 
Supreme Court.  The brief presents arguments congruent to the ones offered in this 
Article.  See generally Amended Brief for Amici Curiae Professors Nicholas J. Johnson, 
David B. Kopel, and Michael P. O’Shea in Support of Defendant-Appellant, People v. 
Aguilar, No. 112116 (Ill. Nov. 30, 2011). 
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historical evidence about the meaning of the Second or the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) do not examine pre-Heller state 
court decisions on the individual right to bear arms for self-defense—
not even the ones expressly relied upon in Heller.  That is an 
extraordinary, and in the end an intellectually unsound, way to 
respond to a pair of landmark decisions as saturated in history and 
tradition as were Heller and McDonald.459 
The Supreme Court has rendered two major holdings about the 
protection of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, 
not one.  First, the Court held that the right the Second Amendment 
protects is an “individual right to keep and bear arms for the purpose 
of self-defense”460—thus rejecting not only all variants of the collective 
rights view, but also rejecting the hybrid individual right.  That was 
holding, not dictum:  we know this both because a majority of the 
Court explicitly instructed lower courts that it was a holding in 
McDonald,461 and because it was the reason the District of Columbia’s 
ban on loaded firearms was struck down in Heller.462  The Court 
repeatedly likened the Second Amendment right to state 
constitutional rights that “secured an individual right to bear arms for 
defensive purposes,”463 and particularly to those that “enshrined a 
right of citizens to ‘bear arms in defense of themselves and the state’ 
or ‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state.’”464  The Court 
prominently relied upon early state court decisions involving 
defensive arms-bearing.465  It did not hold that the Second 
Amendment protected some sui generis alternative version of the 
defense-based right; rather, it emphasized that the right has 
analogues and antecedents in a larger American tradition.  This 
                                                          
 459. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
threshold inquiry in some Second Amendment cases will be a ‘scope’ question:  Is 
the restricted activity protected by the Second Amendment in the first place?  The 
answer requires a textual and historical inquiry into original meaning.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 460. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); id. at 3059 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (determining that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right with the “central component” of self-defense). 
 461. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (identifying this as a “holding” of the Court in Heller). 
 462. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (holding that the prohibition on loaded firearms 
“makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense and is hence unconstitutional”). 
 463. Id. at 602. 
 464. Id. at 584–85 (noting that nine state constitutional provisions from the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries adopted this formulation, and identifying 
it with a self-defense based right to bear arms). 
 465. Id. at 610–14; see supra Part III.A–B. 
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Article has sought to present that tradition, and the consistency with 
which it has recognized a right to carry outside the home.  The 
Second Amendment should be interpreted with the same scope. 
Second, the Court applied the right that it recognized to the 
particular set of facts before it.  It held the challenged laws (the 
District of Columbia’s handgun ban and the ban on defensive use of 
firearms in the home) to be violative of the right it recognized.  To 
consider this as evidence that the right’s scope is confined to the 
specific facts is a misunderstanding of how constitutional rights and 
their elaboration works. 
Courts concerned about the need for guidance in applying the 
Second Amendment can seek it, among other places, in the state 
court tradition interpreting the right to bear arms, as this Article has 
explicated.  If this body of precedent seems too large to navigate, 
courts may usefully simplify their inquiry by focusing upon the subset 
of right-to-arms cases that are the most relevant to the application of 
the Second Amendment as interpreted in Heller.  These are the 
decisions that:  (1) recognize an individual right to bear arms; (2) 
treat self-defense as a central purpose of the right; and (3) employ a 
meaningful standard of review, comparable to those that federal 
courts apply to fundamental rights,466 such as intermediate scrutiny, 
strict scrutiny, or a substantial burden-based criterion such as the 
“frustration of the right” standard.  In addition, (4) it may be 
appropriate to give particular weight to defense-based decisions from 
the antebellum period, since the Court’s originalist methodology in 
Heller and McDonald suggests that this period is especially relevant.  
When courts undertake this reasoned approach, they will find that 
the case law tradition does not leave them without guidance.  It 
supports applying the presumptive carry rights model to the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms. 
 
                                                          
 466. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 & n.27 (rejecting rational basis or “interest-
balancing” modes of scrutiny as incompatible with an express guarantee of the Bill of 
Rights). 
